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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— It is not to be repeated, the Purvapakshin maintains; for the highest Self is just that which is constituted by the qualities — freedom from all evil, and so on — and as that Self so con- 666 vedanta-sOtras. stituted can be comprised in one meditation, there is no need of repeating the meditation on account of the qualities. — This view the Sutra sets aside. The meditation has to be repeated. The highest Self indeed is that being to which alone freedom from evil and the other qualities belong, and it forms the object of the first meditation ; yet there is a difference between it as viewed in its essential being and as viewed as possessing those qualities ; and moreover, the clause ' free from evil, from old age/ &c. enjoins a meditation on the Self as possessing those qualities. It is therefore first to be meditated on in its essential nature, and then there takes place a repetition of the meditation on it in order to bring in those special qualities. The case is analogous to that of ' the offerings/ There is a text * He is to offer a purodasa, on eleven potsherds to Indra the ruler, to Indra the supreme ruler, to Indra the self-ruler/ This injunction refers to one and the same Indra, possessing the qualities of rulership and so on ; but as, through connexion with those several qualities, the aspects of Indra differ, the oblation of the purodasa has to be repeated. This is declared in the Sankarshawa, ' The divinities are different on account of separation.' — Here terminates the adhikara^a of * offerings/ 43. On account of the plurality of indicatory marks; for that (proof) is stronger. This also is declared (in the Purva Mima^sa). The Taittiriyaka contains another daharavidya, 'The thousand-headed god, the all-eyed one/ &c. (Mahanar. Up. XI). Here the doubt arises whether this vidya, as being one with the previously introduced vidya, states qualities to be included in the meditation enjoined in that vidya, or qualities to be included in the meditations on the highest Self as enjoined in all the Vedanta-texts. — The former is the case, the Purvapakshin holds, on account of the leading subject-matter. For in the preceding section (X) the meditation on the small ether is introduced as the subject-matter. ' There is the small lotus placed in the middle of the town (of the body), free from all evil, the abode Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 43. 667
2For in the preceding section (X) the meditation on the small ether is introduced as the subject-matter. ' There is the small lotus placed in the middle of the town (of the body), free from all evil, the abode Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 43. 667 of the Highest; within that there is a small space, free from sorrow — what is within that should be meditated upon* (Mah&nar. Up. X, 23). Now, as the lotus of the heart is mentioned only in section X, the * Naraya^a-section ' (' the heart resembling the bud of a lotus, with its point turned downwards/ XI, 6), we conclude that that section also is concerned with the object of meditation to which the daharavidycl refers. — Against this view the Sutra declares itself, * on account of the majority of indicatory marks ' ; i. e. there are in the text several marks proving that that section is meant to declare characteristics of that which constitutes the object of meditation in all medita- tions on the highest being. For that being which in those meditations is denoted as the Imperishable, .Siva, vSambhu, the highest Brahman, the highest light, the highest entity, the highest Self, and so on, is here referred to by the same names, and then declared to be Naraya^a. There are thus several indications to prove that Nariyawa is none other than that which is the object of meditation in all meditations on the Highest, viz. Brahman, which has bliss and the rest for its qualities. By ' linga ' (inferential mark) we here understand clauses (v&kya) which contain a specific indication ; for such clauses have, according to the Purva Mimosa, greater proving power than leading subject-matter (prakara^a). The argumentation that the clause 'the heart resembling the bud of a lotus flower/ &c, proves that section to stand in a dependent rela- tion to the daharavidy&, is without force ; for it being proved by a stronger argument that the section refers to that which is the object of meditation in all meditations, the clause mentioned may also be taken as declaring that in the daharavidya also the object of meditation is Nara- ya#a. Nor must it be thought that the accusatives with which the section begins (sahasra^irsham, &c.) are to be connected with the ' meditating ' enjoined in the previous section; for the ' meditating' is there enjoined by a gerundive form ('tasmin yad antas tad upasitavyam'), and with this the subsequent accusatives cannot be con- strued. Moreover, the subsequent clause (' all this is Nara- 668 vedanta-sCtras. ya#a/ &c, where the nominative case is used) shows that those accusatives are to be taken in the sense of nomina- tives.— Here terminates the adhikara^a of 'the plurality of indicatory marks/ 44. There is option with regard to what precedes (i. e. the altar made of bricks) on account of subject- matter, and hence there is action ; as in the case of the m&nasa cup.
3There is option with regard to what precedes (i. e. the altar made of bricks) on account of subject- matter, and hence there is action ; as in the case of the m&nasa cup. In the Va^asaneyaka, in the Agnirahasya chapter, there are references to certain altars built of mind, ' built of mind, built of speech/ &c. The doubt here arises whether those structures of mind, and so on, which metaphorically are called fire-altars, should be considered as being of the nature of action, on account of their connexion with a per- formance which itself is of the nature of action ; or merely of the nature of meditation, as being connected with an activity of the nature of meditation. The Sutra maintains the former view. Since those things ' built of mind, and so on/ are, through being built (or piled up)> constituted as fire-altars, they demand a performance with which to con- nect themselves ; and as in immediate proximity to them no performance is enjoined, and as the general subject- matter of the section is the fire-altar built of bricks — introduced by means of the clause ' Non-being this was in the beginning ' — which is invariably connected with a per- formance of the nature of outward action, viz. a certain sacrificial performance — we conclude that the altars built of mind, &c, which the text mentions in connexion with the same subject-matter, are themselves of the nature of action, and as such can be used as alternatives for the altar built of bricks1. An analogous case is presented by the so-called mental cup. On the tenth, so-called avivakya, day of the Soma sacrifice extending over twelve days, 1 So that for the actual outward construction of a brick altar there may optionally be substituted the merely mental construction of an imaginary altar. Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 46. 669 there takes place the mental offering of a Soma cup, all the rites connected with which are rehearsed in imagina- tion only ; the offering of that cup is thus really of the nature of thought only, but as it forms an auxiliary element in an actual outward sacrificial performance it itself assumes the character of an action. 45. And on account of the transfer. That the altar built of thought is an optional substitute for the altar built of bricks, and of the nature of an action, appears therefrom also that the clause * of these each one is as great as that previous one/ explicitly transfers to the altars of mind, and so on, the powers of the previous altar made of bricks. All those altars thus having equal effects there is choice between them. The altars of mind, and so on, therefore are auxiliary members of the sacrificial per- formance which they help to accomplish, and hence them- selves of the nature of action. — Against this view the next Sutra declares itself. 46. But it is a meditation only, on account of assertion and what is seen.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— It is not to be repeated, the Purvapakshin maintains; for the highest Self is just that which is constituted by the qualities — freedom from all evil, and so on — and as that Self so con- 666 vedanta-sOtras. stituted can be comprised in one meditation, there is no need of repeating the meditation on account of the qualities. — This view the Sutra sets aside. The meditation has to be repeated. The highest Self indeed is that being to which alone freedom from evil and the other qualities belong, and it forms the object of the first meditation ; yet there is a difference between it as viewed in its essential being and as viewed as possessing those qualities ; and moreover, the clause ' free from evil, from old age/ &c. enjoins a meditation on the Self as possessing those qualities. It is therefore first to be meditated on in its essential nature, and then there takes place a repetition of the meditation on it in order to bring in those special qualities. The case is analogous to that of ' the offerings/ There is a text * He is to offer a purodasa, on eleven potsherds to Indra the ruler, to Indra the supreme ruler, to Indra the self-ruler/ This injunction refers to one and the same Indra, possessing the qualities of rulership and so on ; but as, through connexion with those several qualities, the aspects of Indra differ, the oblation of the purodasa has to be repeated. This is declared in the Sankarshawa, ' The divinities are different on account of separation.' — Here terminates the adhikara^a of * offerings/ 43. On account of the plurality of indicatory marks; for that (proof) is stronger. This also is declared (in the Purva Mima^sa). The Taittiriyaka contains another daharavidya, 'The thousand-headed god, the all-eyed one/ &c. (Mahanar. Up. XI). Here the doubt arises whether this vidya, as being one with the previously introduced vidya, states qualities to be included in the meditation enjoined in that vidya, or qualities to be included in the meditations on the highest Self as enjoined in all the Vedanta-texts. — The former is the case, the Purvapakshin holds, on account of the leading subject-matter. For in the preceding section (X) the meditation on the small ether is introduced as the subject-matter. ' There is the small lotus placed in the middle of the town (of the body), free from all evil, the abode Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 43. 667
2For in the preceding section (X) the meditation on the small ether is introduced as the subject-matter. ' There is the small lotus placed in the middle of the town (of the body), free from all evil, the abode Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 43. 667 of the Highest; within that there is a small space, free from sorrow — what is within that should be meditated upon* (Mah&nar. Up. X, 23). Now, as the lotus of the heart is mentioned only in section X, the * Naraya^a-section ' (' the heart resembling the bud of a lotus, with its point turned downwards/ XI, 6), we conclude that that section also is concerned with the object of meditation to which the daharavidycl refers. — Against this view the Sutra declares itself, * on account of the majority of indicatory marks ' ; i. e. there are in the text several marks proving that that section is meant to declare characteristics of that which constitutes the object of meditation in all medita- tions on the highest being. For that being which in those meditations is denoted as the Imperishable, .Siva, vSambhu, the highest Brahman, the highest light, the highest entity, the highest Self, and so on, is here referred to by the same names, and then declared to be Naraya^a. There are thus several indications to prove that Nariyawa is none other than that which is the object of meditation in all meditations on the Highest, viz. Brahman, which has bliss and the rest for its qualities. By ' linga ' (inferential mark) we here understand clauses (v&kya) which contain a specific indication ; for such clauses have, according to the Purva Mimosa, greater proving power than leading subject-matter (prakara^a). The argumentation that the clause 'the heart resembling the bud of a lotus flower/ &c, proves that section to stand in a dependent rela- tion to the daharavidy&, is without force ; for it being proved by a stronger argument that the section refers to that which is the object of meditation in all meditations, the clause mentioned may also be taken as declaring that in the daharavidya also the object of meditation is Nara- ya#a. Nor must it be thought that the accusatives with which the section begins (sahasra^irsham, &c.) are to be connected with the ' meditating ' enjoined in the previous section; for the ' meditating' is there enjoined by a gerundive form ('tasmin yad antas tad upasitavyam'), and with this the subsequent accusatives cannot be con- strued. Moreover, the subsequent clause (' all this is Nara- 668 vedanta-sCtras. ya#a/ &c, where the nominative case is used) shows that those accusatives are to be taken in the sense of nomina- tives.— Here terminates the adhikara^a of 'the plurality of indicatory marks/ 44. There is option with regard to what precedes (i. e. the altar made of bricks) on account of subject- matter, and hence there is action ; as in the case of the m&nasa cup.
3There is option with regard to what precedes (i. e. the altar made of bricks) on account of subject- matter, and hence there is action ; as in the case of the m&nasa cup. In the Va^asaneyaka, in the Agnirahasya chapter, there are references to certain altars built of mind, ' built of mind, built of speech/ &c. The doubt here arises whether those structures of mind, and so on, which metaphorically are called fire-altars, should be considered as being of the nature of action, on account of their connexion with a per- formance which itself is of the nature of action ; or merely of the nature of meditation, as being connected with an activity of the nature of meditation. The Sutra maintains the former view. Since those things ' built of mind, and so on/ are, through being built (or piled up)> constituted as fire-altars, they demand a performance with which to con- nect themselves ; and as in immediate proximity to them no performance is enjoined, and as the general subject- matter of the section is the fire-altar built of bricks — introduced by means of the clause ' Non-being this was in the beginning ' — which is invariably connected with a per- formance of the nature of outward action, viz. a certain sacrificial performance — we conclude that the altars built of mind, &c, which the text mentions in connexion with the same subject-matter, are themselves of the nature of action, and as such can be used as alternatives for the altar built of bricks1. An analogous case is presented by the so-called mental cup. On the tenth, so-called avivakya, day of the Soma sacrifice extending over twelve days, 1 So that for the actual outward construction of a brick altar there may optionally be substituted the merely mental construction of an imaginary altar. Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 46. 669 there takes place the mental offering of a Soma cup, all the rites connected with which are rehearsed in imagina- tion only ; the offering of that cup is thus really of the nature of thought only, but as it forms an auxiliary element in an actual outward sacrificial performance it itself assumes the character of an action. 45. And on account of the transfer. That the altar built of thought is an optional substitute for the altar built of bricks, and of the nature of an action, appears therefrom also that the clause * of these each one is as great as that previous one/ explicitly transfers to the altars of mind, and so on, the powers of the previous altar made of bricks. All those altars thus having equal effects there is choice between them. The altars of mind, and so on, therefore are auxiliary members of the sacrificial per- formance which they help to accomplish, and hence them- selves of the nature of action. — Against this view the next Sutra declares itself. 46. But it is a meditation only, on account of assertion and what is seen.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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