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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1the moon, to be double. Now in the case of these people there never arises a subsequent cognition sublating their primitive I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 75 cognition; but the latter is false all the same, and its object, viz. the doubleness of the moon, is false likewise ; the defect of vision being the cause of a cognition not corresponding to reality. — And so it is with the cognition of Brahman also. This cognition is based on Nescience, and therefore is false, together with its object, viz. Brahman, although no sublating cognition presents itself. — This conclusion admits of various expressions in logical form. * The Brahman under dispute is false because it is the object of knowledge which has sprung from what is affected with Nescience ; as the phe- nomenal world is/ ' Brahman is false because it is the object of knowledge ; as the world is/ ' Brahman is false because it is the object of knowledge, the rise of which has the Untrue for its cause ; as the world is.' You will now perhaps set forth the following analogy. States of dreaming consciousness — such as the perception of elephants and the like in one's dreams — are unreal, and yet they are the cause of the knowledge of real things, viz. good or ill fortune (portended by those dreams). Hence there is no reason why Scripture — although unreal in so far as based on Nescience — should not likewise be the cause of the cognition of what is real, viz. Brahman. — The two cases are not parallel, we reply. The conscious states ex- perienced in dreams are not unreal ; it is only their objects that are false ; these objects only, not the conscious states, are sublated by the waking consciousness. Nobody thinks ' the cognitions of which I was conscious in my dream are unreal ' ; what men actually think is * the cognitions are real, but the things are not real/ In the same way the illusive state of consciousness which the magician produces in the minds of other men by means of mantras, drugs, &c, is true, and hence the cause of love and fear ; for such states of consciousness also are not sublated. The cognition which, owing to some defect in the object, the sense organ, &c., apprehends a rope as a snake is real, and hence the cause of fear and other emotions. True also is the imagination which, owing to the nearness of a snake, arises in the mind of a man though not actually bitten, viz. that he has been bitten; true also is the representation of the imagined j6 vedanta-sOtras.
2True also is the imagination which, owing to the nearness of a snake, arises in the mind of a man though not actually bitten, viz. that he has been bitten; true also is the representation of the imagined j6 vedanta-sOtras. poison, for it may be the cause of actual death. In the same way the reflection of the face in the water is real, and hence enables us to ascertain details belonging to the real face. All these states of consciousness are real, as we conclude from their having a beginning and actual effects. — Nor would it avail you to object that in the absence of real elephants, and so on, the ideas of them cannot be real. For ideas require only some substrate in general ; the mere appearance of a thing is a sufficient substrate, and such an appearance is present in the case in question, owing to a certain defect. The thing we deter- mine to be unreal because it is sublated ; the idea is non- sublated, and therefore real. Nor can you quote in favour of your view — of the real being known through the unreal — the instance of the stroke and the letter. The letter being apprehended through the stroke (i.e. the written character) does not furnish a case of the real being apprehended through the unreal ; for the stroke itself is real. — But the stroke causes the idea of the letter only in so far as it is apprehended as being a letter, and this ' being a letter ' is untrue ! — Not so, we rejoin. If this ' being a letter ' were unreal it could not be a means of the apprehension of the letter ; for we neither observe nor can prove that what is nan-existent and indefinable con- stitutes a means. — Let then the idea of the letter constitute the means ! — In that case, we rejoin, the apprehension of the real does not spring from the unreal ; and besides, it would follow therefrom that the means and what is to be effected thereby would be one, i.e. both would be, without any distinction, the idea of the letter only. Moreover, if the means were constituted by the stroke in so far as it is not the letter, the apprehension of all letters would result from the sight of one stroke ; for one stroke may easily be con- ceived as not being any letter. — But, in the same way as the word ' Devadatta ' conventionally denotes some particular man, so some particular stroke apprehended by the eye may conventionally symbolise some particular letter to be apprehended by the ear, and thus a particular stroke may be the cause of the idea of a particular letter ! — Quite so. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 77
3— Quite so. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 77 we reply, but on this explanation the real is known through the real ; for both stroke and conventional power of sym- bolisation are real. The case is analogous to that of the idea of a buffalo being caused by the picture of a buffalo ; that idea rests on the similarity of picture and thing depicted, and that similarity is something real. Nor can it be said (with a view to proving the purvapaksha by another analo- gous instance) that we meet with a cognition of the real by means of the unreal in the case of sound (sabda) which is essentially uniform, but causes the apprehension of different things by means of difference of tone (nada). For sound is the cause of the apprehension of different things in so far only as we apprehend the connexion of sound manifest- ing itself in various tones, with the different things indicated by those various tones 1. And, moreover, it is not correct to argue on the ground of the uniformity of sound ; for only particular significant sounds such as c ga,' which can be apprehended by the ear, are really c sound.' — All this proves that it is difficult indeed to show that the know- ledge of a true thing, viz. Brahman, can be derived from Scripture, if Scripture — as based on Nescience — is itself untrue. Our opponent may finally argue as follows : — Scripture is not unreal in the same sense as a sky-flower is unreal ; for antecedently to the cognition of universal non-duality Scripture is viewed as something that is, and only on the rise of that knowledge it is seen to be unreal. At this latter time Scripture no longer is a means of cognising Brahman, devoid of all difference, consisting of pure Intel- ligence ; as long on the other hand as it is such a means, Scripture is ; for then we judge ' Scripture is.' — But to this we reply that if Scripture is not (true), the judgment ' Scripture is ' is false, and hence the knowledge resting on false Scripture being false likewise, the object of that know- ledge, i.e. Brahman itself, is false. If the cognition of fire which rests on mist being mistaken for smoke is false, it 1 And those manifestations of sound by means of various tones are themselves something real. 78 VEDANTA-stiTRAS. follows that the object of that cognition, viz. fire itself, is likewise unreal. Nor can it be shown that (in the case of Brahman) there is no possibility of ulterior sublative cognition ; for there may be such sublative cognition, viz. the one expressed in the judgment * the Reality is a Void.' And if you say that this latter judgment rests on error, we point out that according to yourself the knowledge of Brahman is also based on error. And of our judgment (viz. ' the Reality is a Void ') it may truly be said that all further negation is impossible. — But there is no need to continue this demolition of an altogether baseless theory. No scriptural texts teach a Brahman devoid of all difference.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1the moon, to be double. Now in the case of these people there never arises a subsequent cognition sublating their primitive I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 75 cognition; but the latter is false all the same, and its object, viz. the doubleness of the moon, is false likewise ; the defect of vision being the cause of a cognition not corresponding to reality. — And so it is with the cognition of Brahman also. This cognition is based on Nescience, and therefore is false, together with its object, viz. Brahman, although no sublating cognition presents itself. — This conclusion admits of various expressions in logical form. * The Brahman under dispute is false because it is the object of knowledge which has sprung from what is affected with Nescience ; as the phe- nomenal world is/ ' Brahman is false because it is the object of knowledge ; as the world is/ ' Brahman is false because it is the object of knowledge, the rise of which has the Untrue for its cause ; as the world is.' You will now perhaps set forth the following analogy. States of dreaming consciousness — such as the perception of elephants and the like in one's dreams — are unreal, and yet they are the cause of the knowledge of real things, viz. good or ill fortune (portended by those dreams). Hence there is no reason why Scripture — although unreal in so far as based on Nescience — should not likewise be the cause of the cognition of what is real, viz. Brahman. — The two cases are not parallel, we reply. The conscious states ex- perienced in dreams are not unreal ; it is only their objects that are false ; these objects only, not the conscious states, are sublated by the waking consciousness. Nobody thinks ' the cognitions of which I was conscious in my dream are unreal ' ; what men actually think is * the cognitions are real, but the things are not real/ In the same way the illusive state of consciousness which the magician produces in the minds of other men by means of mantras, drugs, &c, is true, and hence the cause of love and fear ; for such states of consciousness also are not sublated. The cognition which, owing to some defect in the object, the sense organ, &c., apprehends a rope as a snake is real, and hence the cause of fear and other emotions. True also is the imagination which, owing to the nearness of a snake, arises in the mind of a man though not actually bitten, viz. that he has been bitten; true also is the representation of the imagined j6 vedanta-sOtras.
2True also is the imagination which, owing to the nearness of a snake, arises in the mind of a man though not actually bitten, viz. that he has been bitten; true also is the representation of the imagined j6 vedanta-sOtras. poison, for it may be the cause of actual death. In the same way the reflection of the face in the water is real, and hence enables us to ascertain details belonging to the real face. All these states of consciousness are real, as we conclude from their having a beginning and actual effects. — Nor would it avail you to object that in the absence of real elephants, and so on, the ideas of them cannot be real. For ideas require only some substrate in general ; the mere appearance of a thing is a sufficient substrate, and such an appearance is present in the case in question, owing to a certain defect. The thing we deter- mine to be unreal because it is sublated ; the idea is non- sublated, and therefore real. Nor can you quote in favour of your view — of the real being known through the unreal — the instance of the stroke and the letter. The letter being apprehended through the stroke (i.e. the written character) does not furnish a case of the real being apprehended through the unreal ; for the stroke itself is real. — But the stroke causes the idea of the letter only in so far as it is apprehended as being a letter, and this ' being a letter ' is untrue ! — Not so, we rejoin. If this ' being a letter ' were unreal it could not be a means of the apprehension of the letter ; for we neither observe nor can prove that what is nan-existent and indefinable con- stitutes a means. — Let then the idea of the letter constitute the means ! — In that case, we rejoin, the apprehension of the real does not spring from the unreal ; and besides, it would follow therefrom that the means and what is to be effected thereby would be one, i.e. both would be, without any distinction, the idea of the letter only. Moreover, if the means were constituted by the stroke in so far as it is not the letter, the apprehension of all letters would result from the sight of one stroke ; for one stroke may easily be con- ceived as not being any letter. — But, in the same way as the word ' Devadatta ' conventionally denotes some particular man, so some particular stroke apprehended by the eye may conventionally symbolise some particular letter to be apprehended by the ear, and thus a particular stroke may be the cause of the idea of a particular letter ! — Quite so. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 77
3— Quite so. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 77 we reply, but on this explanation the real is known through the real ; for both stroke and conventional power of sym- bolisation are real. The case is analogous to that of the idea of a buffalo being caused by the picture of a buffalo ; that idea rests on the similarity of picture and thing depicted, and that similarity is something real. Nor can it be said (with a view to proving the purvapaksha by another analo- gous instance) that we meet with a cognition of the real by means of the unreal in the case of sound (sabda) which is essentially uniform, but causes the apprehension of different things by means of difference of tone (nada). For sound is the cause of the apprehension of different things in so far only as we apprehend the connexion of sound manifest- ing itself in various tones, with the different things indicated by those various tones 1. And, moreover, it is not correct to argue on the ground of the uniformity of sound ; for only particular significant sounds such as c ga,' which can be apprehended by the ear, are really c sound.' — All this proves that it is difficult indeed to show that the know- ledge of a true thing, viz. Brahman, can be derived from Scripture, if Scripture — as based on Nescience — is itself untrue. Our opponent may finally argue as follows : — Scripture is not unreal in the same sense as a sky-flower is unreal ; for antecedently to the cognition of universal non-duality Scripture is viewed as something that is, and only on the rise of that knowledge it is seen to be unreal. At this latter time Scripture no longer is a means of cognising Brahman, devoid of all difference, consisting of pure Intel- ligence ; as long on the other hand as it is such a means, Scripture is ; for then we judge ' Scripture is.' — But to this we reply that if Scripture is not (true), the judgment ' Scripture is ' is false, and hence the knowledge resting on false Scripture being false likewise, the object of that know- ledge, i.e. Brahman itself, is false. If the cognition of fire which rests on mist being mistaken for smoke is false, it 1 And those manifestations of sound by means of various tones are themselves something real. 78 VEDANTA-stiTRAS. follows that the object of that cognition, viz. fire itself, is likewise unreal. Nor can it be shown that (in the case of Brahman) there is no possibility of ulterior sublative cognition ; for there may be such sublative cognition, viz. the one expressed in the judgment * the Reality is a Void.' And if you say that this latter judgment rests on error, we point out that according to yourself the knowledge of Brahman is also based on error. And of our judgment (viz. ' the Reality is a Void ') it may truly be said that all further negation is impossible. — But there is no need to continue this demolition of an altogether baseless theory. No scriptural texts teach a Brahman devoid of all difference.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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