Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1For on this latter theory the origination of the world cannot be accounted for. The Sankhyas hold that owing to the soul's approximation to Prakrzti the attributes of the latter II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 12. 425 are fictitiously superimposed upon the soul which in itself consists entirely of pure intelligence free from all change, and that thereon depends the origination of the empirical world. Now here we must raise the question as to the nature of that approximation or nearness of Prakrz'ti which causes the superimposition on the changeless soul of the attributes of Prakrz'ti. Does that nearness mean merely the existence of Prakrz'ti or some change in Prakrz'ti ? or does it mean some change in the soul ? — Not the latter ; for the soul is assumed to be incapable of change. — Nor again a change in Prakrz'ti ; for changes in Prakrz'ti are supposed, in the system, to be the effects of superimposition, and cannot therefore be its cause. And if, finally, the nearness of Prakrz'ti means no more than its existence, it follows that even the released soul would be liable to that superimposition (for Prakrz'ti exists always). — The Sankhya is thus unable to give a rational account of the origination of the world. This same point will be treated of fully in connexion with the special refutation of the Sankhya theory. (II, 2, 6.) 11. Also in consequence of the ill-foundedness of reasoning. The theory, resting on Scripture, of Brahman being the universal cause must be accepted, and the theory of the Pradhana must be abandoned, because all (mere) reasoning is ill-founded. This latter point is proved by the fact that the arguments set forth by Buddha, Ka^ada, Akshapada, £ina, Kapila and Pata^-ali respectively are all mutually contradictory. 12. Should it be said that inference is to be carried on in a different way ; (we reply that) thus also it follows that (the objection raised) is not got rid of. Let us then view the matter as follows. The arguments actually set forth by Buddha and others may have to be considered as invalid, but all the same we may arrive at the Pradhana theory through other lines of reasoning by which 426 VEDANTA-StJTRAS.
2Let us then view the matter as follows. The arguments actually set forth by Buddha and others may have to be considered as invalid, but all the same we may arrive at the Pradhana theory through other lines of reasoning by which 426 VEDANTA-StJTRAS. the objections raised against the theory are refuted. — But, we reply, this also is of no avail. A theory which rests exclusively on arguments derived from human reason may, at some other time or place, be disestablished by arguments devised by people more skilful than you in reasoning ; and thus there is no getting over the objection founded on the invalidity of all mere argumentation. The conclusion from all this is that, with regard to super- sensuous matters, Scripture alone is authoritative, and that reasoning is to be applied only to the support of Scripture. In agreement herewith Manu says, ' He who supports the teaching of the i?zshis and the doctrine as to sacred duty with arguments not conflicting with the Veda, he alone truly knows sacred duty' (Manu XII, 1 06). The teaching of the Sankhyas which conflicts with the Veda cannot therefore be used for the pur- pose of confirming and elucidating the meaning of the Veda. — Here finishes the section treating of * difference of nature.' 13. Thereby also the remaining (theories) which are not comprised (within the Veda) are explained. Not comprised means those theories which are not known to be comprised within (countenanced by) the Veda. The Sutra means to say that by the demolition given above of the Sankhya doctrine which is not comprised within the Veda the remaining theories which are in the same position, viz. the theories of Ka^ada, Akshapada, £ina, and Buddha, must likewise be considered as demolished. Here, however, a new objection may be raised, on the ground namely that, since all these theories agree in the view of atoms constituting the general cause, it cannot be said that their reasoning as to the causal substance is ill-founded. — They indeed, we reply, are agreed to that extent, but they are all of them equally founded on Reasoning only, and they are seen to disagree in many ways as to the nature of the atoms which by different schools are held to be either fundamentally void or non- II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4. 427 void, having either a merely cognitional or an objective existence, being either momentary or permanent, either of a definite nature or the reverse, either real or unreal, &c. This disagreement proves all those theories to be ill- founded, and the objection is thus disposed of. — Here finishes the section of 'the remaining (theories) non- comprised (within the Veda)/ 14. If it be said that from (Brahman) becoming an enjoyer, there follows non-distinction (of Brahman and the individual soul) ; we reply — it may be as in ordinary life.
3— Here finishes the section of 'the remaining (theories) non- comprised (within the Veda)/ 14. If it be said that from (Brahman) becoming an enjoyer, there follows non-distinction (of Brahman and the individual soul) ; we reply — it may be as in ordinary life. The Sankhya here comes forward with a new objection. You maintain, he says, that the highest Brahman has the character either of a cause or an effect according as it has for its body sentient and non-sentient beings in either their subtle or gross state ; and that this explains the difference in nature between the individual soul and Brahman. But such difference is not possible, since Brahman, if embodied, at once becomes an enjoying subject (just like the individual soul). For if, possessing a body, the Lord necessarily experiences all pain and pleasure due to embodiedness, no less than the individual soul does. — But we have, under I, 2, 8, refuted the view of the Lords being liable to experiences of pleasure and pain ! — By no meatus ! There you have shown only that the Lord's ' abiding within the heart of a creature so as to constitute the object of its devotion does not imply fruition on his part of pleasure and pain. Now, however, you maintain that the Lord is embodied just like an individual soul, and the unavoidable inference from this is that, like that soul, he undergoes pleasurable and painful experiences. For we observe that embodied souls, although not capable of participating in the changing states of the body such as childhood, old age, &c, yet experience pleasures and pains caused by the normal or abnormal condition of the matter constituting the body. In agreement with this Scripture says, ' As long as he possesses a body there is for him no escape from pleasure and pain ; but when he 428 vedanta-sOtras. is free of the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 1). As thus, the theory of an embodied Brahman constituting the universal cause does not allow of a distinction in nature between the Lord and the individual soul ; and as, further, the theory of a mere Brahman (i.e. an absolutely homogeneous Brahman) leads to the conclusion that Brahman is the abode of all the imperfections attaching to the world, in the same way as a lump of clay or gold participates in the imperfections of the thing fashioned out of it; we maintain that the theory of the Pradhana being the general cause is the more valid one.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1For on this latter theory the origination of the world cannot be accounted for. The Sankhyas hold that owing to the soul's approximation to Prakrzti the attributes of the latter II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 12. 425 are fictitiously superimposed upon the soul which in itself consists entirely of pure intelligence free from all change, and that thereon depends the origination of the empirical world. Now here we must raise the question as to the nature of that approximation or nearness of Prakrz'ti which causes the superimposition on the changeless soul of the attributes of Prakrz'ti. Does that nearness mean merely the existence of Prakrz'ti or some change in Prakrz'ti ? or does it mean some change in the soul ? — Not the latter ; for the soul is assumed to be incapable of change. — Nor again a change in Prakrz'ti ; for changes in Prakrz'ti are supposed, in the system, to be the effects of superimposition, and cannot therefore be its cause. And if, finally, the nearness of Prakrz'ti means no more than its existence, it follows that even the released soul would be liable to that superimposition (for Prakrz'ti exists always). — The Sankhya is thus unable to give a rational account of the origination of the world. This same point will be treated of fully in connexion with the special refutation of the Sankhya theory. (II, 2, 6.) 11. Also in consequence of the ill-foundedness of reasoning. The theory, resting on Scripture, of Brahman being the universal cause must be accepted, and the theory of the Pradhana must be abandoned, because all (mere) reasoning is ill-founded. This latter point is proved by the fact that the arguments set forth by Buddha, Ka^ada, Akshapada, £ina, Kapila and Pata^-ali respectively are all mutually contradictory. 12. Should it be said that inference is to be carried on in a different way ; (we reply that) thus also it follows that (the objection raised) is not got rid of. Let us then view the matter as follows. The arguments actually set forth by Buddha and others may have to be considered as invalid, but all the same we may arrive at the Pradhana theory through other lines of reasoning by which 426 VEDANTA-StJTRAS.
2Let us then view the matter as follows. The arguments actually set forth by Buddha and others may have to be considered as invalid, but all the same we may arrive at the Pradhana theory through other lines of reasoning by which 426 VEDANTA-StJTRAS. the objections raised against the theory are refuted. — But, we reply, this also is of no avail. A theory which rests exclusively on arguments derived from human reason may, at some other time or place, be disestablished by arguments devised by people more skilful than you in reasoning ; and thus there is no getting over the objection founded on the invalidity of all mere argumentation. The conclusion from all this is that, with regard to super- sensuous matters, Scripture alone is authoritative, and that reasoning is to be applied only to the support of Scripture. In agreement herewith Manu says, ' He who supports the teaching of the i?zshis and the doctrine as to sacred duty with arguments not conflicting with the Veda, he alone truly knows sacred duty' (Manu XII, 1 06). The teaching of the Sankhyas which conflicts with the Veda cannot therefore be used for the pur- pose of confirming and elucidating the meaning of the Veda. — Here finishes the section treating of * difference of nature.' 13. Thereby also the remaining (theories) which are not comprised (within the Veda) are explained. Not comprised means those theories which are not known to be comprised within (countenanced by) the Veda. The Sutra means to say that by the demolition given above of the Sankhya doctrine which is not comprised within the Veda the remaining theories which are in the same position, viz. the theories of Ka^ada, Akshapada, £ina, and Buddha, must likewise be considered as demolished. Here, however, a new objection may be raised, on the ground namely that, since all these theories agree in the view of atoms constituting the general cause, it cannot be said that their reasoning as to the causal substance is ill-founded. — They indeed, we reply, are agreed to that extent, but they are all of them equally founded on Reasoning only, and they are seen to disagree in many ways as to the nature of the atoms which by different schools are held to be either fundamentally void or non- II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4. 427 void, having either a merely cognitional or an objective existence, being either momentary or permanent, either of a definite nature or the reverse, either real or unreal, &c. This disagreement proves all those theories to be ill- founded, and the objection is thus disposed of. — Here finishes the section of 'the remaining (theories) non- comprised (within the Veda)/ 14. If it be said that from (Brahman) becoming an enjoyer, there follows non-distinction (of Brahman and the individual soul) ; we reply — it may be as in ordinary life.
3— Here finishes the section of 'the remaining (theories) non- comprised (within the Veda)/ 14. If it be said that from (Brahman) becoming an enjoyer, there follows non-distinction (of Brahman and the individual soul) ; we reply — it may be as in ordinary life. The Sankhya here comes forward with a new objection. You maintain, he says, that the highest Brahman has the character either of a cause or an effect according as it has for its body sentient and non-sentient beings in either their subtle or gross state ; and that this explains the difference in nature between the individual soul and Brahman. But such difference is not possible, since Brahman, if embodied, at once becomes an enjoying subject (just like the individual soul). For if, possessing a body, the Lord necessarily experiences all pain and pleasure due to embodiedness, no less than the individual soul does. — But we have, under I, 2, 8, refuted the view of the Lords being liable to experiences of pleasure and pain ! — By no meatus ! There you have shown only that the Lord's ' abiding within the heart of a creature so as to constitute the object of its devotion does not imply fruition on his part of pleasure and pain. Now, however, you maintain that the Lord is embodied just like an individual soul, and the unavoidable inference from this is that, like that soul, he undergoes pleasurable and painful experiences. For we observe that embodied souls, although not capable of participating in the changing states of the body such as childhood, old age, &c, yet experience pleasures and pains caused by the normal or abnormal condition of the matter constituting the body. In agreement with this Scripture says, ' As long as he possesses a body there is for him no escape from pleasure and pain ; but when he 428 vedanta-sOtras. is free of the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 1). As thus, the theory of an embodied Brahman constituting the universal cause does not allow of a distinction in nature between the Lord and the individual soul ; and as, further, the theory of a mere Brahman (i.e. an absolutely homogeneous Brahman) leads to the conclusion that Brahman is the abode of all the imperfections attaching to the world, in the same way as a lump of clay or gold participates in the imperfections of the thing fashioned out of it; we maintain that the theory of the Pradhana being the general cause is the more valid one.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
No commentary for this page.