Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— It might appear, we reply, that the Vedanta should be sup- ported by the Yoga-smrzti, firstly, because the latter admits II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 413 the existence of a Lord * secondly, because the Vedanta- texts mention Yoga as a means to bring about final Release; and thirdly, because Hira^yagarbha, who proclaimed the Yoga-snmti, is qualified for the promulgation of all Vedanta- texts. — But these arguments refute themselves as follows. In the first place the Yoga holds the Pradhana, which is independent of Brahman, to be the general material cause, and hence the Lord acknowledged by it is a mere operative cause. In the second place the nature of meditation, in which Yoga consists, is determined by the nature of the object of meditation, and as of its two objects, viz. the soul and the Lord, the former does not have its Self in Brahman, and the latter is neither the cause of the world nor en- dowed with the other auspicious qualities (which belong to Brahman), the Yoga is not of Vedic character. And as to the third point, Hira^yagarbha himself is only an indi- vidual soul, and hence liable to be overpowered by the inferior gu?zas, i. e. passion and darkness ; and hence the Yoga-smrzti is founded on error, no less than the Pura?zas, promulgated by him, which are founded on ra^-as and tamas. The Yoga cannot, therefore, be used for the sup- port of the Vedanta. — Here finishes the adhikara/za of ' the refutation of the Yoga/ 4. Not, on account of the difference of character of that ; and its being such (appears) from Scripture. The same opponent who laid stress on the conflict between Scripture and Smrzti now again comes forward, relying this time (not on Smr/ti but) on simple reasoning. Your doctrine, he says, as to the world being an effect of Brahman which you attempted to prove by a refutation of the Sahkhya Smr/ti shows itself to be irrational for the following reason. Perception and the other means of knowledge show this world with all its sentient and non- sentient beings to be of a non-intelligent and impure nature, to possess none of the qualities of the Lord, and to have pain for its very essence ; and such a world totally differs in nature from the Brahman, postulated by you, which is said to be all-knowing, of supreme lordly power, 414 VED ANTA-S<JTR AS.
2antagonistic to all evil, enjoying unbroken uniform blessed- ness. This difference in character of the world from Brahman is, moreover, not only known through Percep- tion, and so on, but is seen to be directly stated in Scripture itself ; compare ' Knowledge and non-knowledge ' (Taitt. Up. II, 6, 1) ; ' Thus are these objects placed on the subjects, and the subjects on the pra^a ' (Kau. Up. Ill, 9) ; * On the same tree man sits grieving, immersed, bewildered by his own impotence ' (Svet. Up. IV, 7); 'The soul not being a Lord is bound because he has to enjoy ' (5vet. Up. I, 8) ; and so on ; all which texts refer to the effect, i. e. the world as being non-intelligent, of the essence of pain, and so on. The general rule is that an effect is non-different in character from its cause ; as e. g. pots and bracelets are non-different in character from their material causes— clay and gold. The world cannot, therefore, be the effect of Brahman from which it differs in character, and we hence conclude that, in agreement with the Sankhya Smrzti, the Pradhana which resembles the actual world in character must be assumed to be the general cause. Scripture, although not dependent on anything else and concerned with super- sensuous objects, must all the same come to terms with ratiocination (tarka); for all the different means of know- ledge can in many cases help us to arrive at a decisive conclusion, only if they are supported by ratiocination. For by tarka we understand that kind of knowledge (intellectual activity) which in the case of any given matter, by means of an investigation either into the essential nature of that matter or into collateral (auxiliary) factors, determines what possesses proving power, and what are the special details of the matter under consideration : this kind of cognitional activity is also called uha. All means of knowledge equally stand in need of tarka ; Scripture how- ever, the authoritative character of which specially depends on expectancy (akanksha), proximity (sannidhi), and com- patibility (yogyata), throughout requires to be assisted by tarka. In accordance with this Manu says, ' He who investi- gates by means of reasoning, he only knows religious duty, and none other/ It is with a view to such confirmation of II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 415
3In accordance with this Manu says, ' He who investi- gates by means of reasoning, he only knows religious duty, and none other/ It is with a view to such confirmation of II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 415 the sense of Scripture by means of Reasoning that the texts declare that certain topics such as the Self must be ' reflected on ' (mantavya). — Now here it might possibly be said that as Brahman is ascertained from Scripture to be the sole cause of the world, it must be admitted that intelligence exists in the world also, which is an effect of Brahman. In the same way as the consciousness of an intelligent being is not perceived when it is in the states of deep sleep, swoon, &c, so the intelligent nature of jars and the like also is not observed, although it really exists ; and it is this very difference of manifestation and non- manifestation of intelligence on which the distinction of intelligent and non-intelligent beings depends. — But to this we reply that permanent non-perception of intelligence proves its non-existence. This consideration also refutes the hypothesis of things commonly called non-intelligent possessing the power, or potentiality, of consciousness. For if you maintain that a thing possesses the power of producing an effect while yet that effect is never and nowhere seen to be produced by it, you may as well pro- claim at a meeting of sons of barren women that their mothers possess eminent procreative power ! Moreover, to prove at first from the Vedanta-texts that Brahman is the material cause of the world, and from this that pots and the like possess potential consciousness, and therefrom the existence of non- manifested consciousness ; and then, on the other hand, to start from the last principle as proved and to deduce therefrom that the Vedanta-texts prove Brahman to be the material cause of the world, is simply to argue in a circle; for that the relation of cause and effect should exist between things different in character is just what cannot be proved. — What sameness of character, again, of causal substance and effects, have you in mind when you maintain that from the absence of such same- ness it follows that Brahman cannot be proved to be the material cause of the world ? It cannot be complete same- ness of all attributes, because in that case the relation of cause and effect (which after all requires some difference) could not be established. For we do not observe that in 4 1 6 vedAnta-s6tr as.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— It might appear, we reply, that the Vedanta should be sup- ported by the Yoga-smrzti, firstly, because the latter admits II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 413 the existence of a Lord * secondly, because the Vedanta- texts mention Yoga as a means to bring about final Release; and thirdly, because Hira^yagarbha, who proclaimed the Yoga-snmti, is qualified for the promulgation of all Vedanta- texts. — But these arguments refute themselves as follows. In the first place the Yoga holds the Pradhana, which is independent of Brahman, to be the general material cause, and hence the Lord acknowledged by it is a mere operative cause. In the second place the nature of meditation, in which Yoga consists, is determined by the nature of the object of meditation, and as of its two objects, viz. the soul and the Lord, the former does not have its Self in Brahman, and the latter is neither the cause of the world nor en- dowed with the other auspicious qualities (which belong to Brahman), the Yoga is not of Vedic character. And as to the third point, Hira^yagarbha himself is only an indi- vidual soul, and hence liable to be overpowered by the inferior gu?zas, i. e. passion and darkness ; and hence the Yoga-smrzti is founded on error, no less than the Pura?zas, promulgated by him, which are founded on ra^-as and tamas. The Yoga cannot, therefore, be used for the sup- port of the Vedanta. — Here finishes the adhikara/za of ' the refutation of the Yoga/ 4. Not, on account of the difference of character of that ; and its being such (appears) from Scripture. The same opponent who laid stress on the conflict between Scripture and Smrzti now again comes forward, relying this time (not on Smr/ti but) on simple reasoning. Your doctrine, he says, as to the world being an effect of Brahman which you attempted to prove by a refutation of the Sahkhya Smr/ti shows itself to be irrational for the following reason. Perception and the other means of knowledge show this world with all its sentient and non- sentient beings to be of a non-intelligent and impure nature, to possess none of the qualities of the Lord, and to have pain for its very essence ; and such a world totally differs in nature from the Brahman, postulated by you, which is said to be all-knowing, of supreme lordly power, 414 VED ANTA-S<JTR AS.
2antagonistic to all evil, enjoying unbroken uniform blessed- ness. This difference in character of the world from Brahman is, moreover, not only known through Percep- tion, and so on, but is seen to be directly stated in Scripture itself ; compare ' Knowledge and non-knowledge ' (Taitt. Up. II, 6, 1) ; ' Thus are these objects placed on the subjects, and the subjects on the pra^a ' (Kau. Up. Ill, 9) ; * On the same tree man sits grieving, immersed, bewildered by his own impotence ' (Svet. Up. IV, 7); 'The soul not being a Lord is bound because he has to enjoy ' (5vet. Up. I, 8) ; and so on ; all which texts refer to the effect, i. e. the world as being non-intelligent, of the essence of pain, and so on. The general rule is that an effect is non-different in character from its cause ; as e. g. pots and bracelets are non-different in character from their material causes— clay and gold. The world cannot, therefore, be the effect of Brahman from which it differs in character, and we hence conclude that, in agreement with the Sankhya Smrzti, the Pradhana which resembles the actual world in character must be assumed to be the general cause. Scripture, although not dependent on anything else and concerned with super- sensuous objects, must all the same come to terms with ratiocination (tarka); for all the different means of know- ledge can in many cases help us to arrive at a decisive conclusion, only if they are supported by ratiocination. For by tarka we understand that kind of knowledge (intellectual activity) which in the case of any given matter, by means of an investigation either into the essential nature of that matter or into collateral (auxiliary) factors, determines what possesses proving power, and what are the special details of the matter under consideration : this kind of cognitional activity is also called uha. All means of knowledge equally stand in need of tarka ; Scripture how- ever, the authoritative character of which specially depends on expectancy (akanksha), proximity (sannidhi), and com- patibility (yogyata), throughout requires to be assisted by tarka. In accordance with this Manu says, ' He who investi- gates by means of reasoning, he only knows religious duty, and none other/ It is with a view to such confirmation of II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 415
3In accordance with this Manu says, ' He who investi- gates by means of reasoning, he only knows religious duty, and none other/ It is with a view to such confirmation of II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 415 the sense of Scripture by means of Reasoning that the texts declare that certain topics such as the Self must be ' reflected on ' (mantavya). — Now here it might possibly be said that as Brahman is ascertained from Scripture to be the sole cause of the world, it must be admitted that intelligence exists in the world also, which is an effect of Brahman. In the same way as the consciousness of an intelligent being is not perceived when it is in the states of deep sleep, swoon, &c, so the intelligent nature of jars and the like also is not observed, although it really exists ; and it is this very difference of manifestation and non- manifestation of intelligence on which the distinction of intelligent and non-intelligent beings depends. — But to this we reply that permanent non-perception of intelligence proves its non-existence. This consideration also refutes the hypothesis of things commonly called non-intelligent possessing the power, or potentiality, of consciousness. For if you maintain that a thing possesses the power of producing an effect while yet that effect is never and nowhere seen to be produced by it, you may as well pro- claim at a meeting of sons of barren women that their mothers possess eminent procreative power ! Moreover, to prove at first from the Vedanta-texts that Brahman is the material cause of the world, and from this that pots and the like possess potential consciousness, and therefrom the existence of non- manifested consciousness ; and then, on the other hand, to start from the last principle as proved and to deduce therefrom that the Vedanta-texts prove Brahman to be the material cause of the world, is simply to argue in a circle; for that the relation of cause and effect should exist between things different in character is just what cannot be proved. — What sameness of character, again, of causal substance and effects, have you in mind when you maintain that from the absence of such same- ness it follows that Brahman cannot be proved to be the material cause of the world ? It cannot be complete same- ness of all attributes, because in that case the relation of cause and effect (which after all requires some difference) could not be established. For we do not observe that in 4 1 6 vedAnta-s6tr as.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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