Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1(Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 5). Compare also * He, consisting of mind, having pra^a for his body, whose form is light, who realises his wishes/ &c. (KA. Up. Ill, 14, 2). 31. Not, on account of the absence of organs ; this has been explained (before). Although the one Brahman is different from all other beings and endowed with all powers, we yet infer from the text ' Of him there is known no effect and no instrument/ that as it is destitute of instruments it cannot produce any effect. — To this objection an answer has already been given in II, 1, 27 ; 28, * on account of its being founded on the word/ and 'for there are manifold (powers)/ That for which the sacred word is the only means of knowledge, and which is different from all other things, is capable of producing those effects also of the instrumental means of which it is destitute. It is in this spirit that Scripture says ' He sees without eyes, he hears without ears, without hands and feet he hastens and grasps ' (Svet. Up. Ill, 19). — Here terminates the adhikara/za of ' the consequence of the entire (Brahman)/ 32. (Brahman is) not (the cause) ; on account of (the world) having the nature of what depends on a motive. Although the Lord, who before creation is alone, is endowed with all kinds of powers since he differs in nature II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 34. 477 from all other beings, and hence is by himself capable of creating the world ; we all the same cannot ascribe to him actual causality with regard to the world ; for this manifold world displays the nature of a thing depending on a motive, and the Lord has no motive to urge him to creation. In the case of all those who enter on some activity after having formed an idea of the effect to be accomplished, there exists a motive in the form of something beneficial either to themselves or to others. Now Brahman, to whose essential nature it belongs that all his wishes are eternally fulfilled, does not attain through the creation of the world any object not attained before. Nor again is the second alternative possible. For a being, all whose wishes are fulfilled, could concern itself about others only with a view to benefitting them. No merciful divinity would create a world so full, as ours is, of evils of all kind — birth, old age, death, hell, and so on ; — if it created at all, pity would move it to create a world altogether happy. Brahman thus having no possible motive cannot be the cause of the world. — This prima facie view is disposed of in the next Sutra. 33. But (it is) mere sport, as in ordinary life.
2Brahman thus having no possible motive cannot be the cause of the world. — This prima facie view is disposed of in the next Sutra. 33. But (it is) mere sport, as in ordinary life. The motive which prompts Brahman — all whose wishes are fulfilled and who is perfect in himself — to the creation of a world comprising all kinds of sentient and non- sentient beings dependent on his volition, is nothing else but sport, play. We see in ordinary life how some great king, ruling this earth with its seven dvipas, and possessing perfect strength, valour, and so on, has a game at balls, or the like, from no other motive than to amuse himself; hence there is no objection to the view that sport only is the motive prompting Brahman to the creation, sustenta- tion, and destruction of this world which is easily fashioned by his mere will. 34. Not inequality and cruelty, on account of there being regard ; for so (Scripture) declares. It must indeed be admitted that the Lord, who differs in nature from all other beings, intelligent and non-intelligent, 478 ved anta-s6tr AS, and hence possesses powers unfathomable by thought, is capable of creating this manifold world, although before creation he is one only and without parts. But the assump- tion of his having actually created the world would lay him open to the charge of partiality, in so far as the world contains beings of high, middle, and low station — gods, men, animals, immovable beings ; and to that of cruelty, in so far as he would be instrumental in making his creatures experience pain of the most dreadful kind. — The reply to this is 'not so, on account of there being regard'; i. e. ' on account of the inequality of creation depending on the deeds of the intelligent beings, gods, and so on, about to be created.' *Sruti and Smrtti alike declare that the connexion of the individual souls with bodies of different kinds — divine, human, animal, and so on — depends on the karman of those souls ; compare ' He who performs good works becomes good, he who performs bad works becomes bad. He becomes pure by pure deeds, bad by bad deeds ' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 5). In the same way the reverend PanLrara declares that what causes the difference in nature and status between gods, men, and so on, is the power of the former deeds of the souls about to enter into a new creation — ' He (the Lord) is the operative cause only in the creation of new beings ; the material cause is constituted by the potentialities of the beings to be created. The being to be embodied requires nothing but an operative cause ; it is its own potentiality which leads its being into that con- dition of being (which it is to occupy in the new creation).' Potentiality here means karman. 35. If it be said 'not so, on account of non-distinc- tion of deeds ' ; we say, ' not so, on account of begin- ninglessness ' ; this is reasonable, and it is also observed.
335. If it be said 'not so, on account of non-distinc- tion of deeds ' ; we say, ' not so, on account of begin- ninglessness ' ; this is reasonable, and it is also observed. But before creation the individual souls do not exist ; since Scripture teaches non-distinction ' Being only this was in the beginning.' And as then the souls do not exist, no karman can exist, and it cannot therefore be said that the inequality of creation depends on karman. — Of this objec- II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 36. 479 tion the Sutra disposes by saying ' on account of beginning- lessness,' i. e. although the individual souls and their deeds form an eternal stream, without a beginning, yet non- distinction of them ' is reasonable ' (i.e. may reasonably be asserted) in so far as, previous to creation, the substance of the souls abides in a very subtle condition, destitute of names and forms, and thus incapable of being designated as something apart from Brahman, although in reality then also they constitute Brahman's body only. If it were not admitted (that the distinctions in the new creation are due to karman), it would moreover follow that souls are requited for what they have not done, and not requited for what they have done. The fact of the souls being without a beginning is observed, viz., to be stated in Scripture, c The intelligent one is not born and dies not ' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18) ; so also the fact of the flow of creation going on from all eternity, ' As the creator formed sun and moon formerly.' Moreover, the text, ' Now all this was then undeveloped. It became developed by form and name5 (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7), states merely that the names and forms of the souls were developed, and this shows that the souls themselves existed from the beginning. Smrz'ti also says, * Dost thou know both Prakrzti and the soul to be without beginning ?' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 19.) — As Brahman thus differs in nature from everything else, possesses all powers, has no other motive than sport, and arranges the diversity of the creation in accordance with the different karman of the individual souls, Brahman alone can be the universal cause. 36. And because all the attributes are proved (to be present in Brahman). As all those attributes required to constitute causality which have been or will be shown to be absent in the Pradh&na, the atoms, and so on, can be shown to be pre- sent in Brahman, it remains a settled conclusion that Brahman only is the cause of the world. Here terminates the adhikara^a of ' that which has the nature of depending on a motive.' 480 vedanta-sOtras. SECOND PADA. 1. Not that which is inferred, on account of the impossibility of construction, and on account of activity.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1(Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 5). Compare also * He, consisting of mind, having pra^a for his body, whose form is light, who realises his wishes/ &c. (KA. Up. Ill, 14, 2). 31. Not, on account of the absence of organs ; this has been explained (before). Although the one Brahman is different from all other beings and endowed with all powers, we yet infer from the text ' Of him there is known no effect and no instrument/ that as it is destitute of instruments it cannot produce any effect. — To this objection an answer has already been given in II, 1, 27 ; 28, * on account of its being founded on the word/ and 'for there are manifold (powers)/ That for which the sacred word is the only means of knowledge, and which is different from all other things, is capable of producing those effects also of the instrumental means of which it is destitute. It is in this spirit that Scripture says ' He sees without eyes, he hears without ears, without hands and feet he hastens and grasps ' (Svet. Up. Ill, 19). — Here terminates the adhikara/za of ' the consequence of the entire (Brahman)/ 32. (Brahman is) not (the cause) ; on account of (the world) having the nature of what depends on a motive. Although the Lord, who before creation is alone, is endowed with all kinds of powers since he differs in nature II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 34. 477 from all other beings, and hence is by himself capable of creating the world ; we all the same cannot ascribe to him actual causality with regard to the world ; for this manifold world displays the nature of a thing depending on a motive, and the Lord has no motive to urge him to creation. In the case of all those who enter on some activity after having formed an idea of the effect to be accomplished, there exists a motive in the form of something beneficial either to themselves or to others. Now Brahman, to whose essential nature it belongs that all his wishes are eternally fulfilled, does not attain through the creation of the world any object not attained before. Nor again is the second alternative possible. For a being, all whose wishes are fulfilled, could concern itself about others only with a view to benefitting them. No merciful divinity would create a world so full, as ours is, of evils of all kind — birth, old age, death, hell, and so on ; — if it created at all, pity would move it to create a world altogether happy. Brahman thus having no possible motive cannot be the cause of the world. — This prima facie view is disposed of in the next Sutra. 33. But (it is) mere sport, as in ordinary life.
2Brahman thus having no possible motive cannot be the cause of the world. — This prima facie view is disposed of in the next Sutra. 33. But (it is) mere sport, as in ordinary life. The motive which prompts Brahman — all whose wishes are fulfilled and who is perfect in himself — to the creation of a world comprising all kinds of sentient and non- sentient beings dependent on his volition, is nothing else but sport, play. We see in ordinary life how some great king, ruling this earth with its seven dvipas, and possessing perfect strength, valour, and so on, has a game at balls, or the like, from no other motive than to amuse himself; hence there is no objection to the view that sport only is the motive prompting Brahman to the creation, sustenta- tion, and destruction of this world which is easily fashioned by his mere will. 34. Not inequality and cruelty, on account of there being regard ; for so (Scripture) declares. It must indeed be admitted that the Lord, who differs in nature from all other beings, intelligent and non-intelligent, 478 ved anta-s6tr AS, and hence possesses powers unfathomable by thought, is capable of creating this manifold world, although before creation he is one only and without parts. But the assump- tion of his having actually created the world would lay him open to the charge of partiality, in so far as the world contains beings of high, middle, and low station — gods, men, animals, immovable beings ; and to that of cruelty, in so far as he would be instrumental in making his creatures experience pain of the most dreadful kind. — The reply to this is 'not so, on account of there being regard'; i. e. ' on account of the inequality of creation depending on the deeds of the intelligent beings, gods, and so on, about to be created.' *Sruti and Smrtti alike declare that the connexion of the individual souls with bodies of different kinds — divine, human, animal, and so on — depends on the karman of those souls ; compare ' He who performs good works becomes good, he who performs bad works becomes bad. He becomes pure by pure deeds, bad by bad deeds ' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 5). In the same way the reverend PanLrara declares that what causes the difference in nature and status between gods, men, and so on, is the power of the former deeds of the souls about to enter into a new creation — ' He (the Lord) is the operative cause only in the creation of new beings ; the material cause is constituted by the potentialities of the beings to be created. The being to be embodied requires nothing but an operative cause ; it is its own potentiality which leads its being into that con- dition of being (which it is to occupy in the new creation).' Potentiality here means karman. 35. If it be said 'not so, on account of non-distinc- tion of deeds ' ; we say, ' not so, on account of begin- ninglessness ' ; this is reasonable, and it is also observed.
335. If it be said 'not so, on account of non-distinc- tion of deeds ' ; we say, ' not so, on account of begin- ninglessness ' ; this is reasonable, and it is also observed. But before creation the individual souls do not exist ; since Scripture teaches non-distinction ' Being only this was in the beginning.' And as then the souls do not exist, no karman can exist, and it cannot therefore be said that the inequality of creation depends on karman. — Of this objec- II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 36. 479 tion the Sutra disposes by saying ' on account of beginning- lessness,' i. e. although the individual souls and their deeds form an eternal stream, without a beginning, yet non- distinction of them ' is reasonable ' (i.e. may reasonably be asserted) in so far as, previous to creation, the substance of the souls abides in a very subtle condition, destitute of names and forms, and thus incapable of being designated as something apart from Brahman, although in reality then also they constitute Brahman's body only. If it were not admitted (that the distinctions in the new creation are due to karman), it would moreover follow that souls are requited for what they have not done, and not requited for what they have done. The fact of the souls being without a beginning is observed, viz., to be stated in Scripture, c The intelligent one is not born and dies not ' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18) ; so also the fact of the flow of creation going on from all eternity, ' As the creator formed sun and moon formerly.' Moreover, the text, ' Now all this was then undeveloped. It became developed by form and name5 (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7), states merely that the names and forms of the souls were developed, and this shows that the souls themselves existed from the beginning. Smrz'ti also says, * Dost thou know both Prakrzti and the soul to be without beginning ?' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 19.) — As Brahman thus differs in nature from everything else, possesses all powers, has no other motive than sport, and arranges the diversity of the creation in accordance with the different karman of the individual souls, Brahman alone can be the universal cause. 36. And because all the attributes are proved (to be present in Brahman). As all those attributes required to constitute causality which have been or will be shown to be absent in the Pradh&na, the atoms, and so on, can be shown to be pre- sent in Brahman, it remains a settled conclusion that Brahman only is the cause of the world. Here terminates the adhikara^a of ' that which has the nature of depending on a motive.' 480 vedanta-sOtras. SECOND PADA. 1. Not that which is inferred, on account of the impossibility of construction, and on account of activity.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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