Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1elements and elemental things, mind and mental things, there are certain further independent entities such as ether, Self, and so on. — Others finally assert a universal void, i. e. the non- reality of everything. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I 7. 5OI The Sutras at first dispose of the theory of those who acknowledge the real existence of external things. Their opinion is as follows. The atoms of earth which possess the qualities of colour, taste, touch and smell ; the atoms of water which possess the qualities of colour, taste and touch ; the atoms of fire which possess the qualities of colour and touch ; and the atoms of air which possess the quality of touch only, combine so as to constitute earth, water, fire and air ; and out of the latter there originate the aggregates called bodies, sense-organs, and objects of sense-organs. And that flow of ideas, which assumes the form of the imagination of an apprehending agent abiding within the body, is what constitutes the so-called Self. On the agencies enumerated there rests the entire empiric world.— On this view the Sutra remarks, * Even on the aggregate with its two causes, there is non-establishment of that.' That aggregate which consists of earth and the other elements and of which the atoms are the cause ; and that further aggregate which consists of bodies, sense-organs and objects, and of which the elements are the cause — on neither of these two aggregates with their twofold causes can there be proved establishment of that, i. e. can the origination of that aggregate which we call the world be rationally established. If the atoms as well as earth and the other elements are held to have a momentary existence only, when, we ask, do the atoms which perish within a moment, and the elements, move towards combination, and when do they combine ? and when do they become the objects of states of consciousness ? and when do they become the abodes of the activities of appropriation, avoidance and so on (on the part of agents) ? and what is the cognising Self? and with what objects does it enter into contact through the sense-organs? and which cog- nising Self cognises which objects, and at what time ? and which Self proceeds to appropriate which objects, and at what time? For the sentient subject has perished, and the object of sensation has perished; and the cognising subject has perished, and the object cognised has perished. And how can one subject cognise what has been appre- 502 vedAnta-sIjtras.
2For the sentient subject has perished, and the object of sensation has perished; and the cognising subject has perished, and the object cognised has perished. And how can one subject cognise what has been appre- 502 vedAnta-sIjtras. hended through the senses of another? and how is one subject to take to itself what another subject has cognised ? And should it be said that each stream of cognitions is one (whereby a kind of unity of the cognising subject is claimed to be established), yet this affords no sufficient basis for the ordinary notions and activities of life, since the stream really is nothing different from the constituent parts of the stream (all of which are momentary and hence discrete). — That in reality the Ego constitutes the Self and is the knowing subject, we have proved previously. 1 8. If it be said that (this) is to be explained through successive causality ; we say ' no/ on account of their not being the causes of aggregation. ' If it be said that through the successive causality of Nescience and so on, the formation of aggregates and other matters may be satisfactorily accounted for/ To explain. Although all the entities (acknowledged by the Bauddhas) have a merely momentary existence, yet all that is accounted for by avidya. Avidya means that con- ception, contrary to reality, by which permanency, and so on, are ascribed to what is momentary, and so on. Through avidya there are originated desire, aversion, &c, which are comprised under the general term ' impression' (sa^skara) ; and from those there springs cognition (vi^ana) which con- sists in the ' kindling ' of mind ; from that mind (kltta) and what is of the nature of mind (£aitta) and the substances possessing colour, and so on, viz. earth, water, &c. From that again the six sense-organs, called ' the six abodes ' ; from that the body, called 'touch* (spar^a) ; from that sensation (vedana), and so on. And from that again avidya, and the whole series as described ; so that there is an endlessly revolving cycle, in which avidya, and so on, are in turn the causes of the links succeeding them. Now all this is not possible without those aggregates of the elements and elemental things which are called earth, and so on ; and thereby the rationality of the formation of those aggregates is proved. To this the second half of the Sfitra replies 'Not so, on II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 9. 503
3Now all this is not possible without those aggregates of the elements and elemental things which are called earth, and so on ; and thereby the rationality of the formation of those aggregates is proved. To this the second half of the Sfitra replies 'Not so, on II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 9. 503 account of (their) not being the causes of aggregation.' This cannot rationally be assumed, because avidya, and so on, cannot be operative causes with regard to the aggrega- tion of earth and the other elements and elemental things. For avidyd, which consists in the view of permanency and so on, belonging to what is non-permanent, and desire, aversion and the rest, which are originated by avidya, cannot constitute the causes of (other) momentary things entering into aggregation ; not any more than the mistaken idea of shell-silver is the cause of the aggregation of things such as shells. Moreover, on the Bauddha doctrine, he who views a momentary thing as permanent himself perishes at the same moment ; who then is the subject in whom the so- called sa/^skaras, i. e. desire, aversion, and so on, originate ? Those who do not acknowledge one permanent substance constituting the abode of the sa^skaras have no right to assume the continuance of the sawskaras. 19. And on account of the cessation of the pre- ceding one on the origination of the subsequent one. For the following reason also the origination of the world cannot be accounted for on the view of the momentariness of all existence. At the time when the subsequent momen- tary existence originates, the preceding momentary exist- ence has passed away, and it cannot therefore stand in a causal relation towards the subsequent one. For if non- existence had causal power, anything might originate at any time at any place. — Let it then be said that what con- stitutes a cause is nothing else but existence in a previous moment. — But, if this were so, the previous momentary existence of a jar, let us say, would be the cause of all things whatever that would be met with in this threefold world in the subsequent moment — cows, buffaloes, horses, chairs, stones, &c. ! — Let us then say that a thing existing in a previous moment is the cause only of those things, existing in the subsequent moment, which belong to the same species. — But from this again it would follow that one jar existing in the previous moment would be the cause of all jars, to be met with in any place, existing in 504 vedanta-sCtras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1elements and elemental things, mind and mental things, there are certain further independent entities such as ether, Self, and so on. — Others finally assert a universal void, i. e. the non- reality of everything. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I 7. 5OI The Sutras at first dispose of the theory of those who acknowledge the real existence of external things. Their opinion is as follows. The atoms of earth which possess the qualities of colour, taste, touch and smell ; the atoms of water which possess the qualities of colour, taste and touch ; the atoms of fire which possess the qualities of colour and touch ; and the atoms of air which possess the quality of touch only, combine so as to constitute earth, water, fire and air ; and out of the latter there originate the aggregates called bodies, sense-organs, and objects of sense-organs. And that flow of ideas, which assumes the form of the imagination of an apprehending agent abiding within the body, is what constitutes the so-called Self. On the agencies enumerated there rests the entire empiric world.— On this view the Sutra remarks, * Even on the aggregate with its two causes, there is non-establishment of that.' That aggregate which consists of earth and the other elements and of which the atoms are the cause ; and that further aggregate which consists of bodies, sense-organs and objects, and of which the elements are the cause — on neither of these two aggregates with their twofold causes can there be proved establishment of that, i. e. can the origination of that aggregate which we call the world be rationally established. If the atoms as well as earth and the other elements are held to have a momentary existence only, when, we ask, do the atoms which perish within a moment, and the elements, move towards combination, and when do they combine ? and when do they become the objects of states of consciousness ? and when do they become the abodes of the activities of appropriation, avoidance and so on (on the part of agents) ? and what is the cognising Self? and with what objects does it enter into contact through the sense-organs? and which cog- nising Self cognises which objects, and at what time ? and which Self proceeds to appropriate which objects, and at what time? For the sentient subject has perished, and the object of sensation has perished; and the cognising subject has perished, and the object cognised has perished. And how can one subject cognise what has been appre- 502 vedAnta-sIjtras.
2For the sentient subject has perished, and the object of sensation has perished; and the cognising subject has perished, and the object cognised has perished. And how can one subject cognise what has been appre- 502 vedAnta-sIjtras. hended through the senses of another? and how is one subject to take to itself what another subject has cognised ? And should it be said that each stream of cognitions is one (whereby a kind of unity of the cognising subject is claimed to be established), yet this affords no sufficient basis for the ordinary notions and activities of life, since the stream really is nothing different from the constituent parts of the stream (all of which are momentary and hence discrete). — That in reality the Ego constitutes the Self and is the knowing subject, we have proved previously. 1 8. If it be said that (this) is to be explained through successive causality ; we say ' no/ on account of their not being the causes of aggregation. ' If it be said that through the successive causality of Nescience and so on, the formation of aggregates and other matters may be satisfactorily accounted for/ To explain. Although all the entities (acknowledged by the Bauddhas) have a merely momentary existence, yet all that is accounted for by avidya. Avidya means that con- ception, contrary to reality, by which permanency, and so on, are ascribed to what is momentary, and so on. Through avidya there are originated desire, aversion, &c, which are comprised under the general term ' impression' (sa^skara) ; and from those there springs cognition (vi^ana) which con- sists in the ' kindling ' of mind ; from that mind (kltta) and what is of the nature of mind (£aitta) and the substances possessing colour, and so on, viz. earth, water, &c. From that again the six sense-organs, called ' the six abodes ' ; from that the body, called 'touch* (spar^a) ; from that sensation (vedana), and so on. And from that again avidya, and the whole series as described ; so that there is an endlessly revolving cycle, in which avidya, and so on, are in turn the causes of the links succeeding them. Now all this is not possible without those aggregates of the elements and elemental things which are called earth, and so on ; and thereby the rationality of the formation of those aggregates is proved. To this the second half of the Sfitra replies 'Not so, on II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 9. 503
3Now all this is not possible without those aggregates of the elements and elemental things which are called earth, and so on ; and thereby the rationality of the formation of those aggregates is proved. To this the second half of the Sfitra replies 'Not so, on II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 9. 503 account of (their) not being the causes of aggregation.' This cannot rationally be assumed, because avidya, and so on, cannot be operative causes with regard to the aggrega- tion of earth and the other elements and elemental things. For avidyd, which consists in the view of permanency and so on, belonging to what is non-permanent, and desire, aversion and the rest, which are originated by avidya, cannot constitute the causes of (other) momentary things entering into aggregation ; not any more than the mistaken idea of shell-silver is the cause of the aggregation of things such as shells. Moreover, on the Bauddha doctrine, he who views a momentary thing as permanent himself perishes at the same moment ; who then is the subject in whom the so- called sa/^skaras, i. e. desire, aversion, and so on, originate ? Those who do not acknowledge one permanent substance constituting the abode of the sa^skaras have no right to assume the continuance of the sawskaras. 19. And on account of the cessation of the pre- ceding one on the origination of the subsequent one. For the following reason also the origination of the world cannot be accounted for on the view of the momentariness of all existence. At the time when the subsequent momen- tary existence originates, the preceding momentary exist- ence has passed away, and it cannot therefore stand in a causal relation towards the subsequent one. For if non- existence had causal power, anything might originate at any time at any place. — Let it then be said that what con- stitutes a cause is nothing else but existence in a previous moment. — But, if this were so, the previous momentary existence of a jar, let us say, would be the cause of all things whatever that would be met with in this threefold world in the subsequent moment — cows, buffaloes, horses, chairs, stones, &c. ! — Let us then say that a thing existing in a previous moment is the cause only of those things, existing in the subsequent moment, which belong to the same species. — But from this again it would follow that one jar existing in the previous moment would be the cause of all jars, to be met with in any place, existing in 504 vedanta-sCtras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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