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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1The connexion of the whole Taittiriya-text then is as follows. In the intro- ductory clause, ' He who knows Brahman attains the [48] p 2 io vedanta-s6tras. Highest/ the true nature of the £"iva, free from all con- nexion with matter, is referred to as something to be attained; and of this nature a definition is given in the words, 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman/ The attainment of the £*iva in this form is what consti- tutes Release, in agreement with the text, ' So long as he is in the body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain ; but when he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him ' (Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 1). This true nature of the Self, free from all avidya, which the text begins by presenting as an object to be attained, is thereupon declared to be the Self consisting of bliss. In order to lead up to this — just as a man points out to another the moon by first pointing out the branch of a tree near which the moon is to be seen— the text at first refers to the body (' Man consists of food ') ; next to the vital breath with its five modifica- tions which is within the body and supports it ; then to the manas within the vital breath ; then to the buddhi within the manas — ' the Self consisting of breath ' ; c the Self con- sisting of mind' (manas); 'the Self consisting of under- standing * (vi^ana). Having thus gradually led up to the ^iva, the text finally points out the latter, which is the innermost of all (' Different from that is the inner Self which consists of bliss '), and thus completes the series of Selfs one inside the other. We hence conclude that the Self consisting of bliss is that same ^iva-self which was at the outset pointed out as the Brahman to be attained. — But the clause immediately following, 'Brahman is the tail, the support (of the Self of bliss '), indicates that Brahman is something different from the Self of bliss ! — By no means (the Purvapakshin rejoins). Brahman is, owing to its different characteristics, there compared to an animal body, and head, wings, and tail are ascribed to it, just as in a pre- ceding clause the body consisting of food had also been imagined as having head, wings, and tail — these members not being something different from the body, but the body itself. Joy, satisfaction, great satisfaction, bliss, are imagined as the members, non-different from it, of Brahman consisting of bliss, and of them all the unmixed bliss-constituted I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 13. 211
2Joy, satisfaction, great satisfaction, bliss, are imagined as the members, non-different from it, of Brahman consisting of bliss, and of them all the unmixed bliss-constituted I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 13. 211 Brahman is said to be the tail or support. If Brahman were something different from the Self consisting of bliss, the text would have continued, * Different from this Self consisting of bliss is the other inner Self— Brahman.' But there is no such continuation. The connexion of the different clauses stands as follows : After Brahman has been introduced as the topic of the section (' He who knows Brahman attains the Highest'), and denned as different in nature from everything else (' The True, knowledge '), the text designates it by the term ' Self,' &c. (' From that Self sprang ether'), and then, in order to make it clear that Brahman is the innermost Self of all, enumerates the pra/za- maya and so on — designating them in succession as more and more inward Selfs — , and finally leads up to the anandamaya as the innermost Self ('Different from this,&c, is the Self con- sisting of bliss '). From all which it appears that the term * Self ' up to the end denotes the Brahman mentioned at the beginning. — But, in immediate continuation of the clause, ' Brahman is the tail, the support,' the text exhibits the fol- lowing ^loka : ' Non-existing becomes he who views Brahman as non-existing; who knows Brahman as existing, him we know as himself existing.' Here the existence and non-exis- tence of the Self are declared to depend on the knowledge and non-knowledge of Brahman, not of the Self consisting of bliss. Now no doubt can possibly arise as to the existence or non-existence of this latter Self, which, in the form of joy, satisfaction, &c, is known to every one. Hence the ^•loka cannot refer to that Self, and hence Brahman is different from that Self.- — This objection, the Purvapakshin rejoins, is unfounded. In the earlier parts of the chapter we have corresponding i'lokas, each of them following on a preceding clause that refers to the tail or support of a particular Self: in the case, e.g. of the Self consisting of food, we read, ' This is the tail, the support,' and then comes the ^loka, ( From food are produced all creatures,' &c. Now it is evident that all these .riokas are meant to set forth not only what had been called ' tail,' but the entire Self concerned (Self of food, Self of breath, &c.) ; and from this it follows that also the ^loka, ' Non-existing becomes P 2 2 I 2 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
3Now it is evident that all these .riokas are meant to set forth not only what had been called ' tail,' but the entire Self concerned (Self of food, Self of breath, &c.) ; and from this it follows that also the ^loka, ' Non-existing becomes P 2 2 I 2 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. he/ does not refer to the * tail ' only as something other than the Self of bliss, but to the entire Self of bliss. And there may very well be a doubt with regard to the knowledge or non-knowledge of the existence of that Self consisting of unlimited bliss. On your view also the circumstance of Brahman which forms the tail not being known is due to its being of the nature of limitless bliss. And should it be said that the Self of bliss cannot be Brahman because Brahman does not possess a head and other members ; the answer is that Brahman also does not possess the quality of being a tail or support, and that hence Brahman cannot be a tail. — Let it then be said that the expression, ' Brahman is the tail,' is merely figurative, in so far as Brahman is the substrate of all things imagined through avidya ! — But, the Purvapakshin rejoins, we may as well assume that the ascription to Brahman of joy, as its head and so on, is also merely figurative, meant to illustrate the nature of Brahman, i.e. the Self of bliss as free from all pain. To speak of Brahman or the Self as consisting of bliss has thus the purpose of separating from all pain and grief that which in a preceding clause ('The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman ') had already been separated from all changeful material things. As applied to Brahman (or the Self), whose nature is nothing but absolute bliss, the term 'anandamaya' therefore has to be interpreted as meaning nothing more than ' ananda* ; just as pra^amaya means pra^a. The outcome of all this is that the term ' anandamaya * denotes the true essential nature — which is nothing but absolute uniform bliss — of the ^iva that appears as dis- tinguished by all the manifold individualising forms which are the figments of Nescience. The Self of bliss is the £iva or pratyag-atman, i. e. the individual soul. Against this prima facie view the Sutrakara contends that the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self 'on account of multiplication/ — The section which begins with the words, ' This is an examination of bliss/ and terminates with the ^loka, ' from whence all speech turns back ' (Taitt. Up. II, 8), arrives at bliss, supreme and not to be surpassed, by successively multiplying inferior stages of bliss by a I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 3. 213
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1The connexion of the whole Taittiriya-text then is as follows. In the intro- ductory clause, ' He who knows Brahman attains the [48] p 2 io vedanta-s6tras. Highest/ the true nature of the £"iva, free from all con- nexion with matter, is referred to as something to be attained; and of this nature a definition is given in the words, 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman/ The attainment of the £*iva in this form is what consti- tutes Release, in agreement with the text, ' So long as he is in the body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain ; but when he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him ' (Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 1). This true nature of the Self, free from all avidya, which the text begins by presenting as an object to be attained, is thereupon declared to be the Self consisting of bliss. In order to lead up to this — just as a man points out to another the moon by first pointing out the branch of a tree near which the moon is to be seen— the text at first refers to the body (' Man consists of food ') ; next to the vital breath with its five modifica- tions which is within the body and supports it ; then to the manas within the vital breath ; then to the buddhi within the manas — ' the Self consisting of breath ' ; c the Self con- sisting of mind' (manas); 'the Self consisting of under- standing * (vi^ana). Having thus gradually led up to the ^iva, the text finally points out the latter, which is the innermost of all (' Different from that is the inner Self which consists of bliss '), and thus completes the series of Selfs one inside the other. We hence conclude that the Self consisting of bliss is that same ^iva-self which was at the outset pointed out as the Brahman to be attained. — But the clause immediately following, 'Brahman is the tail, the support (of the Self of bliss '), indicates that Brahman is something different from the Self of bliss ! — By no means (the Purvapakshin rejoins). Brahman is, owing to its different characteristics, there compared to an animal body, and head, wings, and tail are ascribed to it, just as in a pre- ceding clause the body consisting of food had also been imagined as having head, wings, and tail — these members not being something different from the body, but the body itself. Joy, satisfaction, great satisfaction, bliss, are imagined as the members, non-different from it, of Brahman consisting of bliss, and of them all the unmixed bliss-constituted I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 13. 211
2Joy, satisfaction, great satisfaction, bliss, are imagined as the members, non-different from it, of Brahman consisting of bliss, and of them all the unmixed bliss-constituted I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 13. 211 Brahman is said to be the tail or support. If Brahman were something different from the Self consisting of bliss, the text would have continued, * Different from this Self consisting of bliss is the other inner Self— Brahman.' But there is no such continuation. The connexion of the different clauses stands as follows : After Brahman has been introduced as the topic of the section (' He who knows Brahman attains the Highest'), and denned as different in nature from everything else (' The True, knowledge '), the text designates it by the term ' Self,' &c. (' From that Self sprang ether'), and then, in order to make it clear that Brahman is the innermost Self of all, enumerates the pra/za- maya and so on — designating them in succession as more and more inward Selfs — , and finally leads up to the anandamaya as the innermost Self ('Different from this,&c, is the Self con- sisting of bliss '). From all which it appears that the term * Self ' up to the end denotes the Brahman mentioned at the beginning. — But, in immediate continuation of the clause, ' Brahman is the tail, the support,' the text exhibits the fol- lowing ^loka : ' Non-existing becomes he who views Brahman as non-existing; who knows Brahman as existing, him we know as himself existing.' Here the existence and non-exis- tence of the Self are declared to depend on the knowledge and non-knowledge of Brahman, not of the Self consisting of bliss. Now no doubt can possibly arise as to the existence or non-existence of this latter Self, which, in the form of joy, satisfaction, &c, is known to every one. Hence the ^•loka cannot refer to that Self, and hence Brahman is different from that Self.- — This objection, the Purvapakshin rejoins, is unfounded. In the earlier parts of the chapter we have corresponding i'lokas, each of them following on a preceding clause that refers to the tail or support of a particular Self: in the case, e.g. of the Self consisting of food, we read, ' This is the tail, the support,' and then comes the ^loka, ( From food are produced all creatures,' &c. Now it is evident that all these .riokas are meant to set forth not only what had been called ' tail,' but the entire Self concerned (Self of food, Self of breath, &c.) ; and from this it follows that also the ^loka, ' Non-existing becomes P 2 2 I 2 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
3Now it is evident that all these .riokas are meant to set forth not only what had been called ' tail,' but the entire Self concerned (Self of food, Self of breath, &c.) ; and from this it follows that also the ^loka, ' Non-existing becomes P 2 2 I 2 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. he/ does not refer to the * tail ' only as something other than the Self of bliss, but to the entire Self of bliss. And there may very well be a doubt with regard to the knowledge or non-knowledge of the existence of that Self consisting of unlimited bliss. On your view also the circumstance of Brahman which forms the tail not being known is due to its being of the nature of limitless bliss. And should it be said that the Self of bliss cannot be Brahman because Brahman does not possess a head and other members ; the answer is that Brahman also does not possess the quality of being a tail or support, and that hence Brahman cannot be a tail. — Let it then be said that the expression, ' Brahman is the tail,' is merely figurative, in so far as Brahman is the substrate of all things imagined through avidya ! — But, the Purvapakshin rejoins, we may as well assume that the ascription to Brahman of joy, as its head and so on, is also merely figurative, meant to illustrate the nature of Brahman, i.e. the Self of bliss as free from all pain. To speak of Brahman or the Self as consisting of bliss has thus the purpose of separating from all pain and grief that which in a preceding clause ('The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman ') had already been separated from all changeful material things. As applied to Brahman (or the Self), whose nature is nothing but absolute bliss, the term 'anandamaya' therefore has to be interpreted as meaning nothing more than ' ananda* ; just as pra^amaya means pra^a. The outcome of all this is that the term ' anandamaya * denotes the true essential nature — which is nothing but absolute uniform bliss — of the ^iva that appears as dis- tinguished by all the manifold individualising forms which are the figments of Nescience. The Self of bliss is the £iva or pratyag-atman, i. e. the individual soul. Against this prima facie view the Sutrakara contends that the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self 'on account of multiplication/ — The section which begins with the words, ' This is an examination of bliss/ and terminates with the ^loka, ' from whence all speech turns back ' (Taitt. Up. II, 8), arrives at bliss, supreme and not to be surpassed, by successively multiplying inferior stages of bliss by a I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 3. 213
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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