Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Gi. XV, 16). In other places the Divine one declares that as inward Ruler he is the Self of all : ' The Lord dwells in the heart of all creatures' (XVIII, 61), and 'I dwell within the heart of all ' (XV, 15), and CI am the 1 02 vedanta-s6tr as. Self which has its abode within all creatures ' (X, 20). The term ' creature ' in these passages denotes the entire aggregate of body, &c, up to the Self. — Because he is the Self of all, the text expressly denies that among all the things constituting his body there is any one separate from him, ' There is not anything which is without me ' (X, 39). The place where this text occurs is the winding up of a glorification of the Divine one, and the text has to be understood accordingly. The passage immediately follow- ing is c Whatever being there is, powerful, beautiful, or glorious, even that know thou to have sprung from a portion of my glory ; pervading this entire Universe by a portion of mine I do abide ' (X, 41 ; 42). All this clearly proves that the authoritative books do not teach the doctrine of one non-differenced substance ; that they do not teach that the universe of things is false ; and that they do not deny the essential distinction of in- telligent beings, non-intelligent things, and the Lord. The theory of Nescience cannot be proved. We now proceed to the consideration of Nescience. — According to the view of our opponent, this entire world, with all its endless distinctions of Ruler, creatures ruled, and so on, is, owing to a certain defect, fictitiously super- imposed upon the non-differenced, self-luminous Reality ; and what constitutes that defect is beginningless Nescience, which invests the Reality, gives rise to manifold illusions, and cannot be defined either as being or non-being. Such Nescience, he says, must necessarily be admitted, firstly on the ground of scriptural texts, such as ' Hidden by what is untrue' {Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 2), and secondly because other- wise the oneness of the individual souls with Brahman — which is taught by texts such as 'Thou are that ' — cannot be established. This Nescience is neither ' being,' because in that case it could not be the object of erroneous cogni- tion (bhrama) and sublation (badha) ; nor is it ' non-being/ because in that case it could not be the object of apprehen- sion and sublation 1. Hence orthodox Philosophers declare 1 'Nescience' is sublated (refuted) by the cognition of Brahman, I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. IO3 that this Nescience falls under neither of these two opposite categories.
2Hence orthodox Philosophers declare 1 'Nescience' is sublated (refuted) by the cognition of Brahman, I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. IO3 that this Nescience falls under neither of these two opposite categories. Now this theory of Nescience is altogether untenable. In the first place we ask, * What is the substrate of this Nescience which gives rise to the great error of plurality of existence ? ' You cannot reply ' the individual soul ' ; for the individual soul itself exists in so far only as it is fictitiously imagined through Nescience. Nor can you say ' Brahman ' ; for Brahman is nothing but self-luminous intelligence, and hence contradictory in nature to Nescience, which is avowedly sublated by knowledge. ' The highest Brahman has knowledge for its essential nature : if Nescience, which is essentially false and to be terminated by knowledge, invests Brahman, who then will be strong enough to put an end to it ? ' ' What puts an end to Nescience is the knowledge that Brahman is pure knowledge ! ' — c Not so, for that knowledge also is, like Brahman, of the nature of light, and hence has no power to put an end to Nescience.— And if there exists the knowledge that Brahman is knowledge, then Brahman is an object of knowledge, and that, according to your own teaching, implies that Brahman is not of the nature of consciousness.' To explain the second of these ^lokas. — If you maintain that what sublates Nescience is not that knowledge which constitutes Brahman's essential nature, but rather that knowledge which has for its object the truth of Brahman being of such a nature, we demur ; for as both these kinds of knowledge are of the same nature, viz. the nature of light, which is just that which constitutes Brahman's nature, there is no reason for making a distinction and saying that one knowledge is contradictory of Nescience, and the other is not. Or, to put it otherwise — that essential nature of Brahman which is apprehended through the cognition and thereby shown to have been the object of erroneous cognition : it thus cannot be 'being/ i.e. real. Nor can it be altogether unreal, ' non-being,' because in that case it could not be the object either of mental apprehension or of sublation. 104 VEDANTA-S<JTRAS.
3real. Nor can it be altogether unreal, ' non-being,' because in that case it could not be the object either of mental apprehension or of sublation. 104 VEDANTA-S<JTRAS. that Brahman is knowledge, itself shines forth in con- sequence of the self-luminous nature of Brahman, and hence we have no right to make a distinction between that knowledge which constitutes Brahman's nature, and that of which that nature is the object, and to maintain that the latter only is antagonistic to Nescience. — Moreover (and this explains the third ^loka), according to your own view Brahman, which is mere consciousness, cannot be the object of another consciousness, and hence there is no knowledge which has Brahman for its object. If, therefore, knowledge is contradictory to non-knowledge (Nescience), Brahman itself must be contradictory to it, and hence cannot be its substrate. Shells (mistaken for silver) and the like which by themselves are incapable of throwing light upon their own true nature are not contradictory to non-knowledge of themselves, and depend, for the termination of that non- knowledge, on another knowledge (viz. on the knowledge of an intelligent being); Brahman, on the other hand, whose essential nature is established by its own conscious- ness, is contradictorily opposed to non-knowledge of itself, and hence does not depend, for the termination of that non- knowledge, on some other knowledge. — If our opponent should argue that the knowledge of the falsity of whatever is other than Brahman is contradictory to non-know- ledge, we ask whether this knowledge of the falsity of what is other than Brahman is contradictory to the non- knowledge of the true nature of Brahman, or to that non- knowledge which consists in the view of the reality of the apparent world. The former alternative is inadmissible ; because the cognition of the falsity of what is other than Brahman has a different object (from the non-knowledge of Brahman's true nature) and therefore cannot be con- tradictory to it ; for knowledge and non-knowledge are contradictory in so far only as they refer to one and the same object. And with regard to the latter alternative we point out that the knowledge of the falsity of the world is contradictory to the non-knowledge which consists in the view of the reality of the world ; the former knowledge therefore sublates the latter non-knowledge only, while I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. JO5
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Gi. XV, 16). In other places the Divine one declares that as inward Ruler he is the Self of all : ' The Lord dwells in the heart of all creatures' (XVIII, 61), and 'I dwell within the heart of all ' (XV, 15), and CI am the 1 02 vedanta-s6tr as. Self which has its abode within all creatures ' (X, 20). The term ' creature ' in these passages denotes the entire aggregate of body, &c, up to the Self. — Because he is the Self of all, the text expressly denies that among all the things constituting his body there is any one separate from him, ' There is not anything which is without me ' (X, 39). The place where this text occurs is the winding up of a glorification of the Divine one, and the text has to be understood accordingly. The passage immediately follow- ing is c Whatever being there is, powerful, beautiful, or glorious, even that know thou to have sprung from a portion of my glory ; pervading this entire Universe by a portion of mine I do abide ' (X, 41 ; 42). All this clearly proves that the authoritative books do not teach the doctrine of one non-differenced substance ; that they do not teach that the universe of things is false ; and that they do not deny the essential distinction of in- telligent beings, non-intelligent things, and the Lord. The theory of Nescience cannot be proved. We now proceed to the consideration of Nescience. — According to the view of our opponent, this entire world, with all its endless distinctions of Ruler, creatures ruled, and so on, is, owing to a certain defect, fictitiously super- imposed upon the non-differenced, self-luminous Reality ; and what constitutes that defect is beginningless Nescience, which invests the Reality, gives rise to manifold illusions, and cannot be defined either as being or non-being. Such Nescience, he says, must necessarily be admitted, firstly on the ground of scriptural texts, such as ' Hidden by what is untrue' {Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 2), and secondly because other- wise the oneness of the individual souls with Brahman — which is taught by texts such as 'Thou are that ' — cannot be established. This Nescience is neither ' being,' because in that case it could not be the object of erroneous cogni- tion (bhrama) and sublation (badha) ; nor is it ' non-being/ because in that case it could not be the object of apprehen- sion and sublation 1. Hence orthodox Philosophers declare 1 'Nescience' is sublated (refuted) by the cognition of Brahman, I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. IO3 that this Nescience falls under neither of these two opposite categories.
2Hence orthodox Philosophers declare 1 'Nescience' is sublated (refuted) by the cognition of Brahman, I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. IO3 that this Nescience falls under neither of these two opposite categories. Now this theory of Nescience is altogether untenable. In the first place we ask, * What is the substrate of this Nescience which gives rise to the great error of plurality of existence ? ' You cannot reply ' the individual soul ' ; for the individual soul itself exists in so far only as it is fictitiously imagined through Nescience. Nor can you say ' Brahman ' ; for Brahman is nothing but self-luminous intelligence, and hence contradictory in nature to Nescience, which is avowedly sublated by knowledge. ' The highest Brahman has knowledge for its essential nature : if Nescience, which is essentially false and to be terminated by knowledge, invests Brahman, who then will be strong enough to put an end to it ? ' ' What puts an end to Nescience is the knowledge that Brahman is pure knowledge ! ' — c Not so, for that knowledge also is, like Brahman, of the nature of light, and hence has no power to put an end to Nescience.— And if there exists the knowledge that Brahman is knowledge, then Brahman is an object of knowledge, and that, according to your own teaching, implies that Brahman is not of the nature of consciousness.' To explain the second of these ^lokas. — If you maintain that what sublates Nescience is not that knowledge which constitutes Brahman's essential nature, but rather that knowledge which has for its object the truth of Brahman being of such a nature, we demur ; for as both these kinds of knowledge are of the same nature, viz. the nature of light, which is just that which constitutes Brahman's nature, there is no reason for making a distinction and saying that one knowledge is contradictory of Nescience, and the other is not. Or, to put it otherwise — that essential nature of Brahman which is apprehended through the cognition and thereby shown to have been the object of erroneous cognition : it thus cannot be 'being/ i.e. real. Nor can it be altogether unreal, ' non-being,' because in that case it could not be the object either of mental apprehension or of sublation. 104 VEDANTA-S<JTRAS.
3real. Nor can it be altogether unreal, ' non-being,' because in that case it could not be the object either of mental apprehension or of sublation. 104 VEDANTA-S<JTRAS. that Brahman is knowledge, itself shines forth in con- sequence of the self-luminous nature of Brahman, and hence we have no right to make a distinction between that knowledge which constitutes Brahman's nature, and that of which that nature is the object, and to maintain that the latter only is antagonistic to Nescience. — Moreover (and this explains the third ^loka), according to your own view Brahman, which is mere consciousness, cannot be the object of another consciousness, and hence there is no knowledge which has Brahman for its object. If, therefore, knowledge is contradictory to non-knowledge (Nescience), Brahman itself must be contradictory to it, and hence cannot be its substrate. Shells (mistaken for silver) and the like which by themselves are incapable of throwing light upon their own true nature are not contradictory to non-knowledge of themselves, and depend, for the termination of that non- knowledge, on another knowledge (viz. on the knowledge of an intelligent being); Brahman, on the other hand, whose essential nature is established by its own conscious- ness, is contradictorily opposed to non-knowledge of itself, and hence does not depend, for the termination of that non- knowledge, on some other knowledge. — If our opponent should argue that the knowledge of the falsity of whatever is other than Brahman is contradictory to non-know- ledge, we ask whether this knowledge of the falsity of what is other than Brahman is contradictory to the non- knowledge of the true nature of Brahman, or to that non- knowledge which consists in the view of the reality of the apparent world. The former alternative is inadmissible ; because the cognition of the falsity of what is other than Brahman has a different object (from the non-knowledge of Brahman's true nature) and therefore cannot be con- tradictory to it ; for knowledge and non-knowledge are contradictory in so far only as they refer to one and the same object. And with regard to the latter alternative we point out that the knowledge of the falsity of the world is contradictory to the non-knowledge which consists in the view of the reality of the world ; the former knowledge therefore sublates the latter non-knowledge only, while I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. JO5
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
No commentary for this page.