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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1In the seventh place, there is the uselessness of the activity of the producing agent (which would result from cause and effect being II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I 5. 43 1 identical) ; for if the effect were nothing but the cause, what could be effected by the activity of the agent ? — Let us then say that, although the effect exists (at all times), the activity of the agent must be postulated as helpful towards the effect. — But in that case the activity of the agent would have to be assumed as taking place perpetually, and as hence everything would exist always, there would be no distinction between eternal and non-eternal things! — Let us then say that the effect, although always existing, is at first non-manifest and then is manifested through the activity of the agent ; in this way that activity will not be purposeless, and there will be a distinction between eternal and non-eternal things ! — This view also is untenable. For if that manifestation requires another manifestation (to account for it) we are driven into a regressus in infinitum. If, on the other hand, it is independent of another manifesta- tion (and hence eternal), it follows that the effect also is eternally perceived. And if, as a third alternative, the manifestation is said to originate, we lapse into the asat- karyavada (according to which the effect does not exist before its origination). Moreover, if the activity of the agent serves to manifest the effect, it follows that the activity devoted to a jar will manifest also waterpots and similar things. For things which admittedly possess mani- festing power, such as lamps and the like, are not observed to be restricted to particular objects to be manifested by them : we do not see that a lamp lit for showing a jar does not at the same time manifest waterpots and other things. All this proves that the activity of the agent has a purpose in so far only as it is the cause of the origination of an effect which previously did not exist ; and thus the theory of the previous existence of the effect cannot be upheld. Nor does the fact of definite causes having to be employed (in order to produce definite effects ; clay e. g. to produce a jar) prove that that only which already exists can become an effect; for the facts explain themselves also on the hypothesis of the cause having definite potentialities (de- termining the definite effect which will result from the cause). 43 2 vedanta-s6tras.
2g. to produce a jar) prove that that only which already exists can become an effect; for the facts explain themselves also on the hypothesis of the cause having definite potentialities (de- termining the definite effect which will result from the cause). 43 2 vedanta-s6tras. But, an objection is raised, he also who holds the theory of the previous non-existence of the effect, can really do nothing with the activity of the agent. For as, on his view, the effect has no existence before it is originated, the activity of the agent must be supposed to operate elsewhere than on the effect ; and as this ' elsewhere ' comprises with- out distinction all other things, it follows that the agent's activity with reference to threads may give rise to water- pots also (not only to cloth). — Not so, the Vaueshika replies. Activity applied to a certain cause gives rise to those effects only the potentiality of which inheres in that cause. Now, against all this, the following objection is raised. The effect is non-different from the cause. For in reality there is no such thing as an effect different from the cause, since all effects, and all empirical thought and speech about effects, are based on Nescience. Apart from the causal substance, clay, which is seen to be present in effected things such as jars, the so-called effect, i. e. the jar or pot, rests altogether on Nescience. All effected things whatever, such as jars, waterpots, &c, viewed as different from their causal substance, viz. clay, which is perceived to exist in these its effects, rest merely on em- pirical thought and speech, and are fundamentally false, unreal ; while the causal substance, i.e. clay, alone is real. In the same way the entire world in so far as viewed apart from its cause, i. e. Brahman which is nothing but pure non-differenced Being, rests exclusively on the empirical assumption of Egoity and so on, and is false ; while reality belongs to the causal Brahman which is mere Being. It follows that there is no such thing as an effect apart from its cause ; the effect in fact is identical with the cause. Nor must you object to our theory on the ground that the corroborative instance of the silver erroneously imagined in the shell is inappropriate because the non-reality of such effected things as jars is by no means well proved while the non-reality of the shell- silver is so proved ; for as a matter of fact it is determined by reasoning that it is the causal substance of jars, viz. clay, only that is real while the II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 433
3clay, only that is real while the II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 433 reality of everything apart from clay is disproved by reasoning. And if you ask whereupon that reasoning rests, we reply — on the fact that the clay only is continuous, permanent, while everything different from it is discon- tinuous, non-permanent. For just as in the case of the snake-rope we observe that the continuously existing rope only — which forms the substrate of the imagined snake — is real, while the snake or cleft in the ground, which is non- continuous, is unreal ; so we conclude that it is the per- manently enduring clay-material only which is real, while the non-continuous effects, such as jars and pots, are unreal. And, further, since what is real, i. e. the Self, does not perish, and what is altogether unreal, as e. g. the horn of a hare, is not perceived, we conclude that an effected thing, which on the one hand is perceived and on the other is liable to destruction, must be viewed as something to be defined neither as that which is nor as that which is not. And what is thus undefinable, is false, no less than the silver imagined in the shell, the anirva^aniyatva of which is proved by perception and sublation (see above, p. 102 ff.).«— We further ask, ' Is a causal substance, such as clay, when producing its effect, in a non-modified state, or has it passed over into some special modified condition?' The former alternative cannot be allowed, because thence it would follow that the cause originates effects at all times ; and the latter must equally be rejected, because the passing over of the cause into a special state would oblige us to postulate a previous passing over into a different state (to account for the latter passing over) and again a previous one, &c, so that a regressus in infinitum would result.— Let it then be said that the causal substance when giving rise to the effect is indeed unchanged, but connected with a special operative cause, time and place (this connexion accounting for the origination of the effect). — But this also we cannot allow; for such connexion would be with the causal substance either as unchanged or as having entered on a changed condition ; and thus the difficulties stated above would arise again. — Nor may you say that the origination of jars, gold coins, and sour milk from clay, [48] F f 434 vedanta-sOtras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1In the seventh place, there is the uselessness of the activity of the producing agent (which would result from cause and effect being II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I 5. 43 1 identical) ; for if the effect were nothing but the cause, what could be effected by the activity of the agent ? — Let us then say that, although the effect exists (at all times), the activity of the agent must be postulated as helpful towards the effect. — But in that case the activity of the agent would have to be assumed as taking place perpetually, and as hence everything would exist always, there would be no distinction between eternal and non-eternal things! — Let us then say that the effect, although always existing, is at first non-manifest and then is manifested through the activity of the agent ; in this way that activity will not be purposeless, and there will be a distinction between eternal and non-eternal things ! — This view also is untenable. For if that manifestation requires another manifestation (to account for it) we are driven into a regressus in infinitum. If, on the other hand, it is independent of another manifesta- tion (and hence eternal), it follows that the effect also is eternally perceived. And if, as a third alternative, the manifestation is said to originate, we lapse into the asat- karyavada (according to which the effect does not exist before its origination). Moreover, if the activity of the agent serves to manifest the effect, it follows that the activity devoted to a jar will manifest also waterpots and similar things. For things which admittedly possess mani- festing power, such as lamps and the like, are not observed to be restricted to particular objects to be manifested by them : we do not see that a lamp lit for showing a jar does not at the same time manifest waterpots and other things. All this proves that the activity of the agent has a purpose in so far only as it is the cause of the origination of an effect which previously did not exist ; and thus the theory of the previous existence of the effect cannot be upheld. Nor does the fact of definite causes having to be employed (in order to produce definite effects ; clay e. g. to produce a jar) prove that that only which already exists can become an effect; for the facts explain themselves also on the hypothesis of the cause having definite potentialities (de- termining the definite effect which will result from the cause). 43 2 vedanta-s6tras.
2g. to produce a jar) prove that that only which already exists can become an effect; for the facts explain themselves also on the hypothesis of the cause having definite potentialities (de- termining the definite effect which will result from the cause). 43 2 vedanta-s6tras. But, an objection is raised, he also who holds the theory of the previous non-existence of the effect, can really do nothing with the activity of the agent. For as, on his view, the effect has no existence before it is originated, the activity of the agent must be supposed to operate elsewhere than on the effect ; and as this ' elsewhere ' comprises with- out distinction all other things, it follows that the agent's activity with reference to threads may give rise to water- pots also (not only to cloth). — Not so, the Vaueshika replies. Activity applied to a certain cause gives rise to those effects only the potentiality of which inheres in that cause. Now, against all this, the following objection is raised. The effect is non-different from the cause. For in reality there is no such thing as an effect different from the cause, since all effects, and all empirical thought and speech about effects, are based on Nescience. Apart from the causal substance, clay, which is seen to be present in effected things such as jars, the so-called effect, i. e. the jar or pot, rests altogether on Nescience. All effected things whatever, such as jars, waterpots, &c, viewed as different from their causal substance, viz. clay, which is perceived to exist in these its effects, rest merely on em- pirical thought and speech, and are fundamentally false, unreal ; while the causal substance, i.e. clay, alone is real. In the same way the entire world in so far as viewed apart from its cause, i. e. Brahman which is nothing but pure non-differenced Being, rests exclusively on the empirical assumption of Egoity and so on, and is false ; while reality belongs to the causal Brahman which is mere Being. It follows that there is no such thing as an effect apart from its cause ; the effect in fact is identical with the cause. Nor must you object to our theory on the ground that the corroborative instance of the silver erroneously imagined in the shell is inappropriate because the non-reality of such effected things as jars is by no means well proved while the non-reality of the shell- silver is so proved ; for as a matter of fact it is determined by reasoning that it is the causal substance of jars, viz. clay, only that is real while the II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 433
3clay, only that is real while the II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 433 reality of everything apart from clay is disproved by reasoning. And if you ask whereupon that reasoning rests, we reply — on the fact that the clay only is continuous, permanent, while everything different from it is discon- tinuous, non-permanent. For just as in the case of the snake-rope we observe that the continuously existing rope only — which forms the substrate of the imagined snake — is real, while the snake or cleft in the ground, which is non- continuous, is unreal ; so we conclude that it is the per- manently enduring clay-material only which is real, while the non-continuous effects, such as jars and pots, are unreal. And, further, since what is real, i. e. the Self, does not perish, and what is altogether unreal, as e. g. the horn of a hare, is not perceived, we conclude that an effected thing, which on the one hand is perceived and on the other is liable to destruction, must be viewed as something to be defined neither as that which is nor as that which is not. And what is thus undefinable, is false, no less than the silver imagined in the shell, the anirva^aniyatva of which is proved by perception and sublation (see above, p. 102 ff.).«— We further ask, ' Is a causal substance, such as clay, when producing its effect, in a non-modified state, or has it passed over into some special modified condition?' The former alternative cannot be allowed, because thence it would follow that the cause originates effects at all times ; and the latter must equally be rejected, because the passing over of the cause into a special state would oblige us to postulate a previous passing over into a different state (to account for the latter passing over) and again a previous one, &c, so that a regressus in infinitum would result.— Let it then be said that the causal substance when giving rise to the effect is indeed unchanged, but connected with a special operative cause, time and place (this connexion accounting for the origination of the effect). — But this also we cannot allow; for such connexion would be with the causal substance either as unchanged or as having entered on a changed condition ; and thus the difficulties stated above would arise again. — Nor may you say that the origination of jars, gold coins, and sour milk from clay, [48] F f 434 vedanta-sOtras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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