Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1If the origina- tion of the effect can be accounted for on the basis of the agent's capability of bringing it about, and of his knowledge 1 68 VEDANTA-stiTRAS. of the special material and instrumental causes, it would be unreasonable to ascribe causal agency to his (altogether irrelevant) incapabilities and ignorance with regard to other things, only because those incapabilities, &c, are observed to exist together with his special capability and knowledge. The question would arise moreover whether such want of capability and knowledge (with regard to things other than the one actually effected) would be helpful towards the bringing about of that one effect, in so far as extending to all other things or to some other things. The former alternative is excluded because no agent, a potter e. g., is quite ignorant of all other things but his own special work ; and the second alternative is inadmissible because there is no definite rule indicating that there should be certain definite kinds of want of knowledge and skill in the case of all agents 1, and hence exceptions would arise with regard to every special case of want of knowledge and skill. From this it follows that the absence of lordly power and similar qualities which (indeed is observed in the case of ordinary agents but) in no way contributes towards the production of the effects (to which such agents give rise) is not proved in the case of that which we wish to prove (i. e. a Lord, creator of the world), and that hence Inference does not establish qualities contrary (to the qualities characteristic of a Lord). A further objection will perhaps be raised, viz. that as experience teaches that potters and so on direct their im- plements through the mediation of their own bodies, we are not justified in holding that a bodiless Supreme Lord directs the material and instrumental causes of the universe. — But in reply to this we appeal to the fact of experience, that evil demons possessing men's bodies, and also venom, are driven or drawn out of those bodies by mere will power. Nor must you ask in what way the volition of a bodiless 1 A certain potter may not possess the skill and knowledge required to make chairs and beds; but some other potter may possess both, and so on. We cannot therefore point to any definite want of skill and knowledge as invariably accompanying the capability of producing effects of some other kind. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 1 69
2We cannot therefore point to any definite want of skill and knowledge as invariably accompanying the capability of producing effects of some other kind. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 1 69 Lord can put other bodies in motion ; for volition is not dependent on a body. The cause of volitions is not the body but the internal organ (manas), and such an organ we ascribe to the Lord also, since what proves the presence of an internal organ endowed with power and knowledge is just the presence of effects. — But volitions, even if directly springing from the internal organ, can belong to embodied beings only, such only possessing internal organs ! — This objection also is founded on a mistaken generalization : the fact rather is that the internal organ is permanent, and exists also in separation from the body. The conclusion, therefore, is that — as the individual souls with their limited capacities and knowledge, and their dependence on merit and demerit, are incapable of giving rise to things so variously and wonderfully made as worlds and animated bodies are — inference directly leads us to the theory that there is a supreme intelligent agent, called the Lord, who possesses unfathomable, unlimited powers and wisdom, is capable of constructing the entire world, is without a body, and through his mere volition brings about the infinite expanse of this entire universe so variously and wonder- fully planned. As Brahman may thus be ascertained by means of knowledge other than revelation, the text quoted under the preceding Sutra cannot be taken to convey instruction as to Brahman. Since, moreover, experience demonstrates that material and instrumental causes always are things absolutely distinct from each other, as e. g. the clay and the potter with his implements ; and since, further, there are substances not made up of parts, as e. g. ether, which therefore cannot be viewed as effects; we must object on these grounds also to any attempt to represent the one Brahman as the universal material and instrumental cause of the entire world. Against all this we now argue as follows : — The Vedanta- text declaring the origination, &c, of the world does teach that there is a Brahman possessing the characteristics men- tioned ; since Scripture alone is a means for the knowledge of Brahman. That the world is an effected thing because it consists of parts ; and that, as all effects are observed to 1 70 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
3That the world is an effected thing because it consists of parts ; and that, as all effects are observed to 1 70 VEDANTA-stjTRAS. have for their antecedents certain appropriate agents com- petent to produce them, we must infer a causal agent competent to plan and construct the universe, and stand- ing towards it in the relation of material and operative cause — this would be a conclusion altogether unjustified. There is no proof to show that the earth, oceans, &c, although things produced, were created at one time by one creator. Nor can it be pleaded in favour of such a con- clusion that all those things have one uniform character of being effects, and thus are analogous to one single jar; for we observe that various effects are distinguished by- difference of time of production, and difference of producers. Nor again may you maintain the oneness of the creator on the ground that individual souls are incapable of the creation of this wonderful universe, and that if an additional principle be assumed to account for the world — which manifestly is a product — it would be illegitimate to assume \ more than one such principle. For we observe that in- j dividual beings acquire more and more extraordinary 1 powers in consequence of an increase of religious merit ; and as we may assume that through an eventual supreme degree of merit they may in the end qualify themselves for producing quite extraordinary effects, we have no right to assume a highest soul of infinite merit, different from all individual souls. Nor also can it be proved that all things are destroyed and produced all at once ; for no such thing is observed to take place, while it is, on the other hand, observed that things are produced and destroyed in suc- cession ; and if we infer that all things are produced and destroyed because they are effects, there is no reason why this production and destruction should not take place in a way agreeing with ordinary experience. If, therefore, what it is desired to prove is the agency of one intelligent being, we are met by the difficulty that the proving reason (viz. the circumstance of something being an effect) is not invariably connected with what it is desired to prove ; there, further, is the fault of qualities not met with in experience being attributed to the subject about which something has to be proved ; and lastly there is the fault T ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 171
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1If the origina- tion of the effect can be accounted for on the basis of the agent's capability of bringing it about, and of his knowledge 1 68 VEDANTA-stiTRAS. of the special material and instrumental causes, it would be unreasonable to ascribe causal agency to his (altogether irrelevant) incapabilities and ignorance with regard to other things, only because those incapabilities, &c, are observed to exist together with his special capability and knowledge. The question would arise moreover whether such want of capability and knowledge (with regard to things other than the one actually effected) would be helpful towards the bringing about of that one effect, in so far as extending to all other things or to some other things. The former alternative is excluded because no agent, a potter e. g., is quite ignorant of all other things but his own special work ; and the second alternative is inadmissible because there is no definite rule indicating that there should be certain definite kinds of want of knowledge and skill in the case of all agents 1, and hence exceptions would arise with regard to every special case of want of knowledge and skill. From this it follows that the absence of lordly power and similar qualities which (indeed is observed in the case of ordinary agents but) in no way contributes towards the production of the effects (to which such agents give rise) is not proved in the case of that which we wish to prove (i. e. a Lord, creator of the world), and that hence Inference does not establish qualities contrary (to the qualities characteristic of a Lord). A further objection will perhaps be raised, viz. that as experience teaches that potters and so on direct their im- plements through the mediation of their own bodies, we are not justified in holding that a bodiless Supreme Lord directs the material and instrumental causes of the universe. — But in reply to this we appeal to the fact of experience, that evil demons possessing men's bodies, and also venom, are driven or drawn out of those bodies by mere will power. Nor must you ask in what way the volition of a bodiless 1 A certain potter may not possess the skill and knowledge required to make chairs and beds; but some other potter may possess both, and so on. We cannot therefore point to any definite want of skill and knowledge as invariably accompanying the capability of producing effects of some other kind. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 1 69
2We cannot therefore point to any definite want of skill and knowledge as invariably accompanying the capability of producing effects of some other kind. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 1 69 Lord can put other bodies in motion ; for volition is not dependent on a body. The cause of volitions is not the body but the internal organ (manas), and such an organ we ascribe to the Lord also, since what proves the presence of an internal organ endowed with power and knowledge is just the presence of effects. — But volitions, even if directly springing from the internal organ, can belong to embodied beings only, such only possessing internal organs ! — This objection also is founded on a mistaken generalization : the fact rather is that the internal organ is permanent, and exists also in separation from the body. The conclusion, therefore, is that — as the individual souls with their limited capacities and knowledge, and their dependence on merit and demerit, are incapable of giving rise to things so variously and wonderfully made as worlds and animated bodies are — inference directly leads us to the theory that there is a supreme intelligent agent, called the Lord, who possesses unfathomable, unlimited powers and wisdom, is capable of constructing the entire world, is without a body, and through his mere volition brings about the infinite expanse of this entire universe so variously and wonder- fully planned. As Brahman may thus be ascertained by means of knowledge other than revelation, the text quoted under the preceding Sutra cannot be taken to convey instruction as to Brahman. Since, moreover, experience demonstrates that material and instrumental causes always are things absolutely distinct from each other, as e. g. the clay and the potter with his implements ; and since, further, there are substances not made up of parts, as e. g. ether, which therefore cannot be viewed as effects; we must object on these grounds also to any attempt to represent the one Brahman as the universal material and instrumental cause of the entire world. Against all this we now argue as follows : — The Vedanta- text declaring the origination, &c, of the world does teach that there is a Brahman possessing the characteristics men- tioned ; since Scripture alone is a means for the knowledge of Brahman. That the world is an effected thing because it consists of parts ; and that, as all effects are observed to 1 70 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
3That the world is an effected thing because it consists of parts ; and that, as all effects are observed to 1 70 VEDANTA-stjTRAS. have for their antecedents certain appropriate agents com- petent to produce them, we must infer a causal agent competent to plan and construct the universe, and stand- ing towards it in the relation of material and operative cause — this would be a conclusion altogether unjustified. There is no proof to show that the earth, oceans, &c, although things produced, were created at one time by one creator. Nor can it be pleaded in favour of such a con- clusion that all those things have one uniform character of being effects, and thus are analogous to one single jar; for we observe that various effects are distinguished by- difference of time of production, and difference of producers. Nor again may you maintain the oneness of the creator on the ground that individual souls are incapable of the creation of this wonderful universe, and that if an additional principle be assumed to account for the world — which manifestly is a product — it would be illegitimate to assume \ more than one such principle. For we observe that in- j dividual beings acquire more and more extraordinary 1 powers in consequence of an increase of religious merit ; and as we may assume that through an eventual supreme degree of merit they may in the end qualify themselves for producing quite extraordinary effects, we have no right to assume a highest soul of infinite merit, different from all individual souls. Nor also can it be proved that all things are destroyed and produced all at once ; for no such thing is observed to take place, while it is, on the other hand, observed that things are produced and destroyed in suc- cession ; and if we infer that all things are produced and destroyed because they are effects, there is no reason why this production and destruction should not take place in a way agreeing with ordinary experience. If, therefore, what it is desired to prove is the agency of one intelligent being, we are met by the difficulty that the proving reason (viz. the circumstance of something being an effect) is not invariably connected with what it is desired to prove ; there, further, is the fault of qualities not met with in experience being attributed to the subject about which something has to be proved ; and lastly there is the fault T ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 171
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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