Fetching
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Fetching
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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1For otherwise it would follow that to subdue and chastise one's enemies is something to be blamed. What the Lord himself aims at is ever to increase happiness to the highest degree, and to this end it is instrumental that II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 5. 489 he should reprove and reject the infinite and intolerable mass of sins which accumulates in the course of beginning and endless aeons, and thus check the tendency on the part of individual beings to transgress his laws. For thus he says : * To them ever devoted, worshipping me in love, I give that means of wisdom by which they attain to me. In mercy only to them, dwelling in their hearts, do I destroy the darkness born of ignorance with the brilliant light of know- ledge* (Bha. Gi. X, 10, 11). — It thus remains a settled conclusion that the Pradhana, which is not guided by an intelligent principle, cannot be the general cause. — Here a further objection is raised. Although Prakrzti, as not being ruled by an intelligent principle, is not capable of that kind of activity which springs from effort, she may yet be capable of that kind of activity which consists in mere transformation. For we observe parallel cases ; the grass and water e. g. which are consumed by a cow change on their own account into milk. In the same way, then, Pra- krzti may on her own account transform herself into the world. — To this the next Sutra replies. 4. Nor like grass and so on ; because (milk) does not exist elsewhere. This argumentation does not hold good ; for as grass and the like do not transform themselves without the guidance of an intelligent principle, your proving instance is not established. — But why is it not established? — i Because it does not exist elsewhere/ If grass, water and so on changed into milk even when consumed by a bull or when not consumed at all, then indeed it might be held that they change without the guidance of an intelligent principle. But nothing of the kind takes place, and hence we conclude that it is the intelligent principle only which turns the grass eaten by the cow into milk. — This point has been set forth above under Sutra 3 ; the present Sutra is meant to emphasise and particularise it. 5. And if you say — as the man and the stone ; thus also. 490 vedanta-s£tras.
2— This point has been set forth above under Sutra 3 ; the present Sutra is meant to emphasise and particularise it. 5. And if you say — as the man and the stone ; thus also. 490 vedanta-s£tras. Here the following view might be urged. Although the soul consists of mere intelligence and is inactive, while the Pradhana is destitute of all power of thought ; yet the non- sentient Pradhana may begin to act owing to the mere nearness of the soul. For we observe parallel instances. A man blind but capable of motion may act in some way, owing to the nearness to him of some lame man who has no power of motion but possesses good eyesight and assists the blind man with his intelligence. And through the nearness of the magnetic stone iron moves. In the same way the creation of the world may result from the con- nexion of Prakr/ti and the souL As has been said, * In order that the soul may know the Pradhana and become isolated, the connexion of the two takes place like that of the lame and the blind ; and thence creation springs ' (Sankhya Ka. 21). This means — to the end that the soul may experience the Pradhana, and for the sake of the soul's emancipation, the Pradhana enters on action at the beginning of creation, owing to the nearness of the soul. To this the Sutra replies ' thus also/ This means — the inability of the Pradhana to act remains the same, in spite of these instances. The lame man is indeed incapable of walking, but he possesses various other powers — he can see the road and give instructions regarding it ; and the blind man, being an intelligent being, understands those instruc- tions and directs his steps accordingly. The magnet again possesses the attribute of moving towards the iron and so on. The soul on the other hand, which is absolutely inactive, is incapable of all such changes. As, moreover, the mere nearness of the soul to the Pradhana is something eternal, it would follow that the creation also is eternal. If, on the other hand, the soul is held to be eternally free, then there can be no bondage and no release. 6. And on account of the impossibility of the relation of principal (and subordinate) matter. You Sankhyas maintain that the origination of the world results from a certain relation between principal and sub- ordinate entities which depends on the relative inferiority II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 8. 49 1 and superiority of the gu?zas — £ according to the difference of the abodes of the several gu/zas ' (Sankhya Ka. I, 16). But, as in the pralaya state the three gu^as are in a state of equipoise, none of them being superior or inferior to the others, that relation of superiority and subordination can- not then exist, and hence the world cannot originate. Should it, on the other hand, be maintained that even in the pralaya state there is a certain inequality, it would follow therefrom that creation is eternal.
3Should it, on the other hand, be maintained that even in the pralaya state there is a certain inequality, it would follow therefrom that creation is eternal. 7. And if another inference be made (the result remains unchanged), on account of (the Pradhana) being destitute of the power of a knowing subject. Even if the Pradh&na were inferred by some reasoning different from the arguments so far refuted by us, our ob- jections would remain in force because, anyhow, the Pra- dhana is devoid of the power of a cognising subject. The Pradhana thus cannot be established by any mode of inference. 8. And even if it be admitted ; on account of the absence of a purpose. Even if it were admitted that the Pradhana is established by Inference, the Sankhya theory could not be accepted for the reason that the Pradhana is without a purpose. For, according to the view expressed in the passage, * In order that the soul may know the Pradhana and become isolated ' (Sinkhya Ka. I, 21), the purpose of the Pradhana is fruition and final release on the part of the soul ; but both these are impossible. For, as the soul consists of pure intelligence, is inactive, changeless, and spotless, and hence eternally emancipated, it is capable neither of fruition which consists in consciousness of Prakrzti, nor of Release which consists in separation from Prakrzti. If, on the other hand, it be held that the soul constituted as described is, owing to the mere nearness of Prakrzti, capable of fruition, i.e. of being conscious of pleasure and pain, which are special modifica- tions of Prakrzti, it follows that, as Prakrzti is ever near, the soul will never accomplish emancipation. 49 2 VEDANTA-SUTR AS. 9. And (it is) objectionable on account of the contradictions.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1For otherwise it would follow that to subdue and chastise one's enemies is something to be blamed. What the Lord himself aims at is ever to increase happiness to the highest degree, and to this end it is instrumental that II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 5. 489 he should reprove and reject the infinite and intolerable mass of sins which accumulates in the course of beginning and endless aeons, and thus check the tendency on the part of individual beings to transgress his laws. For thus he says : * To them ever devoted, worshipping me in love, I give that means of wisdom by which they attain to me. In mercy only to them, dwelling in their hearts, do I destroy the darkness born of ignorance with the brilliant light of know- ledge* (Bha. Gi. X, 10, 11). — It thus remains a settled conclusion that the Pradhana, which is not guided by an intelligent principle, cannot be the general cause. — Here a further objection is raised. Although Prakrzti, as not being ruled by an intelligent principle, is not capable of that kind of activity which springs from effort, she may yet be capable of that kind of activity which consists in mere transformation. For we observe parallel cases ; the grass and water e. g. which are consumed by a cow change on their own account into milk. In the same way, then, Pra- krzti may on her own account transform herself into the world. — To this the next Sutra replies. 4. Nor like grass and so on ; because (milk) does not exist elsewhere. This argumentation does not hold good ; for as grass and the like do not transform themselves without the guidance of an intelligent principle, your proving instance is not established. — But why is it not established? — i Because it does not exist elsewhere/ If grass, water and so on changed into milk even when consumed by a bull or when not consumed at all, then indeed it might be held that they change without the guidance of an intelligent principle. But nothing of the kind takes place, and hence we conclude that it is the intelligent principle only which turns the grass eaten by the cow into milk. — This point has been set forth above under Sutra 3 ; the present Sutra is meant to emphasise and particularise it. 5. And if you say — as the man and the stone ; thus also. 490 vedanta-s£tras.
2— This point has been set forth above under Sutra 3 ; the present Sutra is meant to emphasise and particularise it. 5. And if you say — as the man and the stone ; thus also. 490 vedanta-s£tras. Here the following view might be urged. Although the soul consists of mere intelligence and is inactive, while the Pradhana is destitute of all power of thought ; yet the non- sentient Pradhana may begin to act owing to the mere nearness of the soul. For we observe parallel instances. A man blind but capable of motion may act in some way, owing to the nearness to him of some lame man who has no power of motion but possesses good eyesight and assists the blind man with his intelligence. And through the nearness of the magnetic stone iron moves. In the same way the creation of the world may result from the con- nexion of Prakr/ti and the souL As has been said, * In order that the soul may know the Pradhana and become isolated, the connexion of the two takes place like that of the lame and the blind ; and thence creation springs ' (Sankhya Ka. 21). This means — to the end that the soul may experience the Pradhana, and for the sake of the soul's emancipation, the Pradhana enters on action at the beginning of creation, owing to the nearness of the soul. To this the Sutra replies ' thus also/ This means — the inability of the Pradhana to act remains the same, in spite of these instances. The lame man is indeed incapable of walking, but he possesses various other powers — he can see the road and give instructions regarding it ; and the blind man, being an intelligent being, understands those instruc- tions and directs his steps accordingly. The magnet again possesses the attribute of moving towards the iron and so on. The soul on the other hand, which is absolutely inactive, is incapable of all such changes. As, moreover, the mere nearness of the soul to the Pradhana is something eternal, it would follow that the creation also is eternal. If, on the other hand, the soul is held to be eternally free, then there can be no bondage and no release. 6. And on account of the impossibility of the relation of principal (and subordinate) matter. You Sankhyas maintain that the origination of the world results from a certain relation between principal and sub- ordinate entities which depends on the relative inferiority II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 8. 49 1 and superiority of the gu?zas — £ according to the difference of the abodes of the several gu/zas ' (Sankhya Ka. I, 16). But, as in the pralaya state the three gu^as are in a state of equipoise, none of them being superior or inferior to the others, that relation of superiority and subordination can- not then exist, and hence the world cannot originate. Should it, on the other hand, be maintained that even in the pralaya state there is a certain inequality, it would follow therefrom that creation is eternal.
3Should it, on the other hand, be maintained that even in the pralaya state there is a certain inequality, it would follow therefrom that creation is eternal. 7. And if another inference be made (the result remains unchanged), on account of (the Pradhana) being destitute of the power of a knowing subject. Even if the Pradh&na were inferred by some reasoning different from the arguments so far refuted by us, our ob- jections would remain in force because, anyhow, the Pra- dhana is devoid of the power of a cognising subject. The Pradhana thus cannot be established by any mode of inference. 8. And even if it be admitted ; on account of the absence of a purpose. Even if it were admitted that the Pradhana is established by Inference, the Sankhya theory could not be accepted for the reason that the Pradhana is without a purpose. For, according to the view expressed in the passage, * In order that the soul may know the Pradhana and become isolated ' (Sinkhya Ka. I, 21), the purpose of the Pradhana is fruition and final release on the part of the soul ; but both these are impossible. For, as the soul consists of pure intelligence, is inactive, changeless, and spotless, and hence eternally emancipated, it is capable neither of fruition which consists in consciousness of Prakrzti, nor of Release which consists in separation from Prakrzti. If, on the other hand, it be held that the soul constituted as described is, owing to the mere nearness of Prakrzti, capable of fruition, i.e. of being conscious of pleasure and pain, which are special modifica- tions of Prakrzti, it follows that, as Prakrzti is ever near, the soul will never accomplish emancipation. 49 2 VEDANTA-SUTR AS. 9. And (it is) objectionable on account of the contradictions.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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