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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1objects of fruition, enjoying subjects, and a Ruler ; that origination and so on which are characteristic of the objects do not belong to the subjects, and that the latter are eternal ; that the characteristic qualities of the objects and 5 4 2 VED ANTA-stf TR AS. likewise those of the subjects — viz. liability to pain and suffering — do not belong to the Ruler ; that the latter is eternal, free from all imperfections, omniscient, imme- diately realising all his purposes, the Lord of the lords of the organs, the highest Lord of all ; and that sentient and non-sentient beings in all their states constitute the body of the Lord while he constitutes their Self. While Brahman thus has for its modes (prakara) the sentient and non- sentient beings in which it ever is embodied, during certain periods those beings abide in so subtle a condition as to be incapable of receiving designations different from that of Brahman itself; Brahman then is said to be in its causal state. When, on the other hand, its body is constituted by all those beings in their gross state, when they have separate, distinct names and forms, Brahman is said to be in its effected condition. When, now, Brahman passes over from the causal state into the effected state, the aggre- gate of non-sentient things which in the causal state were destitute of name and form undergoes an essential change of nature — implying the possession of distinct names and so on — so as to become fit to constitute objects of fruition for sentient beings ; the change, on the other hand, which the sentient beings (the souls) undergo on that occasion is nothing more than a certain expansion of intelligence (or consciousness), capacitating them to experience the dif- ferent rewards or punishments for their previous deeds. The ruling element of the world, i. e. the Lord, finally, who has the sentient and non-sentient beings for his modes, undergoes a change in so far as he is, at alternating periods, embodied in all those beings in their alternating states. The two modes, and he to whom the modes belong, thus undergo a common change in so far as in the case of all of them the causal condition passes over into a different condition. It is with reference to this change undergone by one substance in passing over into a different state that the .Oandogya says that through the knowledge of one thing everything is known, and illustrates this by the case of the lump of clay (knowing which we know all things made of clay). Texts such as ' Pra^apati sent forth the creatures/ II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 8. 543
2Texts such as ' Pra^apati sent forth the creatures/ II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 8. 543 which declare the origination of the soul, really mean only to state that the souls are by turns associated with or dis- sociated from bodies — the effect of which is that their intel- ligence is either contracted or expanded. Texts again which deny the origination of the soul and affirm its per- manency (' He is not born and does not die/ Sec.) mean to say that the soul does not, like the non-sentient element of creation, undergo changes of essential nature. And finally there are texts the purport of which it is to declare the absence of change of essential nature as well as of alternate expansion and contraction of intelligence — cp. ' That is the great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, Brah- man ' (Br/. Up. XI, 4, 25) ; ' the eternal thinker,' &c. (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13) ; such texts have for their subject the highest Lord. — All this also explains how Brahman, which is at all times differentiated by the sentient and non-sentient beings that constitute its body, can be said to be one only pre- vious to creation ; the statement is possible because at that time the differentiation of names and forms did not exist. That that which makes the difference between plurality and unity is the presence or absence of differentiation through names and forms, is distinctly declared in the text, ' Now all this was undifferentiated. It became differentiated by form and name ' (Brz. Up. I, 4, 7). — Those also who hold that the individual soul is due to Nescience ; and those who^ hold it to be due to a real limiting adjunct (upadhi) ; and those who hold that Brahman, whose essential nature is mere Being, assumes by itself the threefold form of enjoy- ing subjects, objects of enjoyment, and supreme Ruler ; can all of them explain the unity which Scripture predicates of Brahman in the pralaya state, only on the basis of the absence of differentiation by names and forms ; for accord- ing to them also (there is no absolute unity at any time, but) either the potentiality of Nescience, or the potentiality of the limiting adjunct, or the potentialities of enjoying subjects, objects of enjoyment, and supreme Ruler persist in the pra- laya condition also. And, moreover, it is proved by the two Sutras, II, 1, 33 ; 35, that the distinction of the several individual souls and the stream of their works are eternal. 544 vedanta-s6tras.
3And, moreover, it is proved by the two Sutras, II, 1, 33 ; 35, that the distinction of the several individual souls and the stream of their works are eternal. 544 vedanta-s6tras. There is, however, the following difference between those several views. The first-mentioned view implies that Brahman itself is under the illusive influence of begin- ningless Avidya. According to the second view, the effect of the real and beginningless limiting adjunct is that Brah- man itself is in the state of bondage ; for there is no other entity but Brahman and the adjunct. According to the third view, Brahman itself assumes different forms, and itself experiences the various unpleasant consequences of deeds. Nor would it avail to say that that part of Brah- man which is the Ruler is not an experiencing subject ; for as Brahman is all-knowing it recognises the enjoying subject as non- different from itself, and thus is itself an enjoying subject. — According to our view, on the other hand, Brahman, which has for its body all sentient and non-sentient beings, whether in their subtle or their gross state, is always — in its effected as well as in its causal con- dition— free from all shadow of imperfection, and a limit- less ocean as it were of all exalted qualities. All im- perfections, and suffering, and all change belong not to Brahman, but only to the sentient and non-sentient beings which are its modes. This view removes all difficulties. — Here terminates the adhikara/za of ' the Self.' 19. For this very reason (the individual soul is) a knower. -/ It has been shown that, different therein from Ether and the rest, the soul is not produced. This leads to the consideration of the soul's essential nature. Is that essen- tial nature constituted by mere intelligence as Sugata and Kapila hold ; or is the soul as Ka/zada thinks, essentially non- intelligent, comparable to a stone, while intelligence is merely an adventitious quality of it ; or is it essentially a knowing subject? — The soul is mere intelligence, the Purvapakshin maintains ; for the reason that Scripture declares it to be so. For in the antaryamin-brahma;/a the clause which in the Madhyandina-text runs as follows, ' he who abides in the Self/ is in the text of the Ka^vas represented by the clause * he who abides in knowledge.' II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 9. 545
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1objects of fruition, enjoying subjects, and a Ruler ; that origination and so on which are characteristic of the objects do not belong to the subjects, and that the latter are eternal ; that the characteristic qualities of the objects and 5 4 2 VED ANTA-stf TR AS. likewise those of the subjects — viz. liability to pain and suffering — do not belong to the Ruler ; that the latter is eternal, free from all imperfections, omniscient, imme- diately realising all his purposes, the Lord of the lords of the organs, the highest Lord of all ; and that sentient and non-sentient beings in all their states constitute the body of the Lord while he constitutes their Self. While Brahman thus has for its modes (prakara) the sentient and non- sentient beings in which it ever is embodied, during certain periods those beings abide in so subtle a condition as to be incapable of receiving designations different from that of Brahman itself; Brahman then is said to be in its causal state. When, on the other hand, its body is constituted by all those beings in their gross state, when they have separate, distinct names and forms, Brahman is said to be in its effected condition. When, now, Brahman passes over from the causal state into the effected state, the aggre- gate of non-sentient things which in the causal state were destitute of name and form undergoes an essential change of nature — implying the possession of distinct names and so on — so as to become fit to constitute objects of fruition for sentient beings ; the change, on the other hand, which the sentient beings (the souls) undergo on that occasion is nothing more than a certain expansion of intelligence (or consciousness), capacitating them to experience the dif- ferent rewards or punishments for their previous deeds. The ruling element of the world, i. e. the Lord, finally, who has the sentient and non-sentient beings for his modes, undergoes a change in so far as he is, at alternating periods, embodied in all those beings in their alternating states. The two modes, and he to whom the modes belong, thus undergo a common change in so far as in the case of all of them the causal condition passes over into a different condition. It is with reference to this change undergone by one substance in passing over into a different state that the .Oandogya says that through the knowledge of one thing everything is known, and illustrates this by the case of the lump of clay (knowing which we know all things made of clay). Texts such as ' Pra^apati sent forth the creatures/ II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 8. 543
2Texts such as ' Pra^apati sent forth the creatures/ II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 8. 543 which declare the origination of the soul, really mean only to state that the souls are by turns associated with or dis- sociated from bodies — the effect of which is that their intel- ligence is either contracted or expanded. Texts again which deny the origination of the soul and affirm its per- manency (' He is not born and does not die/ Sec.) mean to say that the soul does not, like the non-sentient element of creation, undergo changes of essential nature. And finally there are texts the purport of which it is to declare the absence of change of essential nature as well as of alternate expansion and contraction of intelligence — cp. ' That is the great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, Brah- man ' (Br/. Up. XI, 4, 25) ; ' the eternal thinker,' &c. (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13) ; such texts have for their subject the highest Lord. — All this also explains how Brahman, which is at all times differentiated by the sentient and non-sentient beings that constitute its body, can be said to be one only pre- vious to creation ; the statement is possible because at that time the differentiation of names and forms did not exist. That that which makes the difference between plurality and unity is the presence or absence of differentiation through names and forms, is distinctly declared in the text, ' Now all this was undifferentiated. It became differentiated by form and name ' (Brz. Up. I, 4, 7). — Those also who hold that the individual soul is due to Nescience ; and those who^ hold it to be due to a real limiting adjunct (upadhi) ; and those who hold that Brahman, whose essential nature is mere Being, assumes by itself the threefold form of enjoy- ing subjects, objects of enjoyment, and supreme Ruler ; can all of them explain the unity which Scripture predicates of Brahman in the pralaya state, only on the basis of the absence of differentiation by names and forms ; for accord- ing to them also (there is no absolute unity at any time, but) either the potentiality of Nescience, or the potentiality of the limiting adjunct, or the potentialities of enjoying subjects, objects of enjoyment, and supreme Ruler persist in the pra- laya condition also. And, moreover, it is proved by the two Sutras, II, 1, 33 ; 35, that the distinction of the several individual souls and the stream of their works are eternal. 544 vedanta-s6tras.
3And, moreover, it is proved by the two Sutras, II, 1, 33 ; 35, that the distinction of the several individual souls and the stream of their works are eternal. 544 vedanta-s6tras. There is, however, the following difference between those several views. The first-mentioned view implies that Brahman itself is under the illusive influence of begin- ningless Avidya. According to the second view, the effect of the real and beginningless limiting adjunct is that Brah- man itself is in the state of bondage ; for there is no other entity but Brahman and the adjunct. According to the third view, Brahman itself assumes different forms, and itself experiences the various unpleasant consequences of deeds. Nor would it avail to say that that part of Brah- man which is the Ruler is not an experiencing subject ; for as Brahman is all-knowing it recognises the enjoying subject as non- different from itself, and thus is itself an enjoying subject. — According to our view, on the other hand, Brahman, which has for its body all sentient and non-sentient beings, whether in their subtle or their gross state, is always — in its effected as well as in its causal con- dition— free from all shadow of imperfection, and a limit- less ocean as it were of all exalted qualities. All im- perfections, and suffering, and all change belong not to Brahman, but only to the sentient and non-sentient beings which are its modes. This view removes all difficulties. — Here terminates the adhikara/za of ' the Self.' 19. For this very reason (the individual soul is) a knower. -/ It has been shown that, different therein from Ether and the rest, the soul is not produced. This leads to the consideration of the soul's essential nature. Is that essen- tial nature constituted by mere intelligence as Sugata and Kapila hold ; or is the soul as Ka/zada thinks, essentially non- intelligent, comparable to a stone, while intelligence is merely an adventitious quality of it ; or is it essentially a knowing subject? — The soul is mere intelligence, the Purvapakshin maintains ; for the reason that Scripture declares it to be so. For in the antaryamin-brahma;/a the clause which in the Madhyandina-text runs as follows, ' he who abides in the Self/ is in the text of the Ka^vas represented by the clause * he who abides in knowledge.' II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 9. 545
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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