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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1In the same way the reality of the rope does not follow from its persist- ence, but from the fact of its being not sublated (by another I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 33 cognition). But what, we ask, establishes the non-reality of jars and pieces of cloth? — All are agreed, we reply, that we observe, in jars and similar things, individual difference (vyavr/tti, literally ' separation,' ' distinction '). The point to decide is of what nature such difference is. Does it not mean that the judgment 'This is a jar' implies the negation of pieces of cloth and other things ? But this means that by this judgment pieces of cloth and other things are sublated (badhita). Individual difference (vyavrztti) thus means the cessation (or absence), due to sublation, of certain objects of cognition, and it proves the non-reality of what- ever has non-continuous existence ; while on the other hand, pure Being, like the rope, persists non-sublated. Hence everything that is additional to pure Being is non-real. — This admits of being expressed in technical form. 'Being' is real because it persists, as proved by the case of the rope in the snake-rope ; jars and similar things are non-real because they are non-continuous, as proved by the case of the snake that has the rope for its substrate. From all this it follows that persisting consciousness only has real being ; it alone is. Being and Consciousness are one. Consciousness is svayamprak&sa. But, our adversary objects, as mere Being is the object of consciousness, it is different therefrom (and thus there exists after all 'difference' or 'plurality'). — Not so, we reply. That there is no such thing as ' difference,' we have already shown above on the grounds that it is not the object of perception, and moreover incapable of definition. It cannot therefore be proved that 'Being' is the object of consciousness. Hence Consciousness itself is ' Being ' — that which is. — This consciousness is self- proved, just because it is consciousness. Were it proved through some- thing else, it would follow that like jars and similar things it is not consciousness. Nor can there be assumed, for consciousness, the need of another act of consciousness (through which its knowledge would be established); for [48] D 34 vedanta-sCtras.
2Were it proved through some- thing else, it would follow that like jars and similar things it is not consciousness. Nor can there be assumed, for consciousness, the need of another act of consciousness (through which its knowledge would be established); for [48] D 34 vedanta-sCtras. it shines forth (praka^ate) through its own being. While it exists, consciousness — differing therein from jars and the like — is never observed not to shine forth, and it cannot therefore be held to depend, in its shining forth, on some- thing else. — You (who object to the above reasoning) perhaps hold the following view : — even when conscious- ness has arisen, it is the object only which shines forth — a fact expressed in sentences such as : the jar is perceived. When a person forms the judgment * This is a jar,' he is not at the time conscious of a consciousness which is not an object and is not of a definite character. Hence the existence of consciousness is the reason which brings about the 'shining forth ' of jars and other objects, and thus has a similar office as the approximation of the object to the eye or the other organs of sense (which is another condition of perceptive consciousness). After this the existence of consciousness is inferred on the ground that the shining forth of the object is (not permanent, but) occasional only1. And should this argumentation be objected to on the ground of its implying that consciousness— which is essen- tially of the nature of intelligence— is something non- intelligent like material things, we ask you to define this negation of non-intelligence (which you declare to be cha- racteristic of consciousness). Have we, perhaps, to under- stand by it the invariable concomitance of existence and shining forth? If so, we point out that this invariable concomitance is also found in the case of pleasure and similar affections ; for when pleasure and so on exist at all, they never are non-perceived (i. e. they exist in so far only as we are conscious of them). It is thus clear that we have no consciousness of consciousness itself — just as the tip of a finger, although touching other things, is incapable of touching itself. All this reasoning, we reply, is entirely spun out of your own fancy, without any due consideration of the power of consciousness. The fact is, that in perceiving colour and 1 Being not permanent but occasional, it is an effect only, and as such must have a cause. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 35
3All this reasoning, we reply, is entirely spun out of your own fancy, without any due consideration of the power of consciousness. The fact is, that in perceiving colour and 1 Being not permanent but occasional, it is an effect only, and as such must have a cause. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 35 other qualities of things, we are not aware of a ' shining forth ' as an attribute of those things, and as something different from consciousness ; nor can the assumption of an attribute of things called ' light/ or c shining forth/ be proved in any way, since the entire empirical world itself can be proved only through consciousness, the existence of which we both admit. Consciousness, therefore, is not something which is inferred or proved through some other act of knowledge ; but while proving everything else it is proved by itself. This may be expressed in technical form as follows — Consciousness is, with regard to its attri- butes and to the empirical judgments concerning it, inde- pendent of any other thing, because through its connexion with other things it is the cause of their attributes and the empirical judgments concerning them. For it is a general principle that of two things that which through its connexion with the other is the cause of the attributes of — and the empirical judgments about — the latter, is itself independent of that other as to those two points. We see e. g. that colour, through its conjunction with earth and the like, produces in them the quality of visibility, but does not itself depend for its visibility on conjunction with colour. Hence consciousness is itself the cause of its own ' shining forth/ as well as of the empirically observed shining forth of objects such as jars and the like. Consciousness is eternal and incapable of change. This self-luminous consciousness, further, is eternal, for it is not capable of any form of non-existence — whether so-called antecedent non-existence or any other form. This follows from its being self-established. For the antecedent non-existence of self-established consciousness cannot be apprehended either through consciousness or anything else. If consciousness itself gave rise to the apprehension of its own non-existence, it could not do so in so far as c being/ for that would contradict its being : if it is, i. e. if its non-existence is not, how can it give rise to the idea of its non-existence ? Nor can it do so if not being ; for if consciousness itself is not, how can it furnish D 2 36 VEDANTA-sfjTRAS.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1In the same way the reality of the rope does not follow from its persist- ence, but from the fact of its being not sublated (by another I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 33 cognition). But what, we ask, establishes the non-reality of jars and pieces of cloth? — All are agreed, we reply, that we observe, in jars and similar things, individual difference (vyavr/tti, literally ' separation,' ' distinction '). The point to decide is of what nature such difference is. Does it not mean that the judgment 'This is a jar' implies the negation of pieces of cloth and other things ? But this means that by this judgment pieces of cloth and other things are sublated (badhita). Individual difference (vyavrztti) thus means the cessation (or absence), due to sublation, of certain objects of cognition, and it proves the non-reality of what- ever has non-continuous existence ; while on the other hand, pure Being, like the rope, persists non-sublated. Hence everything that is additional to pure Being is non-real. — This admits of being expressed in technical form. 'Being' is real because it persists, as proved by the case of the rope in the snake-rope ; jars and similar things are non-real because they are non-continuous, as proved by the case of the snake that has the rope for its substrate. From all this it follows that persisting consciousness only has real being ; it alone is. Being and Consciousness are one. Consciousness is svayamprak&sa. But, our adversary objects, as mere Being is the object of consciousness, it is different therefrom (and thus there exists after all 'difference' or 'plurality'). — Not so, we reply. That there is no such thing as ' difference,' we have already shown above on the grounds that it is not the object of perception, and moreover incapable of definition. It cannot therefore be proved that 'Being' is the object of consciousness. Hence Consciousness itself is ' Being ' — that which is. — This consciousness is self- proved, just because it is consciousness. Were it proved through some- thing else, it would follow that like jars and similar things it is not consciousness. Nor can there be assumed, for consciousness, the need of another act of consciousness (through which its knowledge would be established); for [48] D 34 vedanta-sCtras.
2Were it proved through some- thing else, it would follow that like jars and similar things it is not consciousness. Nor can there be assumed, for consciousness, the need of another act of consciousness (through which its knowledge would be established); for [48] D 34 vedanta-sCtras. it shines forth (praka^ate) through its own being. While it exists, consciousness — differing therein from jars and the like — is never observed not to shine forth, and it cannot therefore be held to depend, in its shining forth, on some- thing else. — You (who object to the above reasoning) perhaps hold the following view : — even when conscious- ness has arisen, it is the object only which shines forth — a fact expressed in sentences such as : the jar is perceived. When a person forms the judgment * This is a jar,' he is not at the time conscious of a consciousness which is not an object and is not of a definite character. Hence the existence of consciousness is the reason which brings about the 'shining forth ' of jars and other objects, and thus has a similar office as the approximation of the object to the eye or the other organs of sense (which is another condition of perceptive consciousness). After this the existence of consciousness is inferred on the ground that the shining forth of the object is (not permanent, but) occasional only1. And should this argumentation be objected to on the ground of its implying that consciousness— which is essen- tially of the nature of intelligence— is something non- intelligent like material things, we ask you to define this negation of non-intelligence (which you declare to be cha- racteristic of consciousness). Have we, perhaps, to under- stand by it the invariable concomitance of existence and shining forth? If so, we point out that this invariable concomitance is also found in the case of pleasure and similar affections ; for when pleasure and so on exist at all, they never are non-perceived (i. e. they exist in so far only as we are conscious of them). It is thus clear that we have no consciousness of consciousness itself — just as the tip of a finger, although touching other things, is incapable of touching itself. All this reasoning, we reply, is entirely spun out of your own fancy, without any due consideration of the power of consciousness. The fact is, that in perceiving colour and 1 Being not permanent but occasional, it is an effect only, and as such must have a cause. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 35
3All this reasoning, we reply, is entirely spun out of your own fancy, without any due consideration of the power of consciousness. The fact is, that in perceiving colour and 1 Being not permanent but occasional, it is an effect only, and as such must have a cause. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 35 other qualities of things, we are not aware of a ' shining forth ' as an attribute of those things, and as something different from consciousness ; nor can the assumption of an attribute of things called ' light/ or c shining forth/ be proved in any way, since the entire empirical world itself can be proved only through consciousness, the existence of which we both admit. Consciousness, therefore, is not something which is inferred or proved through some other act of knowledge ; but while proving everything else it is proved by itself. This may be expressed in technical form as follows — Consciousness is, with regard to its attri- butes and to the empirical judgments concerning it, inde- pendent of any other thing, because through its connexion with other things it is the cause of their attributes and the empirical judgments concerning them. For it is a general principle that of two things that which through its connexion with the other is the cause of the attributes of — and the empirical judgments about — the latter, is itself independent of that other as to those two points. We see e. g. that colour, through its conjunction with earth and the like, produces in them the quality of visibility, but does not itself depend for its visibility on conjunction with colour. Hence consciousness is itself the cause of its own ' shining forth/ as well as of the empirically observed shining forth of objects such as jars and the like. Consciousness is eternal and incapable of change. This self-luminous consciousness, further, is eternal, for it is not capable of any form of non-existence — whether so-called antecedent non-existence or any other form. This follows from its being self-established. For the antecedent non-existence of self-established consciousness cannot be apprehended either through consciousness or anything else. If consciousness itself gave rise to the apprehension of its own non-existence, it could not do so in so far as c being/ for that would contradict its being : if it is, i. e. if its non-existence is not, how can it give rise to the idea of its non-existence ? Nor can it do so if not being ; for if consciousness itself is not, how can it furnish D 2 36 VEDANTA-sfjTRAS.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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