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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1It cannot be complete same- ness of all attributes, because in that case the relation of cause and effect (which after all requires some difference) could not be established. For we do not observe that in 4 1 6 vedAnta-s6tr as. pots and jars which are fashioned out of a lump of clay- there persists the quality of c being a lump ' which belongs to the causal substance. And should you say that it suffices that there should be equality in some or any attribute, we point out that such is actually the case with regard to Brahman and the world, both of which have the attribute of ' existence ' and others. The true state of the case rather is as follows. There is equality of nature between an effect and a cause, in that sense that those essential characteristics by which the causal substance distinguishes itself from other things persist in its effects also: those characteristic features, e.g., which distinguish gold from clay and other materials, persist also in things made of gold — bracelets and the like. But applying this consideration to Brahman and the world we find that Brahman's essential nature is to be antagonistic to all evil, and to consist of knowledge, bliss and power, while the world's essential nature is to be the opposite of all this. Brahman cannot, therefore, be the material cause of the world. But, it may be objected, we observe that even things of different essential characteristics stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. From man, e.g., who is a sentient being, there spring nails, teeth, and hair, which are non-sentient things ; the sentient scorpion springs from non- sentient dung ; and non-sentient threads proceed from the sentient spider. — This objection, we reply, is not valid ; for in the instances quoted the relation of cause and effect rests on the non-sentient elements only (i.e. it is only the non-sentient matter of the body which produces nails, See). But, a further objection is raised, Scripture itself declares in many places that things generally held to be non-sen- tient really possess intelligence ; compare ' to him the earth said ' ; ' the water desired ' ; ' the pra^as quarrelling among themselves as to their relative pre-eminence went to Brah- man.' And the writers of the Pura/zas also attribute consciousness to rivers, hills, the sea, and so on. Hence there is after all no essential difference in nature between II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 6. 41 7 sentient and so-called non-sentient beings. — To this ob- jection the Purvapakshin replies in the next Sutra. 5. But (there is) denotation of the superintending (deities), on account of distinction and entering.
241 7 sentient and so-called non-sentient beings. — To this ob- jection the Purvapakshin replies in the next Sutra. 5. But (there is) denotation of the superintending (deities), on account of distinction and entering. The word 'but' is meant to set aside the objection started. In texts such as 'to him the earth said/ the terms ' earth ' and so on, denote the divinities presiding over earth and the rest. — How is this known ? — ' Through distinction and connexion.' For earth and so on are denoted by the distinctive term ' divinities ' ; so e. g. ' Let me enter into those three divinities ' (Kk. Up. VI, 3, 2), where fire, water, and earth are called divinities ; and Kau. Up. II, 14, 'All divinities contending with each other as to pre-eminence/ and-' all these divinities having recognised pre-eminence in pra?za/ The ' entering ' of the Sutra refers to Ait. Ar. II, 4, 3, 4, ' Agni having become speech entered into the mouth ; Aditya having become sight entered into the eyes,' &c, where the text declares that Agni and other divine beings entered into the sense-organs as their superintendents. We therefore adhere to our conclusion that the world, being non-intelligent and hence essentially different in nature from Brahman, cannot be the effect of Brahman ; and that therefore, in agreement with Smrzti confirmed by reasoning, the Vedanta-texts must be held to teach that the Pradhana is the universal material cause. This prima facie view is met by the following Sutra. 6. But it is seen. The 'but* indicates the change of view (introduced in the present Sutra). The assertion that Brahman cannot be the material cause of the world because the latter differs from it in essential nature, is unfounded; since it is a matter of observation that even things of different nature stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. For it is observed that from honey and similar substances there originate worms and other little animals. — But it has been said above that in those cases there is sameness of nature, [48] e e 4 1 8 vedanta-sCtras.
3For it is observed that from honey and similar substances there originate worms and other little animals. — But it has been said above that in those cases there is sameness of nature, [48] e e 4 1 8 vedanta-sCtras. in so far as the relation of cause and effect holds good only between the non-intelligent elements in both ! — This assertion was indeed made, but it does not suffice to prove that equality of character between cause and effect which you have in view. For, being apprehensive that from the demand of equality of character in some point or other only it 'would follow that, as all things have certain characteristics in common, anything might originate from anything, you have declared that the equality of character necessary for the relation of cause and effect is constituted by the persistence, in the effect, of those characteristic points which differentiate the cause from other things. But it is evident that this restrictive rule does not hold good in the case of the origination of worms and the like from honey and so on ; and hence it is not unreasonable to assume that the world also, although differing in character from Brahman, may originate from the latter. For in the case of worms originating from honey, scorpions from dung, &c, we do not observe — what indeed we do observe in certain other cases, as of pots made of clay, ornaments made of gold — that the special characteristics distinguishing the causal substance from other things persist in the effects also. 7. If it be said that (the effect is) non-existing ; we say no, there being a mere denial. But, an objection is raised, if Brahman, the cause, differs in nature from the effect, viz. the world, this means that cause and effect are separate things and that hence the effect does not exist in the cause, i. e. Brahman ; and this again implies that the world originates from what has no existence! — Not so, we reply. For what the preceding Sutra has laid down is merely the denial of an absolute rule demanding that cause and effect should be of the same nature ; it was not asserted that the effect is a thing altogether different and separate from the cause. We by no means abandon our tenet that Brahman the cause modifies itself so as to assume the form of a world differing from it in character. For such is the case with the honey II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 8. 419 and the worms also. There is difference of characteristics, but — as in the case of gold and golden bracelets — there is oneness of substance. — An objection is raised. 8. On account of such consequences in reabsorp- tion (the Vedanta-texts would be) inappropriate.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1It cannot be complete same- ness of all attributes, because in that case the relation of cause and effect (which after all requires some difference) could not be established. For we do not observe that in 4 1 6 vedAnta-s6tr as. pots and jars which are fashioned out of a lump of clay- there persists the quality of c being a lump ' which belongs to the causal substance. And should you say that it suffices that there should be equality in some or any attribute, we point out that such is actually the case with regard to Brahman and the world, both of which have the attribute of ' existence ' and others. The true state of the case rather is as follows. There is equality of nature between an effect and a cause, in that sense that those essential characteristics by which the causal substance distinguishes itself from other things persist in its effects also: those characteristic features, e.g., which distinguish gold from clay and other materials, persist also in things made of gold — bracelets and the like. But applying this consideration to Brahman and the world we find that Brahman's essential nature is to be antagonistic to all evil, and to consist of knowledge, bliss and power, while the world's essential nature is to be the opposite of all this. Brahman cannot, therefore, be the material cause of the world. But, it may be objected, we observe that even things of different essential characteristics stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. From man, e.g., who is a sentient being, there spring nails, teeth, and hair, which are non-sentient things ; the sentient scorpion springs from non- sentient dung ; and non-sentient threads proceed from the sentient spider. — This objection, we reply, is not valid ; for in the instances quoted the relation of cause and effect rests on the non-sentient elements only (i.e. it is only the non-sentient matter of the body which produces nails, See). But, a further objection is raised, Scripture itself declares in many places that things generally held to be non-sen- tient really possess intelligence ; compare ' to him the earth said ' ; ' the water desired ' ; ' the pra^as quarrelling among themselves as to their relative pre-eminence went to Brah- man.' And the writers of the Pura/zas also attribute consciousness to rivers, hills, the sea, and so on. Hence there is after all no essential difference in nature between II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 6. 41 7 sentient and so-called non-sentient beings. — To this ob- jection the Purvapakshin replies in the next Sutra. 5. But (there is) denotation of the superintending (deities), on account of distinction and entering.
241 7 sentient and so-called non-sentient beings. — To this ob- jection the Purvapakshin replies in the next Sutra. 5. But (there is) denotation of the superintending (deities), on account of distinction and entering. The word 'but' is meant to set aside the objection started. In texts such as 'to him the earth said/ the terms ' earth ' and so on, denote the divinities presiding over earth and the rest. — How is this known ? — ' Through distinction and connexion.' For earth and so on are denoted by the distinctive term ' divinities ' ; so e. g. ' Let me enter into those three divinities ' (Kk. Up. VI, 3, 2), where fire, water, and earth are called divinities ; and Kau. Up. II, 14, 'All divinities contending with each other as to pre-eminence/ and-' all these divinities having recognised pre-eminence in pra?za/ The ' entering ' of the Sutra refers to Ait. Ar. II, 4, 3, 4, ' Agni having become speech entered into the mouth ; Aditya having become sight entered into the eyes,' &c, where the text declares that Agni and other divine beings entered into the sense-organs as their superintendents. We therefore adhere to our conclusion that the world, being non-intelligent and hence essentially different in nature from Brahman, cannot be the effect of Brahman ; and that therefore, in agreement with Smrzti confirmed by reasoning, the Vedanta-texts must be held to teach that the Pradhana is the universal material cause. This prima facie view is met by the following Sutra. 6. But it is seen. The 'but* indicates the change of view (introduced in the present Sutra). The assertion that Brahman cannot be the material cause of the world because the latter differs from it in essential nature, is unfounded; since it is a matter of observation that even things of different nature stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. For it is observed that from honey and similar substances there originate worms and other little animals. — But it has been said above that in those cases there is sameness of nature, [48] e e 4 1 8 vedanta-sCtras.
3For it is observed that from honey and similar substances there originate worms and other little animals. — But it has been said above that in those cases there is sameness of nature, [48] e e 4 1 8 vedanta-sCtras. in so far as the relation of cause and effect holds good only between the non-intelligent elements in both ! — This assertion was indeed made, but it does not suffice to prove that equality of character between cause and effect which you have in view. For, being apprehensive that from the demand of equality of character in some point or other only it 'would follow that, as all things have certain characteristics in common, anything might originate from anything, you have declared that the equality of character necessary for the relation of cause and effect is constituted by the persistence, in the effect, of those characteristic points which differentiate the cause from other things. But it is evident that this restrictive rule does not hold good in the case of the origination of worms and the like from honey and so on ; and hence it is not unreasonable to assume that the world also, although differing in character from Brahman, may originate from the latter. For in the case of worms originating from honey, scorpions from dung, &c, we do not observe — what indeed we do observe in certain other cases, as of pots made of clay, ornaments made of gold — that the special characteristics distinguishing the causal substance from other things persist in the effects also. 7. If it be said that (the effect is) non-existing ; we say no, there being a mere denial. But, an objection is raised, if Brahman, the cause, differs in nature from the effect, viz. the world, this means that cause and effect are separate things and that hence the effect does not exist in the cause, i. e. Brahman ; and this again implies that the world originates from what has no existence! — Not so, we reply. For what the preceding Sutra has laid down is merely the denial of an absolute rule demanding that cause and effect should be of the same nature ; it was not asserted that the effect is a thing altogether different and separate from the cause. We by no means abandon our tenet that Brahman the cause modifies itself so as to assume the form of a world differing from it in character. For such is the case with the honey II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 8. 419 and the worms also. There is difference of characteristics, but — as in the case of gold and golden bracelets — there is oneness of substance. — An objection is raised. 8. On account of such consequences in reabsorp- tion (the Vedanta-texts would be) inappropriate.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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