Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1For at the very moment 1 08 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. of such consciousness knowledge exists ; or if it does not exist there can be no consciousness of the absence of knowledge. To explain. When I am conscious that I am non-knowing, is there or is there not apprehension of the Self as having non-existence of knowledge for its attribute, and of knowledge as the counterentity of non-knowledge ? In the former case there can be no consciousness of the absence of knowledge, for that would imply a contradiction. In the latter case, such consciousness can all the less exist, for it presupposes knowledge of that to which absence of knowledge belongs as an attribute (viz. the Self) and of its own counterentity, viz. knowledge. The same difficulty arises if we view the absence of knowledge as either the object of Inference, or as the object of the special means of proof called fabhava' (i. e. anupalabdhi). If, on the other hand, non-knowledge is viewed (not as a merely negative, but) as a positive entity, there arises no contradiction even if there is (as there is in fact) at the same time knowledge of the Self as qualified by non-knowledge, and of know- ledge as the counterentity of non-knowledge ; and we therefore must accept the conclusion that the state of consciousness expressed by ' I am non-knowing/ has for its object a non-knowledge which is a positive entity. — But, a Nescience which is a positive entity, contradicts the witnessing consciousness, whose nature consists in the lighting up of the truth of things! — Not so, we reply. Witnessing consciousness has for its object not the true nature of things, but Nescience ; for otherwise the lighting up (i.e. the consciousness) of false things could not take place. Knowledge which has for its object non-knowledge (Nesci- ence), does not put an end to that non-knowledge. Hence there is no contradiction (between ^aitanya and a^Tzana). — But, a new objection is raised, this positive entity, Nescience, becomes an object of witnessing Consciousness, only in so far as it (Nescience) is defined by some particular object (viz. the particular thing which is not known), and such objects depend for their proof on the different means of knowledge. How then can that Nescience, which is defined by the ' I ' (as expressed e. g. in the judgment, ' I do not I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. IO9
2the particular thing which is not known), and such objects depend for their proof on the different means of knowledge. How then can that Nescience, which is defined by the ' I ' (as expressed e. g. in the judgment, ' I do not I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. IO9 know myself), become the object of witnessing Conscious- ness ? — There is no difficulty here, we reply. All things whatsoever are objects of Consciousness, either as things known or as things not known. But while the mediation of the means of knowledge is required in the case of all those things which, as being non-intelligent (gada), can be proved only in so far as being objects known (through some means of knowledge), such mediation is not required in the case of the intelligent (agada) inner Self which proves itself. Consciousness of Nescience is thus possible in all cases (including the case ' I do not know myself'), since witnessing Consciousness always gives definition to Nes- cience.— From all this it follows that, through Perception confirmed by Reasoning, we apprehend Nescience as a positive entity. This Nescience, viewed as a positive entity, is also proved by Inference — viz. in the following form : All knowledge established by one of the different means of proof is preceded by something else, which is different from the mere antecedent non-existence of knowledge ; which hides the object of knowledge; which is terminated by knowledge ; and which exists in the same place as knowledge ; — because knowledge possesses the property of illumining things not illumined before ; — just as the light of a lamp lit in the dark illumines things. — Nor must you object to this inference on the ground that darkness is not a substance, but rather the mere absence of light, or else the absence of visual perception of form and colour, and that hence darkness cannot be brought forward as a similar instance proving Nescience to be a positive entity. For that Darkness must be considered a positive substance follows, firstly, from its being more or less dense, and secondly, from its being perceived as having colour. To all this we make the following reply. Neither Perception alone, nor Perception aided by Reasoning, reveals to us a positive entity, Nescience, as implied in judgments such as ' I am non-knowing,' ' I know neither myself nor others/ The contradiction which was urged above against the view of non-knowledge being the antecedent non- existence of knowledge, presents itself equally in connexion IIO VEDANTA-SUTR AS.
3with non-knowledge viewed as a positive entity. For here the following alternative presents itself — the inner Reality- is either known or not known as that which gives definition to Nescience by being either its object or its substrate. If it be thus known, then there is in it no room for Nescience which is said to be that which is put an end to by the cognition of the true nature of the Inner Reality. If, on the other hand, it be not thus known, how should there be a consciousness of Nescience in the absence of that which defines it, viz. knowledge of the substrate or of the object of Nescience? — Let it then be said that what is contradictory to non-knowledge is the clear presentation of the nature of the inner Self, and that (while there is consciousness of a^ana) we have only an obscure presenta- tion of the nature of the Self ; things being thus, there is no contradiction between the cognition of the substrate and object of Nescience on the one side, and the conscious- ness of ?Lgn&r\2L on the other. — Well, we reply, all this holds good on our side also. Even if a^Tzana means ante- cedent non-existence of knowledge, we can say that know- ledge of the substrate and object of non-knowledge has for its object the Self presented obscurely only ; and thus there is no difference between our views — unless you choose to be obstinate ! Whether we view non-knowledge as a positive entity or as the antecedent non-existence of knowledge, in either case it comes out as what the word indicates, viz. non- knowledge. Non-knowledge means either absence of knowledge, or that which is other than knowledge, or that which is contradictory to knowledge ; and in any of these cases we have to admit that non-knowledge pre- supposes the cognition of the nature of knowledge. Even though the cognition of the nature of darkness should not require the knowledge of the nature of light, yet when darkness is considered under the aspect of being contrary to light, this presupposes the cognition of light. And the non-knowledge held by you is never known in its own nature but merely as * non-knowledge,' and it therefore presupposes the cognition of knowledge no less than our I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. Ill view does, according to which non-knowledge is simply the negation of knowledge. Now antecedent non-existence of knowledge is admitted by you also, and is an undoubted object of consciousness ; the right conclusion therefore is that what we are conscious of in such judgments as c I am non-knowing,' &c., is this very antecedent non-existence of knowledge which we both admit.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1For at the very moment 1 08 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. of such consciousness knowledge exists ; or if it does not exist there can be no consciousness of the absence of knowledge. To explain. When I am conscious that I am non-knowing, is there or is there not apprehension of the Self as having non-existence of knowledge for its attribute, and of knowledge as the counterentity of non-knowledge ? In the former case there can be no consciousness of the absence of knowledge, for that would imply a contradiction. In the latter case, such consciousness can all the less exist, for it presupposes knowledge of that to which absence of knowledge belongs as an attribute (viz. the Self) and of its own counterentity, viz. knowledge. The same difficulty arises if we view the absence of knowledge as either the object of Inference, or as the object of the special means of proof called fabhava' (i. e. anupalabdhi). If, on the other hand, non-knowledge is viewed (not as a merely negative, but) as a positive entity, there arises no contradiction even if there is (as there is in fact) at the same time knowledge of the Self as qualified by non-knowledge, and of know- ledge as the counterentity of non-knowledge ; and we therefore must accept the conclusion that the state of consciousness expressed by ' I am non-knowing/ has for its object a non-knowledge which is a positive entity. — But, a Nescience which is a positive entity, contradicts the witnessing consciousness, whose nature consists in the lighting up of the truth of things! — Not so, we reply. Witnessing consciousness has for its object not the true nature of things, but Nescience ; for otherwise the lighting up (i.e. the consciousness) of false things could not take place. Knowledge which has for its object non-knowledge (Nesci- ence), does not put an end to that non-knowledge. Hence there is no contradiction (between ^aitanya and a^Tzana). — But, a new objection is raised, this positive entity, Nescience, becomes an object of witnessing Consciousness, only in so far as it (Nescience) is defined by some particular object (viz. the particular thing which is not known), and such objects depend for their proof on the different means of knowledge. How then can that Nescience, which is defined by the ' I ' (as expressed e. g. in the judgment, ' I do not I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. IO9
2the particular thing which is not known), and such objects depend for their proof on the different means of knowledge. How then can that Nescience, which is defined by the ' I ' (as expressed e. g. in the judgment, ' I do not I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. IO9 know myself), become the object of witnessing Conscious- ness ? — There is no difficulty here, we reply. All things whatsoever are objects of Consciousness, either as things known or as things not known. But while the mediation of the means of knowledge is required in the case of all those things which, as being non-intelligent (gada), can be proved only in so far as being objects known (through some means of knowledge), such mediation is not required in the case of the intelligent (agada) inner Self which proves itself. Consciousness of Nescience is thus possible in all cases (including the case ' I do not know myself'), since witnessing Consciousness always gives definition to Nes- cience.— From all this it follows that, through Perception confirmed by Reasoning, we apprehend Nescience as a positive entity. This Nescience, viewed as a positive entity, is also proved by Inference — viz. in the following form : All knowledge established by one of the different means of proof is preceded by something else, which is different from the mere antecedent non-existence of knowledge ; which hides the object of knowledge; which is terminated by knowledge ; and which exists in the same place as knowledge ; — because knowledge possesses the property of illumining things not illumined before ; — just as the light of a lamp lit in the dark illumines things. — Nor must you object to this inference on the ground that darkness is not a substance, but rather the mere absence of light, or else the absence of visual perception of form and colour, and that hence darkness cannot be brought forward as a similar instance proving Nescience to be a positive entity. For that Darkness must be considered a positive substance follows, firstly, from its being more or less dense, and secondly, from its being perceived as having colour. To all this we make the following reply. Neither Perception alone, nor Perception aided by Reasoning, reveals to us a positive entity, Nescience, as implied in judgments such as ' I am non-knowing,' ' I know neither myself nor others/ The contradiction which was urged above against the view of non-knowledge being the antecedent non- existence of knowledge, presents itself equally in connexion IIO VEDANTA-SUTR AS.
3with non-knowledge viewed as a positive entity. For here the following alternative presents itself — the inner Reality- is either known or not known as that which gives definition to Nescience by being either its object or its substrate. If it be thus known, then there is in it no room for Nescience which is said to be that which is put an end to by the cognition of the true nature of the Inner Reality. If, on the other hand, it be not thus known, how should there be a consciousness of Nescience in the absence of that which defines it, viz. knowledge of the substrate or of the object of Nescience? — Let it then be said that what is contradictory to non-knowledge is the clear presentation of the nature of the inner Self, and that (while there is consciousness of a^ana) we have only an obscure presenta- tion of the nature of the Self ; things being thus, there is no contradiction between the cognition of the substrate and object of Nescience on the one side, and the conscious- ness of ?Lgn&r\2L on the other. — Well, we reply, all this holds good on our side also. Even if a^Tzana means ante- cedent non-existence of knowledge, we can say that know- ledge of the substrate and object of non-knowledge has for its object the Self presented obscurely only ; and thus there is no difference between our views — unless you choose to be obstinate ! Whether we view non-knowledge as a positive entity or as the antecedent non-existence of knowledge, in either case it comes out as what the word indicates, viz. non- knowledge. Non-knowledge means either absence of knowledge, or that which is other than knowledge, or that which is contradictory to knowledge ; and in any of these cases we have to admit that non-knowledge pre- supposes the cognition of the nature of knowledge. Even though the cognition of the nature of darkness should not require the knowledge of the nature of light, yet when darkness is considered under the aspect of being contrary to light, this presupposes the cognition of light. And the non-knowledge held by you is never known in its own nature but merely as * non-knowledge,' and it therefore presupposes the cognition of knowledge no less than our I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. Ill view does, according to which non-knowledge is simply the negation of knowledge. Now antecedent non-existence of knowledge is admitted by you also, and is an undoubted object of consciousness ; the right conclusion therefore is that what we are conscious of in such judgments as c I am non-knowing,' &c., is this very antecedent non-existence of knowledge which we both admit.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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