Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1You further asserted that, on the theory of many really different Selfs, it would follow from the infinity of the past aeons that all souls must have been released before this, Gg2 452 ved anta-s6tr as. none being left in the state of bondage ; and that hence the actually observed distinction of souls bound and released remains unexplained. But this argumentation is refuted by the fact of the souls also being infinite. You indeed maintained that, if the souls are really separate, they must necessarily have a definite number like beans, mustard- seeds, earthen vessels, and so on ; but these instances are beside the point, as earthen vessels, and so on, are also infinite in number. — But do we not actually see that all these things have definite numbers, ' Here are ten jars ; a thousand beans/ &c. ? — True, but those numbers do not belong to the essential nature of jars, and so on, but only to jars in so far as connected with time, place, and other limiting adjuncts. And that souls also have definite numbers in this sense, we readily admit. And from this it does not follow that all souls should be released ; for essentially the souls are infinite (in number). — Nor are you entitled to maintain that the real separation of indi- vidual souls would imply that, as earthen vessels and the like, they are non-intelligent, not of the nature of Self, and perishable. For the circumstance of individuals of one species being distinct from each other, does in no way imply that they possess the characteristics of things belonging to another species: the individual separation of jars does not imply their having the characteristics of pieces of cloth. — You further maintain that from the hypothesis of a real plurality of souls it follows that Brahman is substantially limited, and in consequence of this limited with regard to time and space also, and that hence its infinity is disproved. But this also is a mistaken conclusion. Things substantially limited may be limited more or less with regard to time and place : there is no invariable rule on this point, and the measure of their connexion with space and time has hence to be determined in dependence on other means of knowledge. Now Brahman's connexion with all space and all time results from such other means of proof, and hence there is no contradiction (between this non-limitation with regard to space and time, and its limitation in point of substance — II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 453
2Now Brahman's connexion with all space and all time results from such other means of proof, and hence there is no contradiction (between this non-limitation with regard to space and time, and its limitation in point of substance — II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 453 which is due to the existence of other souls). — But mere substantial limitation, as meaning the absence of non- limitation of any kind, by itself proves that Brahman is not infinite! — Well, then you yourself are in no better case ; for you admit that Brahman is something different from avidya. From this admission it follows that Brahman also is something ' different,' and thus all the disadvantages connected with the view of difference cling to your theory as well. If on the other hand it should not be allowed that Brahman differs in nature from avidya, then Brahman's nature itself is constituted by avidya, and the text defining Brahman as ' the True, knowledge, infinite ' is contrary to sense. — If the reality of ' difference ' is not admitted, then there is no longer any distinction between the proofs and the mutual objections set forth by the advocates of different theories, and we are landed in general confusion. The proof of infinity, we further remark, rests altogether on the absence of limitation of space and time, not on absence of substantial limitation ; absence of such limitation is some- thing very much akin to the 'horn of a hare' and is perceived nowhere. On the view of difference, on the other hand, the whole world, as constituting Brahman's body, is its mode, and Brahman is thus limited neither through itself nor through other things. — We thus arrive at the conclusion that, as effects are real in so far as different from their cause, the effect of Brahman, i.e. the entire world, is different from Brahman. Against this view the Sutra now declares itself as follows. — The non-difference of the world from Brahman, the highest cause, follows from * what begins with the word arambhana' — which proves such non- difference ; 'what begins with the word arambhana' means those clauses at the head of which that word is met with, viz. ' va^aram- bhanaw vikaro namadheya/^ mr/ttikety eva satyam ' ; ' Being only this was in the beginning, one only, without a second ' ; ' it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth ; it sent forth fire ' ; ' having entered with this living Self ' ; ' In the True, my son, all these creatures have their root, in the True they dwell, in the True they rest ' ; ' In that all 454 VEDANTA-Sti TR AS.
3that exists has its Self; it is the True, it is the Self; and thou art it, O Svetaketu ' (Kk. Up. VI, 1-8) — it is these clauses and others of similar purport which are met with in other chapters, that the Sutra refers to. For these texts prove the non-difference from Brahman of the world consisting of non-sentient and sentient beings. This is as follows. The teacher, bearing in his mind the idea of Brahman constituting the sole cause of the entire world and of the non-difference of the effect from the cause, asks the pupil, ' Have you ever asked for that instruction by which the non-heard is heard, the non-perceived is per- ceived, the not known is known ' ; wherein there is implied the promise that, through the knowledge of Brahman the general cause, its effect, i. e. the whole Universe, will be known ? The pupil, not knowing that Brahman is the sole cause of the Universe, raises a doubt as to the possibility of one thing being known through another, ' How then, Sir, is that instruction ? ' and the teacher thereupon, in order to convey the notion of Brahman being the sole universal cause, quotes an instance showing that the non-difference of the effect from the cause is proved by ordinary experi- ence, ' As by one clod of clay there is known everything that is made of clay'; the meaning being 'as jars, pots, and the like, which are fashioned out of one piece of clay, are known through the cognition of that clay, since their substance is not different from it.' In order to meet the objection that according to Ka^ada's • doctrine the effect constitutes a substance different from the cause, the teacher next proceeds to prove the non-difference of the effect from the cause by reference to ordinary experience, 'vaMram- bhana^ vikaro namadheya/^ mrzttikety eva satyam.' Arambhanam must here be explained as that which is taken or touched (a-rabh = a-labh ; and 'alambha^ sparja- hiwsayo^') ; compare Pacini III, 3, 113, as to the form and meaning of the word. ' Va£a/ ' on account of speech/ we take to mean ' on account of activity preceded by speech ' ; for activities such as the fetching of water in a pitcher are preceded by speech, ' Fetch water in the pitcher/ and so on. For the bringing about of such activity, the material clay II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I 5. 455
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1You further asserted that, on the theory of many really different Selfs, it would follow from the infinity of the past aeons that all souls must have been released before this, Gg2 452 ved anta-s6tr as. none being left in the state of bondage ; and that hence the actually observed distinction of souls bound and released remains unexplained. But this argumentation is refuted by the fact of the souls also being infinite. You indeed maintained that, if the souls are really separate, they must necessarily have a definite number like beans, mustard- seeds, earthen vessels, and so on ; but these instances are beside the point, as earthen vessels, and so on, are also infinite in number. — But do we not actually see that all these things have definite numbers, ' Here are ten jars ; a thousand beans/ &c. ? — True, but those numbers do not belong to the essential nature of jars, and so on, but only to jars in so far as connected with time, place, and other limiting adjuncts. And that souls also have definite numbers in this sense, we readily admit. And from this it does not follow that all souls should be released ; for essentially the souls are infinite (in number). — Nor are you entitled to maintain that the real separation of indi- vidual souls would imply that, as earthen vessels and the like, they are non-intelligent, not of the nature of Self, and perishable. For the circumstance of individuals of one species being distinct from each other, does in no way imply that they possess the characteristics of things belonging to another species: the individual separation of jars does not imply their having the characteristics of pieces of cloth. — You further maintain that from the hypothesis of a real plurality of souls it follows that Brahman is substantially limited, and in consequence of this limited with regard to time and space also, and that hence its infinity is disproved. But this also is a mistaken conclusion. Things substantially limited may be limited more or less with regard to time and place : there is no invariable rule on this point, and the measure of their connexion with space and time has hence to be determined in dependence on other means of knowledge. Now Brahman's connexion with all space and all time results from such other means of proof, and hence there is no contradiction (between this non-limitation with regard to space and time, and its limitation in point of substance — II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 453
2Now Brahman's connexion with all space and all time results from such other means of proof, and hence there is no contradiction (between this non-limitation with regard to space and time, and its limitation in point of substance — II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 453 which is due to the existence of other souls). — But mere substantial limitation, as meaning the absence of non- limitation of any kind, by itself proves that Brahman is not infinite! — Well, then you yourself are in no better case ; for you admit that Brahman is something different from avidya. From this admission it follows that Brahman also is something ' different,' and thus all the disadvantages connected with the view of difference cling to your theory as well. If on the other hand it should not be allowed that Brahman differs in nature from avidya, then Brahman's nature itself is constituted by avidya, and the text defining Brahman as ' the True, knowledge, infinite ' is contrary to sense. — If the reality of ' difference ' is not admitted, then there is no longer any distinction between the proofs and the mutual objections set forth by the advocates of different theories, and we are landed in general confusion. The proof of infinity, we further remark, rests altogether on the absence of limitation of space and time, not on absence of substantial limitation ; absence of such limitation is some- thing very much akin to the 'horn of a hare' and is perceived nowhere. On the view of difference, on the other hand, the whole world, as constituting Brahman's body, is its mode, and Brahman is thus limited neither through itself nor through other things. — We thus arrive at the conclusion that, as effects are real in so far as different from their cause, the effect of Brahman, i.e. the entire world, is different from Brahman. Against this view the Sutra now declares itself as follows. — The non-difference of the world from Brahman, the highest cause, follows from * what begins with the word arambhana' — which proves such non- difference ; 'what begins with the word arambhana' means those clauses at the head of which that word is met with, viz. ' va^aram- bhanaw vikaro namadheya/^ mr/ttikety eva satyam ' ; ' Being only this was in the beginning, one only, without a second ' ; ' it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth ; it sent forth fire ' ; ' having entered with this living Self ' ; ' In the True, my son, all these creatures have their root, in the True they dwell, in the True they rest ' ; ' In that all 454 VEDANTA-Sti TR AS.
3that exists has its Self; it is the True, it is the Self; and thou art it, O Svetaketu ' (Kk. Up. VI, 1-8) — it is these clauses and others of similar purport which are met with in other chapters, that the Sutra refers to. For these texts prove the non-difference from Brahman of the world consisting of non-sentient and sentient beings. This is as follows. The teacher, bearing in his mind the idea of Brahman constituting the sole cause of the entire world and of the non-difference of the effect from the cause, asks the pupil, ' Have you ever asked for that instruction by which the non-heard is heard, the non-perceived is per- ceived, the not known is known ' ; wherein there is implied the promise that, through the knowledge of Brahman the general cause, its effect, i. e. the whole Universe, will be known ? The pupil, not knowing that Brahman is the sole cause of the Universe, raises a doubt as to the possibility of one thing being known through another, ' How then, Sir, is that instruction ? ' and the teacher thereupon, in order to convey the notion of Brahman being the sole universal cause, quotes an instance showing that the non-difference of the effect from the cause is proved by ordinary experi- ence, ' As by one clod of clay there is known everything that is made of clay'; the meaning being 'as jars, pots, and the like, which are fashioned out of one piece of clay, are known through the cognition of that clay, since their substance is not different from it.' In order to meet the objection that according to Ka^ada's • doctrine the effect constitutes a substance different from the cause, the teacher next proceeds to prove the non-difference of the effect from the cause by reference to ordinary experience, 'vaMram- bhana^ vikaro namadheya/^ mrzttikety eva satyam.' Arambhanam must here be explained as that which is taken or touched (a-rabh = a-labh ; and 'alambha^ sparja- hiwsayo^') ; compare Pacini III, 3, 113, as to the form and meaning of the word. ' Va£a/ ' on account of speech/ we take to mean ' on account of activity preceded by speech ' ; for activities such as the fetching of water in a pitcher are preceded by speech, ' Fetch water in the pitcher/ and so on. For the bringing about of such activity, the material clay II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I 5. 455
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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