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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Up. VI, 16); * He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs ' (Svet. Up. VI, 9) ; ' One of the two eats the sweet fruit, without eating the other looks on ' (Svet Up. IV, 6) ; 'He who dwelling in the Self (Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 22); 192 vedanta-sCtras. c Embraced by the intelligent Self he knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within' (Br/. Up. IV, 3, 21); ' Mounted by the intelligent Self he goes groaning ' (Brz. Up. IV, 3, 35) ; ' Having known him he passes beyond death' (5vet. Up. Ill, 8). — On the ground of these two sets of passages the individual and the highest Self must needs be assumed to stand in the bhedabheda-relation. And texts such as ' He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman ' (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 9), which teach that in the state of Release the individual soul enters into Brahman itself ; and again texts such as 'But when the Self has become all for him, whereby should he see another ' (Br/. Up. II, 4, 13), which forbid us to view, in the state of Release, the Lord as something different (from the individual soul), show that non-difference is essential (while difference is merely aupadhika). But, an objection is raised, the text ' He reaches all desires together in the wise Brahman,' in using the word 'together' shows that even in the state of Release the soul is different from Brahman, and the same view is expressed in two of the Sutras, viz. IV, 4, 17 ; 21.— This is not so, we reply ; for the text, ' There is no other seer but he' (Br/. Up. Ill, 7, 23), and many similar texts distinctly negative all plurality in the Self. The Taittiriya- text quoted by you means that man reaches Brahman with all desires, i.e. Brahman comprising within itself all objects of desire ; if it were understood differently, it would follow that Brahman holds a subordinate position only. And if the Sutra IV, 4, 17 meant that the released soul is separate from Brahman it would follow that it is deficient in lordly power ; and if this were so the Sutra would be in conflict with other Sutras such as IV, 4, 1. — For these reasons, non-difference is the essential condition ; while the distinc- tion of the souls from Brahman and from each other is due to their limiting adjuncts, i.e. the internal organ, the sense- organs, and the body. Brahman indeed is without parts and omnipresent ; but through its adjuncts it becomes capable of division just as ether is divided by jars and the like. Nor must it be said that this leads to a reprehensible I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 1 93
2the internal organ, the sense- organs, and the body. Brahman indeed is without parts and omnipresent ; but through its adjuncts it becomes capable of division just as ether is divided by jars and the like. Nor must it be said that this leads to a reprehensible I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 1 93 mutual dependence — Brahman in so far as divided entering into conjunction with its adjuncts, and again the division in Brahman being caused by its conjunction with its adjuncts; for these adjuncts and Brahman's connexion with them are due to action (karman), and the stream of action is without a beginning. The limiting adjuncts to which a soul is joined spring from the soul as connected with previous works, and work again springs from the soul as joined to its adjuncts : and as this connexion with works and adjuncts is without a beginning in time, no fault can be found with our theory. — The non-difference of the souls from each other and Brahman is thus essential, while their difference is due to the Upadhis. These Upadhis, on the other hand, are at the same time essentially non-distinct and essentially distinct from each other and Brahman ; for there are no other Upadhis (to account for their dis- tinction if non-essential), and if we admitted such, we should again have to assume further Upadhis, and so on in infinitum. We therefore hold that the Upadhis are pro- duced, in accordance with the actions of the individual souls, as essentially non-different and different from Brahman. To this bhedabheda view the Purvapakshin now objects on the following grounds: — The whole aggregate of Vedanta-texts aims at enjoining meditation on a non- dual Brahman whose essence is reality, intelligence, and bliss, and thus sets forth the view of non-difference ; while on the other hand the karma-section of the Veda, and like- wise perception and the other means of knowledge, intimate the view of the difference of things. Now, as difference and non-difference are contradictory, and as the view of difference may be accounted for as resting on beginningless Nescience, we conclude that universal non-difference is what is real. — The tenet that difference and non-difference are not contradictory because both are proved by our con- sciousness, cannot be upheld. If one thing has different characteristics from another there is distinction (bheda) of the two ; the contrary condition of things constitutes non-distinction (abheda) ; who in his senses then would maintain that these two — suchness and non-suchness — can [48] O 1 94 vedanta-sCtras.
3If one thing has different characteristics from another there is distinction (bheda) of the two ; the contrary condition of things constitutes non-distinction (abheda) ; who in his senses then would maintain that these two — suchness and non-suchness — can [48] O 1 94 vedanta-sCtras. be found together ? You have maintained that non- difference belongs to a thing viewed as cause and genus, and difference to the same viewed as effect and individual ; and that, owing to this twofold aspect of things, non- difference and difference are not irreconcileable. But that this view also is untenable, a presentation of the question in definite alternatives will show. Do you mean to say that the difference lies in one aspect of the thing and the non-difference in the other? or that difference and non- difference belong to the thing possessing two aspects? — On the former alternative the difference belongs to the individual and the non-difference to the genus ; and this implies that there is no one thing with a double aspect. And should you say that the genus and individual together constitute one thing only, you abandon the view that it is difference of aspect which takes away the contradictoriness of difference and non-difference. We have moreover re- marked already that difference in characteristics and its opposite are absolutely contradictory. — On the second alternative we have two aspects of different kind and an unknown thing supposed to be the substrate of those aspects ; but this assumption of a triad of entities proves only their mutual difference of character, not their non- difference. Should you say that the non-contradictoriness of two aspects constitutes simultaneous difference and non- difference in the thing which is their substrate, we ask in return — How can two aspects which have a thing for their substrate, and thus are different from the thing, introduce into that thing a combination of two contradictory attri- butes (viz. difference and non-difference) ? And much less even are they able to do so if they are viewed as non-different from the thing which is their substrate. If, moreover, the two aspects on the one hand, and the thing in which they inhere on the other, be admitted to be distinct entities, there will be required a further factor to bring about their difference and non-difference, and we shall thus be led into a regressus in infinitum. — Nor is it a fact that the idea of a thing inclusive of its generic character bears the character of unity, in the same way as I ADHVAYA, I PADA, 4. I95 the admittedly uniform idea of an individual ; for wherever a state of consciousness expresses itself in the form ' this is such and such ' it implies the distinction of an attribute or mode, and that to which the attribute or mode belongs. In the case under discussion the genus constitutes the mode, and the individual that to which the mode belongs : the idea does not therefore possess the character of unity.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Up. VI, 16); * He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs ' (Svet. Up. VI, 9) ; ' One of the two eats the sweet fruit, without eating the other looks on ' (Svet Up. IV, 6) ; 'He who dwelling in the Self (Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 22); 192 vedanta-sCtras. c Embraced by the intelligent Self he knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within' (Br/. Up. IV, 3, 21); ' Mounted by the intelligent Self he goes groaning ' (Brz. Up. IV, 3, 35) ; ' Having known him he passes beyond death' (5vet. Up. Ill, 8). — On the ground of these two sets of passages the individual and the highest Self must needs be assumed to stand in the bhedabheda-relation. And texts such as ' He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman ' (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 9), which teach that in the state of Release the individual soul enters into Brahman itself ; and again texts such as 'But when the Self has become all for him, whereby should he see another ' (Br/. Up. II, 4, 13), which forbid us to view, in the state of Release, the Lord as something different (from the individual soul), show that non-difference is essential (while difference is merely aupadhika). But, an objection is raised, the text ' He reaches all desires together in the wise Brahman,' in using the word 'together' shows that even in the state of Release the soul is different from Brahman, and the same view is expressed in two of the Sutras, viz. IV, 4, 17 ; 21.— This is not so, we reply ; for the text, ' There is no other seer but he' (Br/. Up. Ill, 7, 23), and many similar texts distinctly negative all plurality in the Self. The Taittiriya- text quoted by you means that man reaches Brahman with all desires, i.e. Brahman comprising within itself all objects of desire ; if it were understood differently, it would follow that Brahman holds a subordinate position only. And if the Sutra IV, 4, 17 meant that the released soul is separate from Brahman it would follow that it is deficient in lordly power ; and if this were so the Sutra would be in conflict with other Sutras such as IV, 4, 1. — For these reasons, non-difference is the essential condition ; while the distinc- tion of the souls from Brahman and from each other is due to their limiting adjuncts, i.e. the internal organ, the sense- organs, and the body. Brahman indeed is without parts and omnipresent ; but through its adjuncts it becomes capable of division just as ether is divided by jars and the like. Nor must it be said that this leads to a reprehensible I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 1 93
2the internal organ, the sense- organs, and the body. Brahman indeed is without parts and omnipresent ; but through its adjuncts it becomes capable of division just as ether is divided by jars and the like. Nor must it be said that this leads to a reprehensible I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 1 93 mutual dependence — Brahman in so far as divided entering into conjunction with its adjuncts, and again the division in Brahman being caused by its conjunction with its adjuncts; for these adjuncts and Brahman's connexion with them are due to action (karman), and the stream of action is without a beginning. The limiting adjuncts to which a soul is joined spring from the soul as connected with previous works, and work again springs from the soul as joined to its adjuncts : and as this connexion with works and adjuncts is without a beginning in time, no fault can be found with our theory. — The non-difference of the souls from each other and Brahman is thus essential, while their difference is due to the Upadhis. These Upadhis, on the other hand, are at the same time essentially non-distinct and essentially distinct from each other and Brahman ; for there are no other Upadhis (to account for their dis- tinction if non-essential), and if we admitted such, we should again have to assume further Upadhis, and so on in infinitum. We therefore hold that the Upadhis are pro- duced, in accordance with the actions of the individual souls, as essentially non-different and different from Brahman. To this bhedabheda view the Purvapakshin now objects on the following grounds: — The whole aggregate of Vedanta-texts aims at enjoining meditation on a non- dual Brahman whose essence is reality, intelligence, and bliss, and thus sets forth the view of non-difference ; while on the other hand the karma-section of the Veda, and like- wise perception and the other means of knowledge, intimate the view of the difference of things. Now, as difference and non-difference are contradictory, and as the view of difference may be accounted for as resting on beginningless Nescience, we conclude that universal non-difference is what is real. — The tenet that difference and non-difference are not contradictory because both are proved by our con- sciousness, cannot be upheld. If one thing has different characteristics from another there is distinction (bheda) of the two ; the contrary condition of things constitutes non-distinction (abheda) ; who in his senses then would maintain that these two — suchness and non-suchness — can [48] O 1 94 vedanta-sCtras.
3If one thing has different characteristics from another there is distinction (bheda) of the two ; the contrary condition of things constitutes non-distinction (abheda) ; who in his senses then would maintain that these two — suchness and non-suchness — can [48] O 1 94 vedanta-sCtras. be found together ? You have maintained that non- difference belongs to a thing viewed as cause and genus, and difference to the same viewed as effect and individual ; and that, owing to this twofold aspect of things, non- difference and difference are not irreconcileable. But that this view also is untenable, a presentation of the question in definite alternatives will show. Do you mean to say that the difference lies in one aspect of the thing and the non-difference in the other? or that difference and non- difference belong to the thing possessing two aspects? — On the former alternative the difference belongs to the individual and the non-difference to the genus ; and this implies that there is no one thing with a double aspect. And should you say that the genus and individual together constitute one thing only, you abandon the view that it is difference of aspect which takes away the contradictoriness of difference and non-difference. We have moreover re- marked already that difference in characteristics and its opposite are absolutely contradictory. — On the second alternative we have two aspects of different kind and an unknown thing supposed to be the substrate of those aspects ; but this assumption of a triad of entities proves only their mutual difference of character, not their non- difference. Should you say that the non-contradictoriness of two aspects constitutes simultaneous difference and non- difference in the thing which is their substrate, we ask in return — How can two aspects which have a thing for their substrate, and thus are different from the thing, introduce into that thing a combination of two contradictory attri- butes (viz. difference and non-difference) ? And much less even are they able to do so if they are viewed as non-different from the thing which is their substrate. If, moreover, the two aspects on the one hand, and the thing in which they inhere on the other, be admitted to be distinct entities, there will be required a further factor to bring about their difference and non-difference, and we shall thus be led into a regressus in infinitum. — Nor is it a fact that the idea of a thing inclusive of its generic character bears the character of unity, in the same way as I ADHVAYA, I PADA, 4. I95 the admittedly uniform idea of an individual ; for wherever a state of consciousness expresses itself in the form ' this is such and such ' it implies the distinction of an attribute or mode, and that to which the attribute or mode belongs. In the case under discussion the genus constitutes the mode, and the individual that to which the mode belongs : the idea does not therefore possess the character of unity.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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