Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1We then have to decide what, in the case under discussion (i. e. the alleged injunction set forth by the antagonist), constitutes the qualification of the person to whom the injunction addresses I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. I 77 itself, and whether it be of the nature of a cause or of a result. — Let it then be said that what constitutes the qualification in our case is the intuition of the true nature of Brahman (on the part of the person to whom the injunction is addressed). — This, we rejoin, cannot be a cause, as it is not something previously established ; while in other cases the nimitta is something so established, as e.g. 'life' is in the case of a person to whom the following injunction is addressed, 'As long as his life lasts he is to make the Agnihotra-oblation., And if, after all, it were admitted to be a cause, it would follow that, as the intuition of the true nature of Brahman is something permanent, the object of the injunction would have to be accomplished even subsequently to final release, in the same way as the Agnihotra has to be performed per- manently as long as life lasts. — Nor again can the intuition of Brahman's true nature be a result ; for then, being the result of an action enjoined, it would be something non- permanent, like the heavenly world. — What, in the next place, would be the ' object to be accomplished ' of the injunction? You may not reply 'Brahman'; for as Brahman is something permanent it is not something that can be realised, and moreover it is not denoted by a verbal form (such as denote actions that can be accom- plished, as e.g. yaga, sacrifice). — Let it then be said that what is to be realised is Brahman, in so far as free from the world ! — But, we rejoin, even if this be accepted as a thing to be realised, it is not the object (vishaya) of the injunc- tion— that it cannot be for the second reason just stated — but its final result (phala). What moreover is, on this last assumption, the thing to be realised- — Brahman, or the cessation of the apparent world? — Not Brahman; for Brahman is something accomplished, and from your assumption it would follow that it is not eternal. — -Well then, the dissolution of the world ! — Not so, we reply ; for then it would not be Brahman that is realised. — Let it then be said that the dissolution of the world only is the object of the injunction ! — This, too, cannot be, we rejoin ; that dissolution is the result (phala) and cannot therefore be the [48] N 1 78 vedanta-sOtras.
2— Not so, we reply ; for then it would not be Brahman that is realised. — Let it then be said that the dissolution of the world only is the object of the injunction ! — This, too, cannot be, we rejoin ; that dissolution is the result (phala) and cannot therefore be the [48] N 1 78 vedanta-sOtras. object of the injunction. For the dissolution of the world means final release; and that is the result aimed at. Moreover, if the dissolution of the world is taken as the object of the injunction, that dissolution would follow from the injunction, and the injunction would be carried out by the dissolution of the world ; and this would be a case of vicious mutual dependence. — We further ask — is the world, which is to be put an end to, false or real ? — If it is false, it is put an end to by knowledge alone, and then the injunction is needless. Should you reply to this that the injunction puts an end to the world in so far as it gives rise to knowledge, we reply that knowledge springs of itself from the texts which declare the highest truth : hence there is no need of additional injunctions. As knowledge of the meaning of those texts sublates the entire false world distinct from Brahman, the injunction itself with all its adjuncts is seen to be something baseless. — If, on the other hand, the world is true, we ask — is the injunction, which puts an end to the world, Brahman itself or some- thing different from Brahman ? If the former, the world cannot exist at all : for what terminates it, viz. Brahman, is something eternal ; and the injunction thus being eternal itself cannot be accomplished by means of certain actions. — - Let then the latter alternative be accepted ! — But in that case, the niyoga being something which is accomplished by a set of performances the function of which it is to put an end to the entire world, the performing person himself perishes (with the rest of the world), and the niyoga thus remains without a substrate. And if everything apart from Brahman is put an end to by a performance the function of which it is to put an end to the world, there remains no result to be effected by the niyoga, consequently there is no release. Further, the dissolution of the world cannot constitute the instrument (kara/za) in the action enjoined, because no mode of procedure (itikartavyata) can be assigned for the instrument of the niyoga, and unless assisted by a mode of procedure an instrument cannot operate. — But why is there no 'mode of procedure'? — for the following reasons. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. I 79
3— But why is there no 'mode of procedure'? — for the following reasons. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. I 79 A mode of procedure is either of a positive or a negative kind. If positive, it may be of two kinds, viz. either such as to bring about the instrument or to assist it. Now in our case there is no room for either of these alternatives. Not for the former ; for there exists in our case nothing analogous to the stroke of the pestle (which has the manifest effect of separating the rice grains from the husks), whereby the visible effect of the dissolution of the whole world could be brought about. Nor, secondly, is there the possibility of anything assisting the instrument, already existing independently, to bring about its effect ; for owing to the existence of such an assisting factor the instrument itself, i. e. the cessation of the apparent world, cannot be established. Nor must you say that it is the cognition of the non-duality of Brahman that brings about the means for the dissolution of the world ; for, as we have already explained above, this cognition directly brings about final Release, which is the same as the dissolution of the world, and thus there is nothing left to be effected by special means. — And if finally the mode of procedure is something purely negative, it can, owing to this its nature, neither bring about nor in any way assist the instrumental cause. From all this it follows that there is no possibility of injunctions having for their object the realisation of Brahman, in so far as free from the world. Here another prima facie view of the question is set forth. — It must be admitted that the Vedanta-texts are not means of authoritative knowledge, since they refer to Brahman, which is an accomplished thing (not a thing ' to be accomplished'); nevertheless Brahman itself is esta- blished, viz. by means of those passages which enjoin meditation (as something ' to be done '). This is the pur- port of texts such as the following : ' The Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated upon ' (Brz. Up. II, 4, 5) ; 'The Self which is free from sin must be searched out' (Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Let a man medi- tate upon him as the Self (Brt. Up. I, 4, 7); ' Let a man meditate upon the Self as his world' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 15). — - These injunctions have meditation for their object, and N 2 1 80 VEDANTA-sfiTRAS.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1We then have to decide what, in the case under discussion (i. e. the alleged injunction set forth by the antagonist), constitutes the qualification of the person to whom the injunction addresses I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. I 77 itself, and whether it be of the nature of a cause or of a result. — Let it then be said that what constitutes the qualification in our case is the intuition of the true nature of Brahman (on the part of the person to whom the injunction is addressed). — This, we rejoin, cannot be a cause, as it is not something previously established ; while in other cases the nimitta is something so established, as e.g. 'life' is in the case of a person to whom the following injunction is addressed, 'As long as his life lasts he is to make the Agnihotra-oblation., And if, after all, it were admitted to be a cause, it would follow that, as the intuition of the true nature of Brahman is something permanent, the object of the injunction would have to be accomplished even subsequently to final release, in the same way as the Agnihotra has to be performed per- manently as long as life lasts. — Nor again can the intuition of Brahman's true nature be a result ; for then, being the result of an action enjoined, it would be something non- permanent, like the heavenly world. — What, in the next place, would be the ' object to be accomplished ' of the injunction? You may not reply 'Brahman'; for as Brahman is something permanent it is not something that can be realised, and moreover it is not denoted by a verbal form (such as denote actions that can be accom- plished, as e.g. yaga, sacrifice). — Let it then be said that what is to be realised is Brahman, in so far as free from the world ! — But, we rejoin, even if this be accepted as a thing to be realised, it is not the object (vishaya) of the injunc- tion— that it cannot be for the second reason just stated — but its final result (phala). What moreover is, on this last assumption, the thing to be realised- — Brahman, or the cessation of the apparent world? — Not Brahman; for Brahman is something accomplished, and from your assumption it would follow that it is not eternal. — -Well then, the dissolution of the world ! — Not so, we reply ; for then it would not be Brahman that is realised. — Let it then be said that the dissolution of the world only is the object of the injunction ! — This, too, cannot be, we rejoin ; that dissolution is the result (phala) and cannot therefore be the [48] N 1 78 vedanta-sOtras.
2— Not so, we reply ; for then it would not be Brahman that is realised. — Let it then be said that the dissolution of the world only is the object of the injunction ! — This, too, cannot be, we rejoin ; that dissolution is the result (phala) and cannot therefore be the [48] N 1 78 vedanta-sOtras. object of the injunction. For the dissolution of the world means final release; and that is the result aimed at. Moreover, if the dissolution of the world is taken as the object of the injunction, that dissolution would follow from the injunction, and the injunction would be carried out by the dissolution of the world ; and this would be a case of vicious mutual dependence. — We further ask — is the world, which is to be put an end to, false or real ? — If it is false, it is put an end to by knowledge alone, and then the injunction is needless. Should you reply to this that the injunction puts an end to the world in so far as it gives rise to knowledge, we reply that knowledge springs of itself from the texts which declare the highest truth : hence there is no need of additional injunctions. As knowledge of the meaning of those texts sublates the entire false world distinct from Brahman, the injunction itself with all its adjuncts is seen to be something baseless. — If, on the other hand, the world is true, we ask — is the injunction, which puts an end to the world, Brahman itself or some- thing different from Brahman ? If the former, the world cannot exist at all : for what terminates it, viz. Brahman, is something eternal ; and the injunction thus being eternal itself cannot be accomplished by means of certain actions. — - Let then the latter alternative be accepted ! — But in that case, the niyoga being something which is accomplished by a set of performances the function of which it is to put an end to the entire world, the performing person himself perishes (with the rest of the world), and the niyoga thus remains without a substrate. And if everything apart from Brahman is put an end to by a performance the function of which it is to put an end to the world, there remains no result to be effected by the niyoga, consequently there is no release. Further, the dissolution of the world cannot constitute the instrument (kara/za) in the action enjoined, because no mode of procedure (itikartavyata) can be assigned for the instrument of the niyoga, and unless assisted by a mode of procedure an instrument cannot operate. — But why is there no 'mode of procedure'? — for the following reasons. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. I 79
3— But why is there no 'mode of procedure'? — for the following reasons. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. I 79 A mode of procedure is either of a positive or a negative kind. If positive, it may be of two kinds, viz. either such as to bring about the instrument or to assist it. Now in our case there is no room for either of these alternatives. Not for the former ; for there exists in our case nothing analogous to the stroke of the pestle (which has the manifest effect of separating the rice grains from the husks), whereby the visible effect of the dissolution of the whole world could be brought about. Nor, secondly, is there the possibility of anything assisting the instrument, already existing independently, to bring about its effect ; for owing to the existence of such an assisting factor the instrument itself, i. e. the cessation of the apparent world, cannot be established. Nor must you say that it is the cognition of the non-duality of Brahman that brings about the means for the dissolution of the world ; for, as we have already explained above, this cognition directly brings about final Release, which is the same as the dissolution of the world, and thus there is nothing left to be effected by special means. — And if finally the mode of procedure is something purely negative, it can, owing to this its nature, neither bring about nor in any way assist the instrumental cause. From all this it follows that there is no possibility of injunctions having for their object the realisation of Brahman, in so far as free from the world. Here another prima facie view of the question is set forth. — It must be admitted that the Vedanta-texts are not means of authoritative knowledge, since they refer to Brahman, which is an accomplished thing (not a thing ' to be accomplished'); nevertheless Brahman itself is esta- blished, viz. by means of those passages which enjoin meditation (as something ' to be done '). This is the pur- port of texts such as the following : ' The Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated upon ' (Brz. Up. II, 4, 5) ; 'The Self which is free from sin must be searched out' (Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Let a man medi- tate upon him as the Self (Brt. Up. I, 4, 7); ' Let a man meditate upon the Self as his world' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 15). — - These injunctions have meditation for their object, and N 2 1 80 VEDANTA-sfiTRAS.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
No commentary for this page.