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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1under Su. I, 4, 22. Brahman 4 70 ved Anta-sutr AS . in all its states has the souls and matter for its body ; when the souls and matter are in their subtle state Brahman is in its causal condition ; when, on the other hand, Brahman has for its body souls and matter in their gross state, it is * effected' and then called world. In this way the co-ordina- tion above referred to fully explains itself. The world is non-different from Brahman in so far as it is its effect. There is no confusion of the different characteristic qualities; for liability to change belongs to non-sentient matter, liability to pain to sentient souls, and the possession of all excellent qualities to Brahman : hence the doctrine is not in conflict with any scriptural text. That even in the state of non-separation — described in texts such as, * Being only this was in the beginning' — the souls joined to non-sentient matter persist in a subtle condition and thus constitute Brahman's body must necessarily be admitted ; for that the souls at that time also persist in a subtle form is shown under Sutras II, I, 34 ; 35. Non-division, at that time, is possible in so far as there is no distinction of names and forms. It follows from all this that Brahman's causality is not contrary to reason. Those, on the other hand, who explain the difference, referred to in Sutra 22, as the difference between the ^iva in its state of bondage and the ^iva in so far as free from avidyd, i.e. the unconditioned Brahman, implicate them- selves in contradictions. For the ^iva, in so far as free from avidyi, is neither all-knowing, nor the Lord of all, nor the cause of all, nor the Self of all, nor the ruler of all — it in fact possesses none of those characteristics on which the scriptural texts found the difference of the released soul ; for according to the view in question all those attributes are the mere figment of Nescience. Nor again can the Sutra under discussion be said to refer to the distinction, from the individual soul, of a Lord fictitiously created by avidya — a distinction analogous to that which a man in the state of avidya makes between the shell and the silver ; for it is the task of the Vedanta to convey a knowledge of that true Brahman which is introduced as the object of enquiry in the first Sutra (' Now then the enquiry into Brahman ') 24. 47i and which is the cause of the origination and so on of the world, and what they at this point are engaged in is to refute the objections raised against the doctrine of that Brahman on the basis of Smriti and Reasoning. — The two Sutras II, i, 8; 9 really form a complementary statement to what is proved in the present adhikara^a; for their purport is to show also that things of different nature can stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. And the Sutra II, i, 7 has reference to what is contained in the previous adhikara^a. Here terminates the adhikara/za of ' designation of the other.'
2And the Sutra II, i, 7 has reference to what is contained in the previous adhikara^a. Here terminates the adhikara/za of ' designation of the other.' 24. Should it be said that (it is) not, on account of the observation of employment ; we say, not so ; for as in the case of milk. We have so far determined that it is in no way unreason- able to hold that the highest Brahman, which is all-knowing, capable of realising its purposes, &c, has all beings, sentient and non-sentient, for its body, and hence constitutes the Self of all and differs in nature from everything else. We now proceed to show that it is not unreasonable to hold that, possessing all those attributes, it is able to effect by its mere will and wish the creation of this entire manifold Universe. — But, it may here be said, it is certainly a matter of observation that agents of limited power are obliged to employ a number of instrumental agencies in order to effect their purposes ; but how should it follow therefrom that the view of the all-powerful Brahman producing the world without such instrumental agencies is in any way irrational ? — As, we reply, it is observed in ordinary life that even such agents as possess the capability of producing certain effects stand in need of certain instruments, some slow- witted person may possibly imagine that Brahman, being destitute of all such instruments, is incapable of creating the world. It is this doubt which we have to dispel. It is seen that potters, weavers, &c, who produce jars, cloth, and the like, are incapable of actually producing unless they make use of certain implements, although they may fully 472 VEDANTA-stiTR AS. possess the specially required skill. Men destitute of such skill are not capable of production, even with the help of implements ; those having the capacity produce by means of the instruments only. This leads to the conclusion that Brahman also, although possessing all imaginable powers, is not capable of creating the world without employing the required instrumental agencies. But before creation there existed nothing that could have assisted him, as we know from texts such as ' Being only this was in the beginning ' ; * there was Ndraya^a alone/ Brahman's creative agency thus cannot be rendered plausible; and hence the prima facie view set forth in the earlier part of the Sutra, ' Should it be said that (it is) not ; on account of the observation of employment (of instruments).'
3This view is set aside by the latter part of the Sutra, ' not so ; for as in the case of milk.' It is by no means a fact that every agent capable of producing a certain effect stands in need of instruments. Milk, e.g. and water, which have the power of producing certain effects, viz. sour milk and ice respectively, produce these effects unaided. Analo- gously Brahman also, which possesses the capacity of producing everything, may actually do so without using instrumental aids. The 'for' in the Sutra is meant to point out the fact that the proving instances are generally known, and thus to indicate the silliness of the objection. Whey and similar ingredients are indeed sometimes mixed with milk, but not to the end of making the milk turn sour, but merely in order to accelerate the process and give to the sour milk a certain flavour. 25. And as in the case of the gods and so on, in (their) world. As the gods and similar exalted beings create, each in his own world, whatever they require by their mere volition, so the Supreme Person creates by his mere volition the entire world. That the gods about whose powers we know from the Veda only (not through perception) are here quoted as supplying a proving instance, is done in order to facilitate the comprehension of the creative power of Brahman, which II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 27. 473 is also known through the Veda. — Here terminates the adhikara^a of 'the observation of employment/ 26. Or the consequence of the entire (Brahman entering into the effect), and stultification of (Brah- man's) being devoid of parts.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1under Su. I, 4, 22. Brahman 4 70 ved Anta-sutr AS . in all its states has the souls and matter for its body ; when the souls and matter are in their subtle state Brahman is in its causal condition ; when, on the other hand, Brahman has for its body souls and matter in their gross state, it is * effected' and then called world. In this way the co-ordina- tion above referred to fully explains itself. The world is non-different from Brahman in so far as it is its effect. There is no confusion of the different characteristic qualities; for liability to change belongs to non-sentient matter, liability to pain to sentient souls, and the possession of all excellent qualities to Brahman : hence the doctrine is not in conflict with any scriptural text. That even in the state of non-separation — described in texts such as, * Being only this was in the beginning' — the souls joined to non-sentient matter persist in a subtle condition and thus constitute Brahman's body must necessarily be admitted ; for that the souls at that time also persist in a subtle form is shown under Sutras II, I, 34 ; 35. Non-division, at that time, is possible in so far as there is no distinction of names and forms. It follows from all this that Brahman's causality is not contrary to reason. Those, on the other hand, who explain the difference, referred to in Sutra 22, as the difference between the ^iva in its state of bondage and the ^iva in so far as free from avidyd, i.e. the unconditioned Brahman, implicate them- selves in contradictions. For the ^iva, in so far as free from avidyi, is neither all-knowing, nor the Lord of all, nor the cause of all, nor the Self of all, nor the ruler of all — it in fact possesses none of those characteristics on which the scriptural texts found the difference of the released soul ; for according to the view in question all those attributes are the mere figment of Nescience. Nor again can the Sutra under discussion be said to refer to the distinction, from the individual soul, of a Lord fictitiously created by avidya — a distinction analogous to that which a man in the state of avidya makes between the shell and the silver ; for it is the task of the Vedanta to convey a knowledge of that true Brahman which is introduced as the object of enquiry in the first Sutra (' Now then the enquiry into Brahman ') 24. 47i and which is the cause of the origination and so on of the world, and what they at this point are engaged in is to refute the objections raised against the doctrine of that Brahman on the basis of Smriti and Reasoning. — The two Sutras II, i, 8; 9 really form a complementary statement to what is proved in the present adhikara^a; for their purport is to show also that things of different nature can stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. And the Sutra II, i, 7 has reference to what is contained in the previous adhikara^a. Here terminates the adhikara/za of ' designation of the other.'
2And the Sutra II, i, 7 has reference to what is contained in the previous adhikara^a. Here terminates the adhikara/za of ' designation of the other.' 24. Should it be said that (it is) not, on account of the observation of employment ; we say, not so ; for as in the case of milk. We have so far determined that it is in no way unreason- able to hold that the highest Brahman, which is all-knowing, capable of realising its purposes, &c, has all beings, sentient and non-sentient, for its body, and hence constitutes the Self of all and differs in nature from everything else. We now proceed to show that it is not unreasonable to hold that, possessing all those attributes, it is able to effect by its mere will and wish the creation of this entire manifold Universe. — But, it may here be said, it is certainly a matter of observation that agents of limited power are obliged to employ a number of instrumental agencies in order to effect their purposes ; but how should it follow therefrom that the view of the all-powerful Brahman producing the world without such instrumental agencies is in any way irrational ? — As, we reply, it is observed in ordinary life that even such agents as possess the capability of producing certain effects stand in need of certain instruments, some slow- witted person may possibly imagine that Brahman, being destitute of all such instruments, is incapable of creating the world. It is this doubt which we have to dispel. It is seen that potters, weavers, &c, who produce jars, cloth, and the like, are incapable of actually producing unless they make use of certain implements, although they may fully 472 VEDANTA-stiTR AS. possess the specially required skill. Men destitute of such skill are not capable of production, even with the help of implements ; those having the capacity produce by means of the instruments only. This leads to the conclusion that Brahman also, although possessing all imaginable powers, is not capable of creating the world without employing the required instrumental agencies. But before creation there existed nothing that could have assisted him, as we know from texts such as ' Being only this was in the beginning ' ; * there was Ndraya^a alone/ Brahman's creative agency thus cannot be rendered plausible; and hence the prima facie view set forth in the earlier part of the Sutra, ' Should it be said that (it is) not ; on account of the observation of employment (of instruments).'
3This view is set aside by the latter part of the Sutra, ' not so ; for as in the case of milk.' It is by no means a fact that every agent capable of producing a certain effect stands in need of instruments. Milk, e.g. and water, which have the power of producing certain effects, viz. sour milk and ice respectively, produce these effects unaided. Analo- gously Brahman also, which possesses the capacity of producing everything, may actually do so without using instrumental aids. The 'for' in the Sutra is meant to point out the fact that the proving instances are generally known, and thus to indicate the silliness of the objection. Whey and similar ingredients are indeed sometimes mixed with milk, but not to the end of making the milk turn sour, but merely in order to accelerate the process and give to the sour milk a certain flavour. 25. And as in the case of the gods and so on, in (their) world. As the gods and similar exalted beings create, each in his own world, whatever they require by their mere volition, so the Supreme Person creates by his mere volition the entire world. That the gods about whose powers we know from the Veda only (not through perception) are here quoted as supplying a proving instance, is done in order to facilitate the comprehension of the creative power of Brahman, which II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 27. 473 is also known through the Veda. — Here terminates the adhikara^a of 'the observation of employment/ 26. Or the consequence of the entire (Brahman entering into the effect), and stultification of (Brah- man's) being devoid of parts.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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