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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— The outcome of all this is that unreal Bondage which appears in the form of a plurality of knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, &c, is put an end to by the injunc- tions of meditation, the fruit of which is direct intuitive knowledge of Brahman. Nor can we approve of the doctrine held by some that there is no contradiction between difference and non- difference ; for difference and non-difference cannot co-exist in one thing, any more than coldness and heat, or light and darkness. — Let us first hear in detail what the holder of this so-called bhedabheda view has to say. The whole universe of things must be ordered in agreement with our cognitions. Now we are conscious of all things as different and non-different at the same time : they are non-different in their causal and generic aspects, and different in so far as viewed as effects and individuals. There indeed is a contradiction between light and darkness and so on ; for these cannot possibly exist together, and they are actually met with in different abodes. Such contradictoriness is not, on the other hand, observed in the case of cause and effect, and genus and individual ; on the contrary we here distinctly apprehend one thing as having two aspects — c this jar is clay/ ' this cow is short-horned/ The fact is that experience does not show us anything that has one aspect only. Nor can it be said that in these cases there is absence of contradiction because as fire consumes grass so non-difference absorbs difference ; for the same thing which exists as clay, or gold, or cow, or horse, &c, at the same time exists as jar or diadem, or short-horned cow or mare. There is no command of the Lord to the effect that one aspect only should belong to each thing, non-difference to what is non-different, and difference to what is different.- — But one aspect only belongs to each thing, because it is thus that things are perceived ! — On 1 90 VEDANTA-S<JTRAS.
2There is no command of the Lord to the effect that one aspect only should belong to each thing, non-difference to what is non-different, and difference to what is different.- — But one aspect only belongs to each thing, because it is thus that things are perceived ! — On 1 90 VEDANTA-S<JTRAS. the contrary, we reply, things have twofold aspects, just because it is thus that they are perceived. No man, how- ever wide he may open his eyes, is able to distinguish in an object — e. g. a jar or a cow — placed before him which part is the clay and which the jar, or which part is the generic character of the cow and which the individual cow. On the contrary, his thought finds its true expression in the following judgments : ' this jar is clay ' ; ' this cow is short- horned.' Nor can it be maintained that he makes a dis- tinction between the cause and genus as objects of the idea of persistence, and the effect and individual as objects of the idea of discontinuance (difference) ; for as a matter of fact there is no perception of these two elements in separa- tion. A man may look ever so close at a thing placed before him, he will not be able to perceive a difference of aspect and to point out 'this is the persisting, general, element in the thing, and that the non-persistent, individual, element/ Just as an effect and an individual give rise to the idea of one thing, so the effect plus cause, and the individual plus generic character, also give rise to the idea of one thing only. This very circumstance makes it possible for us to recognise each individual thing, placed as it is among a multitude of things differing in place, time, and character.— -/Each thing thus being cognised as en- dowed with a twofold aspect, the theory of cause and effect, and generic character and individual, being absolutely different, is clearly refuted by perception. But, an objection is raised, if on account of grammatical co-ordination and the resulting idea of oneness, the judgment c this pot is clay ' is taken to express the relation of difference plus non-difference, we shall have analogously to infer from judgments such as ' I am a man/ ' I am a divine being ' that the Self and the body also stand in the bhedabheda-relation ; the theory of the co-existence of difference and non-difference will thus act like a fire which a man has lit on his hearth, and which in the end consumes the entire house ! — This, we reply, is the baseless idea of a person who has not duly considered the true nature of co-ordination as establishing the bhedabheda-relation. The I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 191
3— This, we reply, is the baseless idea of a person who has not duly considered the true nature of co-ordination as establishing the bhedabheda-relation. The I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 191 correct principle is that all reality is determined by states of consciousness not sublated by valid means of proof. The imagination, however, of the identity of the Self and the body is sublated by all the means of proof which apply to the Self: it is in fact no more valid than the imagination of the snake in the rope, and does not therefore prove the non-difference of the two. The co-ordination, on the other hand, which is expressed in the judgment ' the cow is short-horned ' is never observed to be refuted in any way, and hence establishes the bhed&bheda-relation. For the same reasons the individual soul (^iva) is not absolutely different from Brahman, but stands to it in the bhedabheda-relation in so far as it is a part (awa) of Brahman. Its non-difference from Brahman is essential (svabhavika) ; its difference is due to limiting adjuncts (aupadhika). This we know, in the first place, from those scriptural texts which declare non-difference — such as * Thou art that ' (Kk. Up. VI) ; ' There is no other seer but he ' (Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 23) ; < This Self is Brahman ' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19) ; and the passage from the Brahmasukta in the Sa//zhitopanishad of the Atharva^as which, after having said that Brahman is Heaven and Earth, continues, ' The fishermen are Brahman, the slaves are Brahman, Brahman are these gamblers ; man and woman are born from Brahman ; women are Brahman and so are men.' And, in the second place, from those texts which declare difference : ' He who, one, eternal, intelligent, fulfils the desires of many non-eternal intelligent beings' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13); 'There are two unborn, one knowing, the other not- knowing ; one strong, the other weak ' (Svet. Up. I, 9) ; * Being the cause of their connexion with him, through the qualities of action and the qualities of the Self, he is seen as another ' (Svet. Up. V, 12) ; ' The Lord of nature and the souls, the ruler of the qualities, the cause of the bondage, the existence and the release of the sa^sara ' (5vet. Up. VI, 16); * He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs ' (Svet. Up. VI, 9) ; ' One of the two eats the sweet fruit, without eating the other looks on ' (Svet Up. IV, 6) ; 'He who dwelling in the Self (Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 22); 192 vedanta-sCtras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— The outcome of all this is that unreal Bondage which appears in the form of a plurality of knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, &c, is put an end to by the injunc- tions of meditation, the fruit of which is direct intuitive knowledge of Brahman. Nor can we approve of the doctrine held by some that there is no contradiction between difference and non- difference ; for difference and non-difference cannot co-exist in one thing, any more than coldness and heat, or light and darkness. — Let us first hear in detail what the holder of this so-called bhedabheda view has to say. The whole universe of things must be ordered in agreement with our cognitions. Now we are conscious of all things as different and non-different at the same time : they are non-different in their causal and generic aspects, and different in so far as viewed as effects and individuals. There indeed is a contradiction between light and darkness and so on ; for these cannot possibly exist together, and they are actually met with in different abodes. Such contradictoriness is not, on the other hand, observed in the case of cause and effect, and genus and individual ; on the contrary we here distinctly apprehend one thing as having two aspects — c this jar is clay/ ' this cow is short-horned/ The fact is that experience does not show us anything that has one aspect only. Nor can it be said that in these cases there is absence of contradiction because as fire consumes grass so non-difference absorbs difference ; for the same thing which exists as clay, or gold, or cow, or horse, &c, at the same time exists as jar or diadem, or short-horned cow or mare. There is no command of the Lord to the effect that one aspect only should belong to each thing, non-difference to what is non-different, and difference to what is different.- — But one aspect only belongs to each thing, because it is thus that things are perceived ! — On 1 90 VEDANTA-S<JTRAS.
2There is no command of the Lord to the effect that one aspect only should belong to each thing, non-difference to what is non-different, and difference to what is different.- — But one aspect only belongs to each thing, because it is thus that things are perceived ! — On 1 90 VEDANTA-S<JTRAS. the contrary, we reply, things have twofold aspects, just because it is thus that they are perceived. No man, how- ever wide he may open his eyes, is able to distinguish in an object — e. g. a jar or a cow — placed before him which part is the clay and which the jar, or which part is the generic character of the cow and which the individual cow. On the contrary, his thought finds its true expression in the following judgments : ' this jar is clay ' ; ' this cow is short- horned.' Nor can it be maintained that he makes a dis- tinction between the cause and genus as objects of the idea of persistence, and the effect and individual as objects of the idea of discontinuance (difference) ; for as a matter of fact there is no perception of these two elements in separa- tion. A man may look ever so close at a thing placed before him, he will not be able to perceive a difference of aspect and to point out 'this is the persisting, general, element in the thing, and that the non-persistent, individual, element/ Just as an effect and an individual give rise to the idea of one thing, so the effect plus cause, and the individual plus generic character, also give rise to the idea of one thing only. This very circumstance makes it possible for us to recognise each individual thing, placed as it is among a multitude of things differing in place, time, and character.— -/Each thing thus being cognised as en- dowed with a twofold aspect, the theory of cause and effect, and generic character and individual, being absolutely different, is clearly refuted by perception. But, an objection is raised, if on account of grammatical co-ordination and the resulting idea of oneness, the judgment c this pot is clay ' is taken to express the relation of difference plus non-difference, we shall have analogously to infer from judgments such as ' I am a man/ ' I am a divine being ' that the Self and the body also stand in the bhedabheda-relation ; the theory of the co-existence of difference and non-difference will thus act like a fire which a man has lit on his hearth, and which in the end consumes the entire house ! — This, we reply, is the baseless idea of a person who has not duly considered the true nature of co-ordination as establishing the bhedabheda-relation. The I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 191
3— This, we reply, is the baseless idea of a person who has not duly considered the true nature of co-ordination as establishing the bhedabheda-relation. The I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 191 correct principle is that all reality is determined by states of consciousness not sublated by valid means of proof. The imagination, however, of the identity of the Self and the body is sublated by all the means of proof which apply to the Self: it is in fact no more valid than the imagination of the snake in the rope, and does not therefore prove the non-difference of the two. The co-ordination, on the other hand, which is expressed in the judgment ' the cow is short-horned ' is never observed to be refuted in any way, and hence establishes the bhed&bheda-relation. For the same reasons the individual soul (^iva) is not absolutely different from Brahman, but stands to it in the bhedabheda-relation in so far as it is a part (awa) of Brahman. Its non-difference from Brahman is essential (svabhavika) ; its difference is due to limiting adjuncts (aupadhika). This we know, in the first place, from those scriptural texts which declare non-difference — such as * Thou art that ' (Kk. Up. VI) ; ' There is no other seer but he ' (Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 23) ; < This Self is Brahman ' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19) ; and the passage from the Brahmasukta in the Sa//zhitopanishad of the Atharva^as which, after having said that Brahman is Heaven and Earth, continues, ' The fishermen are Brahman, the slaves are Brahman, Brahman are these gamblers ; man and woman are born from Brahman ; women are Brahman and so are men.' And, in the second place, from those texts which declare difference : ' He who, one, eternal, intelligent, fulfils the desires of many non-eternal intelligent beings' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13); 'There are two unborn, one knowing, the other not- knowing ; one strong, the other weak ' (Svet. Up. I, 9) ; * Being the cause of their connexion with him, through the qualities of action and the qualities of the Self, he is seen as another ' (Svet. Up. V, 12) ; ' The Lord of nature and the souls, the ruler of the qualities, the cause of the bondage, the existence and the release of the sa^sara ' (5vet. Up. VI, 16); * He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs ' (Svet. Up. VI, 9) ; ' One of the two eats the sweet fruit, without eating the other looks on ' (Svet Up. IV, 6) ; 'He who dwelling in the Self (Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 22); 192 vedanta-sCtras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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