Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1only if connected with an action not established by other means ; while if connected with an ordinary action they have a secondary, implied, meaning only1. Perception reveals to us non-differenced substance only. We have so far shown that in the case of a conflict between Scripture and Perception and the other instru- ments of knowledge, Scripture is of greater force. The fact, however, is that no such conflict is observed to exist, since Perception itself gives rise to the apprehension of a non-differenced Brahman whose nature is pure Being. — But how can it be said that Perception, which has for its object things of various kinds — and accordingly expresses itself in judgments such as * Here is a jar/ ' There is a piece of cloth ' — causes the apprehension of mere Being ? If there were no apprehension of difference, all cognitions would have one and the same object, and therefore would give rise to one judgment only — as takes place when one unbroken perceptional cognition is continued for some time. — True. We therefore have to enquire in what way, 1 The theory here referred to is held by some of the Mimaw- sakas. The imperative forms of the verb have their primary meaning, i. e. the power of originating action, only in Vedic sentences which enjoin the performance of certain actions for the bringing about of certain ends : no other means of knowledge but the Veda informing us that such ends can be accomplished by such actions. Nobody, e. g. would offer a soma sacrifice in order to obtain the heavenly world, were he not told by the Veda to do so. In ordinary life, on the other hand, no imperative possesses this entirely unique originative force, since any action which may be performed in consequence of a command may be prompted by other motives as well: it is, in technical Indian language, established already, apart from the command, by other means of knowledge. The man who, e. g. is told to milk a cow might have proceeded to do so, apart from the command, for reasons of his own. Imperatives in ordinary speech are therefore held not to have their primary meaning, and this conclusion is extended, somewhat unwarrantably one should say, to all the words entering into an imperative clause. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 3 1
2Imperatives in ordinary speech are therefore held not to have their primary meaning, and this conclusion is extended, somewhat unwarrantably one should say, to all the words entering into an imperative clause. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 3 1 in the judgment ' here is a jar/ an assertion is made about being as well as some special form of being. These implied judgments cannot both be founded on perception, for they are the results of acts of cognition occupying different moments of time, while the perceptional cognition takes place in one moment (is instantaneous). We therefore must decide whether it is the essential nature of the jar, or its difference from other things, that is the object of perception. And we must adopt the former alternative, because the apprehension of difference presupposes the apprehension of the essential nature of the thing, and, in addition, the remembrance of its counterentities (i.e. the things from which the given thing differs). Hence differ- ence is not apprehended by Perception ; and all judgments and propositions relative to difference are founded on error only. Difference — bheda — does not admit of logical definition. The Logicians, moreover, are unable to give a definition of such a thing as ' difference.' Difference cannot in the first place be the essential nature (of that which differs) ; for from that it would follow that on the apprehension of the essential nature of a thing there would at once arise not only the judgment as to that essential nature but also judgments as to its difference from everything else. — But, it may be objected to this, even when the essential nature of a thing is apprehended, the judgment 'this thing is different from other things' depends on the remembrance of its counterentities, and as long as this remembrance does not take place so long the judgment of difference is not formed !— Such reasoning, we reply, is inadmissible. He who maintains that 'difference' is nothing but 'essential nature' has no right to assume a dependence on counterentities since, according to him, essential nature and difference are the same, i. e. nothing but essential nature : the judgment of difference can, on his view, depend on counterentities no more than the judgment of essential nature does. His view really implies that the two words 'the jar' and ' different' (in the judgment 'the jar is different') are 3 2 vedanta-sOtras. synonymous, just as the words ' hasta ' and ' kara ' are (both of which mean ' hand ').
3His view really implies that the two words 'the jar' and ' different' (in the judgment 'the jar is different') are 3 2 vedanta-sOtras. synonymous, just as the words ' hasta ' and ' kara ' are (both of which mean ' hand '). Nor, in the second place, can 'difference' be held to be an attribute (dharma). For if it were that, we should have to assume that ' difference ' possesses difference (i.e. is different) from essential nature ; for otherwise it would be the same as the latter. And this latter difference would have to be viewed as an attribute of the first difference, and this would lead us on to a third difference, and so in infinitum. And the view of 'difference' being an attribute would further imply that difference is appre- hended on the apprehension of a thing distinguished by attributes such as generic character and so on, and at the same time that the thing thus distinguished is apprehended on the apprehension of difference ; and this would consti- tute a logical seesaw. — ' Difference ' thus showing itself incapable of logical definition, we are confirmed in our view that perception reveals mere ' Being ' only. Moreover, it appears that in states of consciousness such as ' Here is a jar/ ' There is a piece of cloth/ ' The jar is perceived/ ' The piece of cloth is perceived/ that which constitutes the things is Being (existence ; satta) and per- ception (or ' consciousness ' ; anubhuti). And we observe that it is pure Being only which persists in all states of cognition : this pure Being alone, therefore, is real. The differences, on the other hand, which do not persist, are unreal. The case is analogous to that of the snake-rope. The rope which persists as a substrate is real, while the non-continuous things (which by wrong imagination are superimposed on the rope) such as a snake, a cleft in the ground, a watercourse, and so on, are unreal. But — our adversary objects — the instance is not truly analogous. In the case of the snake-rope the non-reality of the snake results from the snake's being sublated (bcidhita) by the cognition of the true nature of the sub- strate ' This is a rope, not a snake ' ; it does not result from the non-continuousness of the snake. In the same way the reality of the rope does not follow from its persist- ence, but from the fact of its being not sublated (by another I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 33
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1only if connected with an action not established by other means ; while if connected with an ordinary action they have a secondary, implied, meaning only1. Perception reveals to us non-differenced substance only. We have so far shown that in the case of a conflict between Scripture and Perception and the other instru- ments of knowledge, Scripture is of greater force. The fact, however, is that no such conflict is observed to exist, since Perception itself gives rise to the apprehension of a non-differenced Brahman whose nature is pure Being. — But how can it be said that Perception, which has for its object things of various kinds — and accordingly expresses itself in judgments such as * Here is a jar/ ' There is a piece of cloth ' — causes the apprehension of mere Being ? If there were no apprehension of difference, all cognitions would have one and the same object, and therefore would give rise to one judgment only — as takes place when one unbroken perceptional cognition is continued for some time. — True. We therefore have to enquire in what way, 1 The theory here referred to is held by some of the Mimaw- sakas. The imperative forms of the verb have their primary meaning, i. e. the power of originating action, only in Vedic sentences which enjoin the performance of certain actions for the bringing about of certain ends : no other means of knowledge but the Veda informing us that such ends can be accomplished by such actions. Nobody, e. g. would offer a soma sacrifice in order to obtain the heavenly world, were he not told by the Veda to do so. In ordinary life, on the other hand, no imperative possesses this entirely unique originative force, since any action which may be performed in consequence of a command may be prompted by other motives as well: it is, in technical Indian language, established already, apart from the command, by other means of knowledge. The man who, e. g. is told to milk a cow might have proceeded to do so, apart from the command, for reasons of his own. Imperatives in ordinary speech are therefore held not to have their primary meaning, and this conclusion is extended, somewhat unwarrantably one should say, to all the words entering into an imperative clause. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 3 1
2Imperatives in ordinary speech are therefore held not to have their primary meaning, and this conclusion is extended, somewhat unwarrantably one should say, to all the words entering into an imperative clause. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 3 1 in the judgment ' here is a jar/ an assertion is made about being as well as some special form of being. These implied judgments cannot both be founded on perception, for they are the results of acts of cognition occupying different moments of time, while the perceptional cognition takes place in one moment (is instantaneous). We therefore must decide whether it is the essential nature of the jar, or its difference from other things, that is the object of perception. And we must adopt the former alternative, because the apprehension of difference presupposes the apprehension of the essential nature of the thing, and, in addition, the remembrance of its counterentities (i.e. the things from which the given thing differs). Hence differ- ence is not apprehended by Perception ; and all judgments and propositions relative to difference are founded on error only. Difference — bheda — does not admit of logical definition. The Logicians, moreover, are unable to give a definition of such a thing as ' difference.' Difference cannot in the first place be the essential nature (of that which differs) ; for from that it would follow that on the apprehension of the essential nature of a thing there would at once arise not only the judgment as to that essential nature but also judgments as to its difference from everything else. — But, it may be objected to this, even when the essential nature of a thing is apprehended, the judgment 'this thing is different from other things' depends on the remembrance of its counterentities, and as long as this remembrance does not take place so long the judgment of difference is not formed !— Such reasoning, we reply, is inadmissible. He who maintains that 'difference' is nothing but 'essential nature' has no right to assume a dependence on counterentities since, according to him, essential nature and difference are the same, i. e. nothing but essential nature : the judgment of difference can, on his view, depend on counterentities no more than the judgment of essential nature does. His view really implies that the two words 'the jar' and ' different' (in the judgment 'the jar is different') are 3 2 vedanta-sOtras. synonymous, just as the words ' hasta ' and ' kara ' are (both of which mean ' hand ').
3His view really implies that the two words 'the jar' and ' different' (in the judgment 'the jar is different') are 3 2 vedanta-sOtras. synonymous, just as the words ' hasta ' and ' kara ' are (both of which mean ' hand '). Nor, in the second place, can 'difference' be held to be an attribute (dharma). For if it were that, we should have to assume that ' difference ' possesses difference (i.e. is different) from essential nature ; for otherwise it would be the same as the latter. And this latter difference would have to be viewed as an attribute of the first difference, and this would lead us on to a third difference, and so in infinitum. And the view of 'difference' being an attribute would further imply that difference is appre- hended on the apprehension of a thing distinguished by attributes such as generic character and so on, and at the same time that the thing thus distinguished is apprehended on the apprehension of difference ; and this would consti- tute a logical seesaw. — ' Difference ' thus showing itself incapable of logical definition, we are confirmed in our view that perception reveals mere ' Being ' only. Moreover, it appears that in states of consciousness such as ' Here is a jar/ ' There is a piece of cloth/ ' The jar is perceived/ ' The piece of cloth is perceived/ that which constitutes the things is Being (existence ; satta) and per- ception (or ' consciousness ' ; anubhuti). And we observe that it is pure Being only which persists in all states of cognition : this pure Being alone, therefore, is real. The differences, on the other hand, which do not persist, are unreal. The case is analogous to that of the snake-rope. The rope which persists as a substrate is real, while the non-continuous things (which by wrong imagination are superimposed on the rope) such as a snake, a cleft in the ground, a watercourse, and so on, are unreal. But — our adversary objects — the instance is not truly analogous. In the case of the snake-rope the non-reality of the snake results from the snake's being sublated (bcidhita) by the cognition of the true nature of the sub- strate ' This is a rope, not a snake ' ; it does not result from the non-continuousness of the snake. In the same way the reality of the rope does not follow from its persist- ence, but from the fact of its being not sublated (by another I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 33
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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