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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
149. Not so, on account of this being observed on account of similarity also ; as in the case of Death ; for (the person in yonder orb) does not occupy the worlds (of Death). From a transfer or assimilation of this kind it does not necessarily follow that things of different operation are equal, and that hence those altars of mind, and so on, must connect themselves with an actual outward performance. For it is observed that such assimilation rests sometimes on a special point of resemblance only; so In the text, ' The person in yonder orb is Death indeed/ — where the feature of resemblance is the destroying power of the two ; for the person within yonder orb does certainly not occupy the same worlds, i.e. the same place as Death. Analogously, in the case under discussion, the fact that the altars made of mind are treated as, in a certain respect, equivalent to the altar built of bricks, does not authorise us to connect those altars with the sacrificial performance to which the altar of bricks belongs. When the text says that the altar made of mind is as great as the altar of bricks, this only means that the same result which is Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 5 1. 673 attained through the brick-altar in connexion with its own sacrificial performance is also attained through the altar of mind in connexion with the meditational performance into which it enters. 50. And by a subsequent (Brahma/za) also the * being of such a kind ' of the word (is proved). But the connexion is on account of plurality. The subsequent Brahma^a (.Sat. Br. X, 5, 4) also proves that the text treating of the altars made of mind, and so on, enjoins a meditation only. For that Brahma;^a (which begins ' This brick-built fire-altar is this world ; the waters are its enclosing-stones/ Sec.) declares further on Whoso- ever knows this thus comes to be that whole Agni who is the space- filler,' and from this it appears that what is enjoined there is a meditation with a special result of its own. And further on (X, 6) there is another meditation enjoined, viz. one on Vauvanara. All this shows that the Agnirahasya book (5at. Br. X) is not solely concerned with the injunction of outward sacrificial acts. — But what then is the reason that such matters as the mental (medi- tative) construction of fire-altars which ought to be in- cluded in the Brzhad-ara/zyaka are included in the Agni- rahasya ? — ' That connexion is on account of plurality/ i. e. the altars made of mind, and so on, are, in the sacred text, dealt with in proximity to the real altar made of bricks, because so many details of the latter are mentally to be accomplished in the meditation. — Here terminates the adhikara^a of ' option with the previous one/ 51. Some, on account of the existence of a Self within a body.
2— Here terminates the adhikara^a of ' option with the previous one/ 51. Some, on account of the existence of a Self within a body. In all meditations on the highest Self the nature of the meditating subject has to be ascertained no less than the nature of the object of meditation and of the mode of meditation. The question then arises whether the medi- tating Self is to be viewed as the knowing, doing, and enjoying Self, subject to transmigration ; or as that Self which Pra^-apati describes (Kh. Up. VIII, 1), viz. a Self [48] X x 674 vedAnta-sCtras. free from all sin and imperfection. — Some hold the former view, on the ground that the meditating Self is within a body. For as long as the Self dwells within a body, it is a knower, doer, enjoyer, and so on, and it can bring about the result of its meditation only as viewed under that aspect. A person who, desirous of the heavenly world or a similar result, enters on some sacrificial action may, after he has reached that result, possess character- istics different from those of a knowing, doing, and enjoying subject, but those characteristics cannot be attributed to him as long as he is in the state of having to bring about the means of accomplishing those ends ; in the latter state he must be viewed as an ordinary agent, and there it would be of no use to view him as something different. And the same holds equally good with regard to a person engaged in meditation. — But, an objection is raised, the text * as the thought of a man is in this world, so he will be when he has departed this life' (Kk. Up. Ill, 14, 1) does declare a difference (between the agent engaged in sacri- ficial action, and the meditating subject), and from this it follows that the meditating Self is to be conceived as having a nature free from all evil, and so on. — Not so, the Purvapakshin replies ; for the clause, * howsoever they meditate on him/ proves that that text refers to the equality of the object meditated upon (not of the medi- tating subject). — To this the next Sutra replies. 52. But this is not so, (but rather) difference; since it is of the being of that ; as in the case of intuition. It is not true that the meditating subject must be conceived as having the ordinary characteristics of know- ing, acting, &c. ; it rather possesses those characteristic properties — freedom from evil, and so on — which distinguish the state of Release from the Sa^sara state. At the time of meditation the Self of the devotee is of exactly the same nature as the released Self. ' For it is of the being of that/ i. e. it attains the nature of that — as proved by the texts, Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 53. 675
3At the time of meditation the Self of the devotee is of exactly the same nature as the released Self. ' For it is of the being of that/ i. e. it attains the nature of that — as proved by the texts, Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 53. 675 ' as the thought of a man is in this world, so he will be when he has departed/ and * howsoever he meditate on him, such he becomes himself.' Nor can it be maintained that these texts refer only to meditation on the highest Self (without declaring anything as to the personal Self of the devotee) ; for the personal Self constitutes the body of Brahman which is the object of meditation, and hence itself falls under the category of object of meditation. The character of such meditation, therefore, is that it is a meditation on the highest Self as having for its body the individual Self, distinguished by freedom from evil and the other qualities mentioned in the teaching of Pra^apati. And hence the individual Self is, in such meditation, to be conceived (not as the ordinary Self, but) under that form which it has to attain (i. e. the pure form which belongs to it in the state of Release). 'As in the case of intuition' — i. e. as in the case of intuition of Brahman. As the intui* tion of Brahman has for its object the essential nature of Brahman, so the intuition of the individual soul also has for its object its permanent essential nature. In the case of sacrificial works the conception of the true nature of the Self forms an auxiliary factor. An injunction such as ' Let him who is desirous of the heavenly world sacrifice/ enjoins the performance of the sacrifice to the end of a certain result being reached ; while the conception of the Self as possessing characteristics such as being a knowing subject, and so on — which are separate from the body — has the function of proving its qualification for works meant to effect results which will come about at some future time. So much only (i. e. the mere cognition of the Self as something different from the body) is required for works (as distinguished from meditations). — Here termi- nates the adhikara^a of ' being in the body/ 53. But those (meditations) which are connected with members (of sacrifices) are not (restricted) to (particular) sakh&s, but rather (belong) to all ^akhas. x x 2 6 76 vedanta-sOtras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
149. Not so, on account of this being observed on account of similarity also ; as in the case of Death ; for (the person in yonder orb) does not occupy the worlds (of Death). From a transfer or assimilation of this kind it does not necessarily follow that things of different operation are equal, and that hence those altars of mind, and so on, must connect themselves with an actual outward performance. For it is observed that such assimilation rests sometimes on a special point of resemblance only; so In the text, ' The person in yonder orb is Death indeed/ — where the feature of resemblance is the destroying power of the two ; for the person within yonder orb does certainly not occupy the same worlds, i.e. the same place as Death. Analogously, in the case under discussion, the fact that the altars made of mind are treated as, in a certain respect, equivalent to the altar built of bricks, does not authorise us to connect those altars with the sacrificial performance to which the altar of bricks belongs. When the text says that the altar made of mind is as great as the altar of bricks, this only means that the same result which is Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 5 1. 673 attained through the brick-altar in connexion with its own sacrificial performance is also attained through the altar of mind in connexion with the meditational performance into which it enters. 50. And by a subsequent (Brahma/za) also the * being of such a kind ' of the word (is proved). But the connexion is on account of plurality. The subsequent Brahma^a (.Sat. Br. X, 5, 4) also proves that the text treating of the altars made of mind, and so on, enjoins a meditation only. For that Brahma;^a (which begins ' This brick-built fire-altar is this world ; the waters are its enclosing-stones/ Sec.) declares further on Whoso- ever knows this thus comes to be that whole Agni who is the space- filler,' and from this it appears that what is enjoined there is a meditation with a special result of its own. And further on (X, 6) there is another meditation enjoined, viz. one on Vauvanara. All this shows that the Agnirahasya book (5at. Br. X) is not solely concerned with the injunction of outward sacrificial acts. — But what then is the reason that such matters as the mental (medi- tative) construction of fire-altars which ought to be in- cluded in the Brzhad-ara/zyaka are included in the Agni- rahasya ? — ' That connexion is on account of plurality/ i. e. the altars made of mind, and so on, are, in the sacred text, dealt with in proximity to the real altar made of bricks, because so many details of the latter are mentally to be accomplished in the meditation. — Here terminates the adhikara^a of ' option with the previous one/ 51. Some, on account of the existence of a Self within a body.
2— Here terminates the adhikara^a of ' option with the previous one/ 51. Some, on account of the existence of a Self within a body. In all meditations on the highest Self the nature of the meditating subject has to be ascertained no less than the nature of the object of meditation and of the mode of meditation. The question then arises whether the medi- tating Self is to be viewed as the knowing, doing, and enjoying Self, subject to transmigration ; or as that Self which Pra^-apati describes (Kh. Up. VIII, 1), viz. a Self [48] X x 674 vedAnta-sCtras. free from all sin and imperfection. — Some hold the former view, on the ground that the meditating Self is within a body. For as long as the Self dwells within a body, it is a knower, doer, enjoyer, and so on, and it can bring about the result of its meditation only as viewed under that aspect. A person who, desirous of the heavenly world or a similar result, enters on some sacrificial action may, after he has reached that result, possess character- istics different from those of a knowing, doing, and enjoying subject, but those characteristics cannot be attributed to him as long as he is in the state of having to bring about the means of accomplishing those ends ; in the latter state he must be viewed as an ordinary agent, and there it would be of no use to view him as something different. And the same holds equally good with regard to a person engaged in meditation. — But, an objection is raised, the text * as the thought of a man is in this world, so he will be when he has departed this life' (Kk. Up. Ill, 14, 1) does declare a difference (between the agent engaged in sacri- ficial action, and the meditating subject), and from this it follows that the meditating Self is to be conceived as having a nature free from all evil, and so on. — Not so, the Purvapakshin replies ; for the clause, * howsoever they meditate on him/ proves that that text refers to the equality of the object meditated upon (not of the medi- tating subject). — To this the next Sutra replies. 52. But this is not so, (but rather) difference; since it is of the being of that ; as in the case of intuition. It is not true that the meditating subject must be conceived as having the ordinary characteristics of know- ing, acting, &c. ; it rather possesses those characteristic properties — freedom from evil, and so on — which distinguish the state of Release from the Sa^sara state. At the time of meditation the Self of the devotee is of exactly the same nature as the released Self. ' For it is of the being of that/ i. e. it attains the nature of that — as proved by the texts, Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 53. 675
3At the time of meditation the Self of the devotee is of exactly the same nature as the released Self. ' For it is of the being of that/ i. e. it attains the nature of that — as proved by the texts, Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 53. 675 ' as the thought of a man is in this world, so he will be when he has departed/ and * howsoever he meditate on him, such he becomes himself.' Nor can it be maintained that these texts refer only to meditation on the highest Self (without declaring anything as to the personal Self of the devotee) ; for the personal Self constitutes the body of Brahman which is the object of meditation, and hence itself falls under the category of object of meditation. The character of such meditation, therefore, is that it is a meditation on the highest Self as having for its body the individual Self, distinguished by freedom from evil and the other qualities mentioned in the teaching of Pra^apati. And hence the individual Self is, in such meditation, to be conceived (not as the ordinary Self, but) under that form which it has to attain (i. e. the pure form which belongs to it in the state of Release). 'As in the case of intuition' — i. e. as in the case of intuition of Brahman. As the intui* tion of Brahman has for its object the essential nature of Brahman, so the intuition of the individual soul also has for its object its permanent essential nature. In the case of sacrificial works the conception of the true nature of the Self forms an auxiliary factor. An injunction such as ' Let him who is desirous of the heavenly world sacrifice/ enjoins the performance of the sacrifice to the end of a certain result being reached ; while the conception of the Self as possessing characteristics such as being a knowing subject, and so on — which are separate from the body — has the function of proving its qualification for works meant to effect results which will come about at some future time. So much only (i. e. the mere cognition of the Self as something different from the body) is required for works (as distinguished from meditations). — Here termi- nates the adhikara^a of ' being in the body/ 53. But those (meditations) which are connected with members (of sacrifices) are not (restricted) to (particular) sakh&s, but rather (belong) to all ^akhas. x x 2 6 76 vedanta-sOtras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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