The Vedânta-Sûtras with the Commentary of Râmânuja, Part III — SBE Vol. 48 (trans. George Thibaut, 1904)

Its being helpful to pleasure merely causes the resolve of undertaking it. — Nor, again, can we define that which is aimed at by action as that to which action isp. 53 auxiliary or supplementary (^esha), while itself it holds the position of something principal to be subserved by other things (^eshin) ; for of the ^esha and ^eshin also no proper definition can be given. It cannot be said that a .resha is that which is invariably accompanied by an activity proceeding with a view to something else, and that the correlate of such a i-esha is the ^eshin ; for on this definition the action is not a .resha, and hence that which is to be effected by the action cannot be the correlative ^eshin. And moreover a .yeshin may not be defined as what is correlative to an action proceeding with a view to — i. e. aiming at — something else ; for it is just this ' being aimed at ' of which we require a definition, and moreover we observe that also the jeshin (or * pradhana ') is capable of action proceeding with a view to the ^esha, as when e. g. a master does something for — let us say, keeps or feeds — his servant. This last criticism you must not attempt to ward off by maintaining that the master in keeping his servant acts with a view to himself (to his own advantage) ; for the servant in serving the master likewise acts with a view to himself. — And as, further, we have no adequate definition of c karya,' it would be inappropriate to define jesha as that which is correlative to karya, and ^eshin as that which is correlative to jesha. — Nor, finally, may we define ( that which is aimed at by action ' as that which is the final end (prayq^ana) of action ; for by the final end of an action we could only understand the end for which the agent undertakes the action, and this end is no other than the desired object. As thus * what is aimed at by action ' cannot be defined otherwise than what is desired, karya cannot be defined as what is to be effected by action and stands to action in the relation of principal matter (pradhana or ^eshin). (Let it then be said that the ' niyoga,' i. e. what is commonly called the apurva — the supersensuous result of an action which later on produces the sensible result — constitutes the prayq^ana — the final purpose — of the action. — But) the apurva also can, as it is something different from the direct objects of desire, viz. pleasure and the cessation of pain, be viewed only as a means of bringing about these

p. 154

— But) the apurva also can, as it is something different from the direct objects of desire, viz. pleasure and the cessation of pain, be viewed only as a means of bringing about thesep. 154 direct objects, and as something itself to be effected by the action ; it is for this very reason that it is something different from the action, otherwise the action itself would be that which is effected by the action. The thing to be effected by the action — which is expressed by means of optative and imperative verbal forms such as ya^eta, ' let him sacrifice ' — is, in accordance with the fact of its being connected with words such as svargakama^, 'he who is desirous of heaven/ understood to be the means of bringing about (the enjoyment of) the heavenly world ; and as the (sacrificial) action itself is transitory, there is assumed an altogether ' new ' or ' unprecedented ' (apurva) effect of it which (later on) is to bring about the enjoyment of heaven. This so-called * apurva ' can therefore be understood only with regard to its capability of bringing about the heavenly world. Now it certainly is ludicrous to assert that the apurva, which is assumed to the end of firmly establishing the independent character of the effect of the action first recognised as such (i.e. independent), later on becomes the means of realising the heavenly world ; for as the word expressing the result of the action (ya^eta) appears in syntactical connexion with ' svargakama^ ' (desirous of heaven), it does not, from the very beginning, denote an independent object of action, and moreover it is impossible to recognise an independent result of action other than either pleasure or cessation of pain, or the means to bring about these two results. — What, moreover, do you understand by the apurva being a final end (prayq^ana) ? — You will perhaps reply, ' its being agreeable like pleasure/ — Is then the apurva a pleasure? It is pleasure alone which is agreeable! — Well, let us then define the apurva as a kind of pleasure of a special nature, called by that name ! — But what proof, we ask, have you for this ? You will, in the first place, admit yourself that you do not directly experience any pleasure springing from consciousness of your apurva, which could in any way be compared to the pleasure caused by the consciousness of the objects of the senses. — Well, let us say then that as authoritative doctrine gives us the notion of an apurva as

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 1 55

— Well, let us say then that as authoritative doctrine gives us the notion of an apurva asI ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 1 55 something beneficial to man, we conclude that it will be enjoyed later on. — But, we ask, what is the authoritative doctrine establishing such an apurva beneficial to man ? Not, in the first place, ordinary, i. e. non-Vedic doctrine ; for such has for its object action only which always is essentially painful. Nor, in the next place, Vedic texts ; for those also enjoin action only as the means to bring about certain results such as the heavenly world. Nor again the Smriti texts enjoining works of either permanent or occasional obligation ; for those texts always convey the notion of an apurva only on the basis of an antecedent knowledge of the apurva as intimated by Vedic texts containing terms such as svargakama^. And we, moreover, do not observe that in the case of works having a definite result in this life, there is enjoyment of any special pleasure called apurva, in addition to those advantages which constitute the special result of the work and are enjoyed here below, as e. g. abundance of food or freedom from sickness. Thus there is not any proof of the apurva being a pleasure. The arthavada-passages of the Veda also, while glorifying certain pleasurable results of works, as e.g. the heavenly world, do not anywhere exhibit a similar glorification of a pleasure called apurva.

From all this we conclude that also in injunctory sentences that which is expressed by imperative and similar forms is only the idea that the meaning of the root — as known from grammar — is to be effected by the effort of the agent. And that what constitutes the meaning of roots, viz. the action of sacrificing and the like, possesses the quality of pleasing the highest Person, who is the inner ruler of Agni and other divinities (to whom the sacrifices are ostensibly offered), and that through the highest Person thus pleased the result of the sacrifice is accomplished, we shall show later on, under Su. Ill, 2, 37. — It is thus finally proved that the Vedanta-texts give information about an accomplished entity, viz. Brahman, and that the fruit of meditation on Brahman is something infinite and permanent. Where, on the other hand, Scripture refers to the fruit of mere works, such as the £aturmasya-sacrifices,

156 vedanta-sOtras.

as something imperishable, we have to understand this imperishableness in a merely relative sense, for Scripture definitely teaches that the fruit of all works is perishable.

We thus arrive at the settled conclusion that, since the fruit of mere works is limited and perishable, while that of the cognition of Brahman is infinite and permanent, there is good reason for entering on an enquiry into Brahman — the result of which enquiry will be the accurate determination of Brahman's nature. — Here terminates the adhikara^a of ' Enquiry/