Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Nescience ! Not so, we reply. That Nescience is removed by the aha^kara cannot be admitted; knowledge alone can put an end to Nescience. Nor can consciousness be the abode of Nescience, because in that case Nescience would have the same abode and the same object as knowledge. In pure knowledge where there is no knowing subject and no object of knowledge — the so-called ' witnessing' principle (sakshin) — Nescience cannot exist. Jars and similar things cannot be the abode of Nescience because there is no possibility of their being the abode of know- ledge, and for the same reason pure knowledge also cannot be the abode of Nescience. And even if consciousness were admitted to be the abode of Nescience, it could not be the object of knowledge; for consciousness being viewed as the Self cannot be the object of knowledge, and hence knowledge cannot terminate the Nescience abiding within consciousness. For knowledge puts an end to Nescience only with regard to its own objects, as in the case of the snake-rope. And the consequence of this would be that the Nescience attached to consciousness could never be destroyed by any one. — If Nescience, we further remark, is viewed as that which can be defined neither as Being nor non-Being, we shall show later on that such Nescience is something quite incomprehensible. — On the other hand, Nescience, if understood to be the antecedent non-existence of knowledge, is not opposed in nature to the origination of knowledge, and hence the dispelling of Nescience cannot be viewed as promoting the means of the knowledge of the Self. — From all this it follows that the aha^kara cannot effect in any way 'manifestation of consciousness/ Nor (to finish up this point) can it be said that it is the essential nature of manifesting agents to manifest things in so far as the latter have their abode in the former ; for such a relation is not observed in the case of lamps and the like (which manifest what lies outside them). The essen- I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 6 J
2The essen- I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 6 J tial nature of manifesting agents rather lies therein that they promote the knowledge of things as they really are, and this is also the nature of whatever promotes knowledge and the means thereof. Nor is it even true that the mirror manifests the face. The mirror is only the cause of a certain irregularity, viz. the reversion of the ocular rays of light, and to this irregularity there is due the appearance of the face within the mirror ; but the manifesting agent is the light only. And it is evident that the aha^kara is not capable of producing an irregularity (analogous to that produced by the mirror) in consciousness which is self- luminous. — And— with regard to the second analogous instance alleged by you — the fact is that the species is known through the individual because the latter is its substrate (as expressed in the general principle, 'the species is the form of the individual'), but not because the indi- vidual 'manifests' the species. Thus there is no reason, either real or springing from some imperfection, why the consciousness of consciousness should be brought about by its abiding in the aha^kara, and the attribute of being the knowing agent or the consciousness of that cannot therefore belong to the ahawkara. Hence, what constitutes the inward Self is not pure consciousness but the ' I ' which proves itself as the knowing subject. In the absence of egoity, ' inwardness ' could not be established for con- sciousness. The conscious subject persists in deep sleep. We now come to the question as to the nature of deep sleep. In deep sleep the quality of darkness prevails in the mind and there is no consciousness of outward things, and thus there is no distinct and clear presentation of the ' I ' ; but all the same the Self somehow presents itself up to the time of waking in the one form of the ' 1/ and the latter cannot therefore be said to be absent. Pure con- sciousness assumed by you (to manifest itself in deep sleep) is really in no better case ; for a person risen from deep sleep never represents to himself his state of consciousness during F 2 68 VEDANTA-StfTRAS.
3Pure con- sciousness assumed by you (to manifest itself in deep sleep) is really in no better case ; for a person risen from deep sleep never represents to himself his state of consciousness during F 2 68 VEDANTA-StfTRAS. sleep in the form, c I was pure consciousness free from all egoity and opposed in nature to everything else, witnessing Nescience ' ; what he thinks is only ' I slept well.' From this form of reflection it appears that even during sleep the Self, i. e. the ' 1/ was a knowing subject and perceptive of pleasure. Nor must you urge against this that the reflec- tion has the following form : * As now I feel pleasure, so I slept then also ' ; for the reflection is distinctly not of that kind1. Nor must you say that owing to the non-perma- nency of the ' I ' its perception of pleasure during sleep cannot connect itself with the waking state. For (the ' I ' is permanent as appears from the fact that) the person who has risen from sleep recalls things of which he was conscious before his sleep, c I did such and such a thing,' ' I observed this or that,' * I said so or so.' — But, you will perhaps say, he also reflects, * For such and such a time I was con- scious of nothing ! ' — ' And what does this imply ? ' we ask. — ' It implies a negation of everything ! ' — By no means, we rejoin. The words c I was conscious ' show that the know- ing ' I ' persisted, and that hence what is negated is only the objects of knowledge. If the negation implied in * of nothing ' included everything, it would also negative the pure consciousness which you hold to persist m deep sleep. In the judgment ' I was conscious of nothing/ the word * I ' clearly refers to the ' 1/ i. e. the knowing Self which persists even during deep sleep, while the words ' was con- scious of nothing' negative all knowledge on the part of that ' I ' ; if, now, in the face of this, you undertake to prove by means of this very judgment that knowledge — which is expressly denied — existed at the time, and that the per- sisting knowing Self did not exist, you may address your proof to the patient gods who give no reply! — But — our opponent goes on to urge — I form the following judgment also : ' I then was not conscious of myself,' and from this I understand that the ' I ' did not persist during deep sleep ! — You do not know, we rejoin, that this denial of the per- 1 I. e. the reflection as to the perception of pleasure refers to the past state of sleep only, not to the present moment of reflection. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 69
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Nescience ! Not so, we reply. That Nescience is removed by the aha^kara cannot be admitted; knowledge alone can put an end to Nescience. Nor can consciousness be the abode of Nescience, because in that case Nescience would have the same abode and the same object as knowledge. In pure knowledge where there is no knowing subject and no object of knowledge — the so-called ' witnessing' principle (sakshin) — Nescience cannot exist. Jars and similar things cannot be the abode of Nescience because there is no possibility of their being the abode of know- ledge, and for the same reason pure knowledge also cannot be the abode of Nescience. And even if consciousness were admitted to be the abode of Nescience, it could not be the object of knowledge; for consciousness being viewed as the Self cannot be the object of knowledge, and hence knowledge cannot terminate the Nescience abiding within consciousness. For knowledge puts an end to Nescience only with regard to its own objects, as in the case of the snake-rope. And the consequence of this would be that the Nescience attached to consciousness could never be destroyed by any one. — If Nescience, we further remark, is viewed as that which can be defined neither as Being nor non-Being, we shall show later on that such Nescience is something quite incomprehensible. — On the other hand, Nescience, if understood to be the antecedent non-existence of knowledge, is not opposed in nature to the origination of knowledge, and hence the dispelling of Nescience cannot be viewed as promoting the means of the knowledge of the Self. — From all this it follows that the aha^kara cannot effect in any way 'manifestation of consciousness/ Nor (to finish up this point) can it be said that it is the essential nature of manifesting agents to manifest things in so far as the latter have their abode in the former ; for such a relation is not observed in the case of lamps and the like (which manifest what lies outside them). The essen- I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 6 J
2The essen- I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 6 J tial nature of manifesting agents rather lies therein that they promote the knowledge of things as they really are, and this is also the nature of whatever promotes knowledge and the means thereof. Nor is it even true that the mirror manifests the face. The mirror is only the cause of a certain irregularity, viz. the reversion of the ocular rays of light, and to this irregularity there is due the appearance of the face within the mirror ; but the manifesting agent is the light only. And it is evident that the aha^kara is not capable of producing an irregularity (analogous to that produced by the mirror) in consciousness which is self- luminous. — And— with regard to the second analogous instance alleged by you — the fact is that the species is known through the individual because the latter is its substrate (as expressed in the general principle, 'the species is the form of the individual'), but not because the indi- vidual 'manifests' the species. Thus there is no reason, either real or springing from some imperfection, why the consciousness of consciousness should be brought about by its abiding in the aha^kara, and the attribute of being the knowing agent or the consciousness of that cannot therefore belong to the ahawkara. Hence, what constitutes the inward Self is not pure consciousness but the ' I ' which proves itself as the knowing subject. In the absence of egoity, ' inwardness ' could not be established for con- sciousness. The conscious subject persists in deep sleep. We now come to the question as to the nature of deep sleep. In deep sleep the quality of darkness prevails in the mind and there is no consciousness of outward things, and thus there is no distinct and clear presentation of the ' I ' ; but all the same the Self somehow presents itself up to the time of waking in the one form of the ' 1/ and the latter cannot therefore be said to be absent. Pure con- sciousness assumed by you (to manifest itself in deep sleep) is really in no better case ; for a person risen from deep sleep never represents to himself his state of consciousness during F 2 68 VEDANTA-StfTRAS.
3Pure con- sciousness assumed by you (to manifest itself in deep sleep) is really in no better case ; for a person risen from deep sleep never represents to himself his state of consciousness during F 2 68 VEDANTA-StfTRAS. sleep in the form, c I was pure consciousness free from all egoity and opposed in nature to everything else, witnessing Nescience ' ; what he thinks is only ' I slept well.' From this form of reflection it appears that even during sleep the Self, i. e. the ' 1/ was a knowing subject and perceptive of pleasure. Nor must you urge against this that the reflec- tion has the following form : * As now I feel pleasure, so I slept then also ' ; for the reflection is distinctly not of that kind1. Nor must you say that owing to the non-perma- nency of the ' I ' its perception of pleasure during sleep cannot connect itself with the waking state. For (the ' I ' is permanent as appears from the fact that) the person who has risen from sleep recalls things of which he was conscious before his sleep, c I did such and such a thing,' ' I observed this or that,' * I said so or so.' — But, you will perhaps say, he also reflects, * For such and such a time I was con- scious of nothing ! ' — ' And what does this imply ? ' we ask. — ' It implies a negation of everything ! ' — By no means, we rejoin. The words c I was conscious ' show that the know- ing ' I ' persisted, and that hence what is negated is only the objects of knowledge. If the negation implied in * of nothing ' included everything, it would also negative the pure consciousness which you hold to persist m deep sleep. In the judgment ' I was conscious of nothing/ the word * I ' clearly refers to the ' 1/ i. e. the knowing Self which persists even during deep sleep, while the words ' was con- scious of nothing' negative all knowledge on the part of that ' I ' ; if, now, in the face of this, you undertake to prove by means of this very judgment that knowledge — which is expressly denied — existed at the time, and that the per- sisting knowing Self did not exist, you may address your proof to the patient gods who give no reply! — But — our opponent goes on to urge — I form the following judgment also : ' I then was not conscious of myself,' and from this I understand that the ' I ' did not persist during deep sleep ! — You do not know, we rejoin, that this denial of the per- 1 I. e. the reflection as to the perception of pleasure refers to the past state of sleep only, not to the present moment of reflection. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 69
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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