The Vedânta-Sûtras with the Commentary of Râmânuja, Part III — SBE Vol. 48 (trans. George Thibaut, 1904)
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The translator’s English as printed (George Thibaut). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
We next have shown that the text 'That from which these creatures are born/ &c, conveys the idea of the highest Brahman as that being which in sport, as it were, creates, sustains, and finally reabsorbs this entire universe, comprising within itself infinite numbers of variously constituted animated beings — moving and non-moving — , of objects of enjoyment for those beings, of means of enjoyment, and of abodes of enjoyment ; and which is the sole cause of all bliss. We have established that this highest Brahman, which is the sole cause of the world, cannot be the object of the other means of knowledge, and hence is to be known through scripture oaly. We have pointed out that the position of scripture as an authoritative means of knowledge is established by the fact that all the Vedantatexts connectedly refer to the highest Brahman, which, although not related to any injunctions of action or absten-
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We have pointed out that the position of scripture as an authoritative means of knowledge is established by the fact that all the Vedantatexts connectedly refer to the highest Brahman, which, although not related to any injunctions of action or abstenp. 256tion from action, by its own essential nature constitutes the highest end of man. We have proved that Brahman, which the Vedanta-texts teach to be the sole cause of the world, must be an intelligent principle other than the non-sentient pradhana, since Brahman is said to think. We have declared that this intelligent principle is other than the so-called individual soul, whether in the state of bondage or that of release ; since the texts describe it as in the enjoyment of supreme bliss, all-wise, the cause of fear or fearlessness on the part of intelligent beings, the inner Self of all created things, whether intelligent or non-intelligent, possessing the power of realising all its purposes, and so on. — We have maintained that this highest Being has a divine form, peculiar to itself, not made of the stuff of Prakrzti, and not due to karman. — We have explained that the being which some texts refer to as a well-known cause of the world — designating it by terms such as ether or breath, which generally denote a special non-sentient being — is that same highest Self which is different from all beings, sentient or non-sentient. — We have declared that, owing to its connexion with heaven, this same highest Self is to be recognised in what the text calls a ' light,' said to possess supreme splendour, such as forms a special characteristic of the highest Being. We have stated that, as we recognise through insight derived from scripture, that same highest Person is denoted by terms such as Indra, and so on ; as the text ascribes to that ' Indra ' qualities exclusively belonging to the highest Self, such, e. g., as being the cause of the attainment of immortality. — And the general result arrived at was that the Vedanta-texts help us to the knowledge of one being only, viz. Brahman, or the highest Person, or Naraya/za — of whom it is shown that he cannot possibly be the object of the other means of knowledge, and whom the possession of an unlimited number of glorious qualities proves to differ totally from all other beings whatsoever.
Now, although Brahman is the only object of the teaching of the Vedanta-texts, yet some of these texts might give rise to the notion that they aim at setting forth (not
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Now, although Brahman is the only object of the teaching of the Vedanta-texts, yet some of these texts might give rise to the notion that they aim at setting forth (not
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Brahman), but some particular being comprised within either the pradhana or the aggregate of individual souls. The remaining Padas of the first Adhyaya therefore apply themselves to the task of dispelling this notion and proving that what the texts in question aim at is to set forth certain glorious qualities of Brahman. The second Pâda discusses those texts which contain somewhat obscure references to the individual soul ; the third Pada those which contain clear references to the same ; and the fourth Pâda finally those texts which appear to contain even clearer intimations of the individual soul, and so on.
1. Everywhere; because there is taught what is known.
We read in the KMndogya, ' Man is made of thought ; according to what his thought is in this world, so will he be when he has departed this life. Let him form this thought : he who consists of mind, whose body is breath, whose form is light/ &c. (Ill, 14). We here understand that of the meditation enjoined by the clause ' let him form this thought ' the object is the being said to consist of mind, to have breath for its body, &c. A doubt, however, arises whether the being possessing these attributes be the individual soul or the highest Self. — The Purvapakshin maintains the former alternative. For, he says, mind and breath are instruments of the individual soul ; while the text ' without breath, without mind/ distinctly denies them to the highest Self. Nor can the Brahman mentioned in a previous clause of the same section ('All this indeed is Brahman') be connected as an object with the meditation enjoined in the passage under discussion ; for Brahman is there referred to in order to suggest the idea of its being the Self of all — which idea constitutes a means for bringing about that calmness of mind which is helpful towards the act of meditation enjoined in the clause 'Let a man meditate with calm mind/ &c. Nor, again, can it be said that as the meditation conveyed by the clause l let him form this thought ' demands an object, Brahman, although mentioned in another passage, only admits of being connected with [48] s
258 vedanta-sOtras.
the passage under discussion ; for the demand for an object is fully satisfied by the being made of mind, &c, which is mentioned in that very passage itself ; in order to supply the object we have merely to change the caseterminations of the words ' manomaya^ pra/^a.rarira^,' &c. It having thus been determined that the being made of mind is the individual soul, we further conclude that the Brahman mentioned in the concluding passage of the section ('That is Brahman') is also the individual soul, there called Brahman in order to glorify it.
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