Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1The perception of the second individual thus is ' determinate ' in so far as it is determined by a special attribute, viz. the extension, to the perception, of the generic character of a class — manifested in a certain 42 vedAnta-s{jtras. outward shape — which connects this act of perception with the earlier perception (of the first individual) ; such deter- mination being ascertained only on the apprehension of the second individual. Such extension or continuance of a certain generic character is, on the other hand, not appre- hended on the apprehension of the first individual, and perception of the latter kind thence is ' non-determinate/ That it is such is not due to non-apprehension of struc- ture, colour, generic character and so on, for all these attributes are equally objects of sensuous perception (and hence perceived as belonging to the first individual also). Moreover that which possesses structure cannot be perceived apart from the structure, and hence in the case of the apprehension of the first individual there is already perception of structure, giving rise to the judgment 'The thing is such and such.' In the case of the second, third, &c, individuals, on the other hand, we apprehend, in addition to the thing possessing structure and to the structure itself, the special attribute of the persistence of the generic character, and hence the perception is ' deter- minate.' From all this it follows that perception never has for its object that which is devoid of all difference. The bhed&bheda view is untenable. The same arguments tend to refute the view that there is difference and absence of difference at the same time (the so-called bhedabheda view). Take the judgment 'This is such and such ' ; how can we realise here the non-difference of ' being this ' and ' being such and such ' ? The ' such and such ' denotes a peculiar make characterised, e. g. by a dewlap, the ' this ' denotes the thing distinguished by that peculiar make; the non-difference of these two is thus contradicted by immediate consciousness. At the outset the thing perceived is perceived as separate from all other things, and this separation is founded on the fact that the thing is distinguished by a special constitution, let us say the generic characteristics of a cow, expressed by the term ' such and such/ In general, wherever we cognise the relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I.
2thereby, the two clearly present themselves to our mind as absolutely different. Some things — e. g. staffs and bracelets — appear sometimes as having a separate, independent existence of their own ; at other times they present them- selves as distinguishing attributes of other things or beings (i. e. of the persons carrying staffs or wearing bracelets). Other entities — e.g. the generic character of cows — have a being only in so far as they constitute the form of substances, and thus always present themselves as distinguishing attri- butes of those substances. In both cases there is the same relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished thereby, and these two are apprehended as absolutely different. The difference between the two classes of entities is only that staffs, bracelets, and similar things are capable of being apprehended in separation from other things, while the generic characteristics of a species are absolutely incapable thereof. The assertion, therefore, that the differ- ence of things is refuted by immediate consciousness, is based on the plain denial of a certain form of consciousness, the one namely — admitted by every one — which is expressed in the judgment ' This thing is such and such.' — This same point is clearly expounded by the Sutrakara in II, 2, 33. Inference also teaches difference. Perception thus having for its object only what is marked by difference, inference also is in the same case ; for its object is only what is distinguished by connexion with things known through perception and other means of know- ledge. And thus, even in the case of disagreement as to the number of the different instruments of knowledge, a thing devoid of difference could not be established by any of them since the instruments of knowledge acknowledged by all have only one and the same object, viz. what is marked by difference. And a person who maintains the existence of a thing devoid of difference on the ground of differences affecting that very thing simply contradicts himself without knowing what he does ; he is in fact no better than a man who asserts that his own mother never had any children. 44 vedAnta-s6tras. Perception does not reveal mere Being.
344 vedAnta-s6tras. Perception does not reveal mere Being. In reply to the assertion that perception causes the apprehension of pure Being only, and therefore cannot have difference for its object ; and that ' difference ' cannot be denned because it does not admit of being set forth in definite alternatives ; we point out that these charges are completely refuted by the fact that the only objects of perception are things distinguished by generic character and so on, and that generic character and so on — as being relative things — give at once rise to the judgment as to the distinction between themselves and the things in which they inhere. You yourself admit that in the case of knowledge and in that of colour and other qualities this relation holds good, viz. that something which gives rise to a judgment about another thing at the same time gives rise to a judg- ment about itself; the same may therefore be admitted with regard to difference \ For this reason the charge of a regressus in infinitum and a logical seesaw (see above, p. 33) cannot be upheld. For even if perceptive cognition takes place within one moment, we apprehend within that moment the generic character which constitutes on the one hand the difference of the thing from others, and on the other hand the peculiar character of the thing itself; and thus there remains nothing to be apprehended in a second moment. Moreover, if perception made us apprehend only pure Being, judgments clearly referring to different objects — such as ' Here is a jar,' * There is a piece of cloth ' — would be devoid of all meaning. And if through perception we did not apprehend difference — as marked by generic character, &c, constituting the structure or make of a thing — why should a man searching for a horse not be satisfied with finding a buffalo ? And if mere Being only were the object of all our cognitions, why should we not remember, 1 Colour reveals itself as well as the thing that has colour; knowledge reveals itself as well as the object known ; so difference manifests itself as well as the things that differ. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 45 in the case of each particular cognition, all the words which are connected with all our cognitions ? And further, if the cognition of a horse and that of an elephant had one object only, the later cognition would cause us to apprehend only what was apprehended before, and there being thus no difference (of object of cognition) there would be nothing to distinguish the later state of cognition from remembrance. If on the other hand a difference is admitted for each state of consciousness, we admit thereby that perception has for its objects things affected with difference. If all acts of cognition had one and the same object only, everything would be apprehended by one act of cognition ; and from this it would follow that there are no persons either deaf or blind !
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1The perception of the second individual thus is ' determinate ' in so far as it is determined by a special attribute, viz. the extension, to the perception, of the generic character of a class — manifested in a certain 42 vedAnta-s{jtras. outward shape — which connects this act of perception with the earlier perception (of the first individual) ; such deter- mination being ascertained only on the apprehension of the second individual. Such extension or continuance of a certain generic character is, on the other hand, not appre- hended on the apprehension of the first individual, and perception of the latter kind thence is ' non-determinate/ That it is such is not due to non-apprehension of struc- ture, colour, generic character and so on, for all these attributes are equally objects of sensuous perception (and hence perceived as belonging to the first individual also). Moreover that which possesses structure cannot be perceived apart from the structure, and hence in the case of the apprehension of the first individual there is already perception of structure, giving rise to the judgment 'The thing is such and such.' In the case of the second, third, &c, individuals, on the other hand, we apprehend, in addition to the thing possessing structure and to the structure itself, the special attribute of the persistence of the generic character, and hence the perception is ' deter- minate.' From all this it follows that perception never has for its object that which is devoid of all difference. The bhed&bheda view is untenable. The same arguments tend to refute the view that there is difference and absence of difference at the same time (the so-called bhedabheda view). Take the judgment 'This is such and such ' ; how can we realise here the non-difference of ' being this ' and ' being such and such ' ? The ' such and such ' denotes a peculiar make characterised, e. g. by a dewlap, the ' this ' denotes the thing distinguished by that peculiar make; the non-difference of these two is thus contradicted by immediate consciousness. At the outset the thing perceived is perceived as separate from all other things, and this separation is founded on the fact that the thing is distinguished by a special constitution, let us say the generic characteristics of a cow, expressed by the term ' such and such/ In general, wherever we cognise the relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I.
2thereby, the two clearly present themselves to our mind as absolutely different. Some things — e. g. staffs and bracelets — appear sometimes as having a separate, independent existence of their own ; at other times they present them- selves as distinguishing attributes of other things or beings (i. e. of the persons carrying staffs or wearing bracelets). Other entities — e.g. the generic character of cows — have a being only in so far as they constitute the form of substances, and thus always present themselves as distinguishing attri- butes of those substances. In both cases there is the same relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished thereby, and these two are apprehended as absolutely different. The difference between the two classes of entities is only that staffs, bracelets, and similar things are capable of being apprehended in separation from other things, while the generic characteristics of a species are absolutely incapable thereof. The assertion, therefore, that the differ- ence of things is refuted by immediate consciousness, is based on the plain denial of a certain form of consciousness, the one namely — admitted by every one — which is expressed in the judgment ' This thing is such and such.' — This same point is clearly expounded by the Sutrakara in II, 2, 33. Inference also teaches difference. Perception thus having for its object only what is marked by difference, inference also is in the same case ; for its object is only what is distinguished by connexion with things known through perception and other means of know- ledge. And thus, even in the case of disagreement as to the number of the different instruments of knowledge, a thing devoid of difference could not be established by any of them since the instruments of knowledge acknowledged by all have only one and the same object, viz. what is marked by difference. And a person who maintains the existence of a thing devoid of difference on the ground of differences affecting that very thing simply contradicts himself without knowing what he does ; he is in fact no better than a man who asserts that his own mother never had any children. 44 vedAnta-s6tras. Perception does not reveal mere Being.
344 vedAnta-s6tras. Perception does not reveal mere Being. In reply to the assertion that perception causes the apprehension of pure Being only, and therefore cannot have difference for its object ; and that ' difference ' cannot be denned because it does not admit of being set forth in definite alternatives ; we point out that these charges are completely refuted by the fact that the only objects of perception are things distinguished by generic character and so on, and that generic character and so on — as being relative things — give at once rise to the judgment as to the distinction between themselves and the things in which they inhere. You yourself admit that in the case of knowledge and in that of colour and other qualities this relation holds good, viz. that something which gives rise to a judgment about another thing at the same time gives rise to a judg- ment about itself; the same may therefore be admitted with regard to difference \ For this reason the charge of a regressus in infinitum and a logical seesaw (see above, p. 33) cannot be upheld. For even if perceptive cognition takes place within one moment, we apprehend within that moment the generic character which constitutes on the one hand the difference of the thing from others, and on the other hand the peculiar character of the thing itself; and thus there remains nothing to be apprehended in a second moment. Moreover, if perception made us apprehend only pure Being, judgments clearly referring to different objects — such as ' Here is a jar,' * There is a piece of cloth ' — would be devoid of all meaning. And if through perception we did not apprehend difference — as marked by generic character, &c, constituting the structure or make of a thing — why should a man searching for a horse not be satisfied with finding a buffalo ? And if mere Being only were the object of all our cognitions, why should we not remember, 1 Colour reveals itself as well as the thing that has colour; knowledge reveals itself as well as the object known ; so difference manifests itself as well as the things that differ. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 45 in the case of each particular cognition, all the words which are connected with all our cognitions ? And further, if the cognition of a horse and that of an elephant had one object only, the later cognition would cause us to apprehend only what was apprehended before, and there being thus no difference (of object of cognition) there would be nothing to distinguish the later state of cognition from remembrance. If on the other hand a difference is admitted for each state of consciousness, we admit thereby that perception has for its objects things affected with difference. If all acts of cognition had one and the same object only, everything would be apprehended by one act of cognition ; and from this it would follow that there are no persons either deaf or blind !
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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