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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1In order, then, that texts of both these classes may be taken in their II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 42. 56 1 primary, literal sense, we must admit that the individual soul is a part of Brahman. Nor is it a fact that the declarations of difference refer to matters settled by other means of knowledge, such as perception and so on, and on that account are mere reiterations of something established otherwise (in consequence of which they would have no original proving force of their own, and would be sublated by the texts declaring non-duality). For the fact that the soul is created by Brahman, is ruled by it, constitutes its body, is subordinate to it, abides in it, is preserved by it, is absorbed by it, stands to it in the relation of a meditating devotee, and through its grace attains the different ends of man, viz. religious duty, wealth, pleasure and final release — - all this and what is effected thereby, viz. the distinction of the soul and Brahman, does not fall within the cognisance of perception and the other means of proof, and hence is not established by something else. It is therefore not true that the texts declaring the creation of the world, and so on, are mere reiterations of differences established by other means of authoritative knowledge, and hence have for their purport to teach things that are false. — [Nor will it do to say that the texts declaring duality teach what indeed is not established by other means of knowledge but is erroneous] ' Brahman conceives the thought of differen- tiating itself, forms the resolution of becoming many, and accordingly creates the ether and the other elements, enters into them as individual soul, evolves all the different forms and names, takes upon himself all the pleasures and pains which spring from experiencing the infinite multitude of objects thus constituted, abides within and inwardly rules all beings, recognises itself in its ^iva-condition to be one with the universal causal Brahman, and finally accomplishes its release from the sa;/zsara and the body of sacred doctrine by which this release is effected ' — all this the Veda indeed declares, but its real purport is that all this is only true of a Brahman under the influence of an illusion, and therefore is unreal! — while at the same time Brahman is defined as that the essential nature of which is absolutely pure intelli- gence ! Truly, if such were the purport of the Veda, what [48] o o 562 vedanta-s6tras. more would the Veda be than the idle talk of a person out of his mind ! Nor finally is there any good in the theory of the soul being Brahman in so far as determined by a limiting adjunct. For this view also is in conflict with the texts which distinguish Brahman as the ruling and the soul as the ruled principle, and so on. One and the same Devadatta does not become double as it were — a ruler on the one hand and a ruled subject on the other — because he is determined by the house in which he is, or by something else.
2One and the same Devadatta does not become double as it were — a ruler on the one hand and a ruled subject on the other — because he is determined by the house in which he is, or by something else. In order to be able to account for the twofold designations of the soul, we must therefore admit that the soul is a part of Brahman. 43. And on account of the mantra. ' One part (quarter) of it are all beings, three feet (quarters) of it are the Immortal in heaven' (Kh. Up. Ill, 12, 6) — on account of this mantra also the soul must be held to be a part of Brahman. For the word ' foot ' denotes a part. As the individual souls are many the mantra uses the plural form 'all beings.' In the Sutra (42) the word ' part ' is in the singular, with a view to denote the whole class. For the same reason in II, 3, 18 also the word ' atman ' is in the singular. For that the individual Selfs are different from the Lord, and are many and eternal, is declared by texts such as 'He who, eternal and intelligent, fulfils the desires of many who likewise are eternal and intelligent' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13). Since thus the plurality of the eternal individual Selfs rests on good authority, those who have an insight into the true nature of Selfs will discern without difficulty different characteristics distinguishing the individual Selfs, although all Selfs are alike in so far as having intelligence for their essential nature. Moreover the Sutra II, 3, 48 directly states the plurality of the individual Selfs. 44. Moreover it is so stated in Smnti. Smrzti moreover declares the individual soul to be a part of the highest Person, ' An eternal part of myself becomes II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 45. 563 the individual soul (^iva) in the world of life' (Bha. Gi. XV, 7). — For this reason also the soul must be held to be a part of Brahman. But if the soul is a part of Brahman, all the imperfections of the soul are Brahman's also ! — To this objection the next Sutra replies. 45. But as in the case of light and so on. Not so is the highest
3Gi. XV, 7). — For this reason also the soul must be held to be a part of Brahman. But if the soul is a part of Brahman, all the imperfections of the soul are Brahman's also ! — To this objection the next Sutra replies. 45. But as in the case of light and so on. Not so is the highest The 'but' discards the objection. — 'Like light and so on.' The individual soul is a part of the highest Self; as the light issuing from a luminous thing such as fire or the sun is a part of that body ; or as the generic characteristics of a cow or horse, and the white or black colour of things so coloured, are attributes and hence parts of the things in which those attributes inhere ; or as the body is a part of an embodied being. For by a part we understand that which constitutes one place (dej-a) of some thing, and hence a distinguishing attribute (vuesha^a) is a part of the thing distinguished by that attribute. Hence those analysing a thing of that kind discriminate between the distinguishing element or part of it, and the distinguished element or part. Now although the distinguishing attribute and the thing distinguished thereby stand to each other in the relation of part and whole, yet we observe them to differ in essential character. Hence there is no contradiction between the individual and the highest Self — the former of which is a vi^esha^a of the latter — standing to each other in the relation of part and whole, and their being at the same time of essentially different nature. This the Sutra declares c not so is the highest/ i. e. the highest Self is not of the same nature as the individual soul. For as the luminous body is of a nature different from that of its light, thus the highest Self differs from the individual soul which is a part of it. It is this difference of character — due to the individual soul being the distinguishing element and the highest Self being the substance distinguished thereby — to which all those texts refer which declare difference. Those texts, on the other hand, which declare non-difference are O02 564 vedanta-s6tras. based on the circumstance that attributes which are incapable of separate existence are ultimately bound to the substance which they distinguish, and hence are fundamentally valid. That in declarations such as * Thou art that ' and ' this Self is Brahman/ the words thou and Self, no less than the words that and Brahman, denote Brahman in. so far as having the individual souls for its body, and that thus the two sets of words denote fundamentally one and the same thing, has been explained previously. 46. And Smrzti texts declare this.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1In order, then, that texts of both these classes may be taken in their II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 42. 56 1 primary, literal sense, we must admit that the individual soul is a part of Brahman. Nor is it a fact that the declarations of difference refer to matters settled by other means of knowledge, such as perception and so on, and on that account are mere reiterations of something established otherwise (in consequence of which they would have no original proving force of their own, and would be sublated by the texts declaring non-duality). For the fact that the soul is created by Brahman, is ruled by it, constitutes its body, is subordinate to it, abides in it, is preserved by it, is absorbed by it, stands to it in the relation of a meditating devotee, and through its grace attains the different ends of man, viz. religious duty, wealth, pleasure and final release — - all this and what is effected thereby, viz. the distinction of the soul and Brahman, does not fall within the cognisance of perception and the other means of proof, and hence is not established by something else. It is therefore not true that the texts declaring the creation of the world, and so on, are mere reiterations of differences established by other means of authoritative knowledge, and hence have for their purport to teach things that are false. — [Nor will it do to say that the texts declaring duality teach what indeed is not established by other means of knowledge but is erroneous] ' Brahman conceives the thought of differen- tiating itself, forms the resolution of becoming many, and accordingly creates the ether and the other elements, enters into them as individual soul, evolves all the different forms and names, takes upon himself all the pleasures and pains which spring from experiencing the infinite multitude of objects thus constituted, abides within and inwardly rules all beings, recognises itself in its ^iva-condition to be one with the universal causal Brahman, and finally accomplishes its release from the sa;/zsara and the body of sacred doctrine by which this release is effected ' — all this the Veda indeed declares, but its real purport is that all this is only true of a Brahman under the influence of an illusion, and therefore is unreal! — while at the same time Brahman is defined as that the essential nature of which is absolutely pure intelli- gence ! Truly, if such were the purport of the Veda, what [48] o o 562 vedanta-s6tras. more would the Veda be than the idle talk of a person out of his mind ! Nor finally is there any good in the theory of the soul being Brahman in so far as determined by a limiting adjunct. For this view also is in conflict with the texts which distinguish Brahman as the ruling and the soul as the ruled principle, and so on. One and the same Devadatta does not become double as it were — a ruler on the one hand and a ruled subject on the other — because he is determined by the house in which he is, or by something else.
2One and the same Devadatta does not become double as it were — a ruler on the one hand and a ruled subject on the other — because he is determined by the house in which he is, or by something else. In order to be able to account for the twofold designations of the soul, we must therefore admit that the soul is a part of Brahman. 43. And on account of the mantra. ' One part (quarter) of it are all beings, three feet (quarters) of it are the Immortal in heaven' (Kh. Up. Ill, 12, 6) — on account of this mantra also the soul must be held to be a part of Brahman. For the word ' foot ' denotes a part. As the individual souls are many the mantra uses the plural form 'all beings.' In the Sutra (42) the word ' part ' is in the singular, with a view to denote the whole class. For the same reason in II, 3, 18 also the word ' atman ' is in the singular. For that the individual Selfs are different from the Lord, and are many and eternal, is declared by texts such as 'He who, eternal and intelligent, fulfils the desires of many who likewise are eternal and intelligent' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13). Since thus the plurality of the eternal individual Selfs rests on good authority, those who have an insight into the true nature of Selfs will discern without difficulty different characteristics distinguishing the individual Selfs, although all Selfs are alike in so far as having intelligence for their essential nature. Moreover the Sutra II, 3, 48 directly states the plurality of the individual Selfs. 44. Moreover it is so stated in Smnti. Smrzti moreover declares the individual soul to be a part of the highest Person, ' An eternal part of myself becomes II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 45. 563 the individual soul (^iva) in the world of life' (Bha. Gi. XV, 7). — For this reason also the soul must be held to be a part of Brahman. But if the soul is a part of Brahman, all the imperfections of the soul are Brahman's also ! — To this objection the next Sutra replies. 45. But as in the case of light and so on. Not so is the highest
3Gi. XV, 7). — For this reason also the soul must be held to be a part of Brahman. But if the soul is a part of Brahman, all the imperfections of the soul are Brahman's also ! — To this objection the next Sutra replies. 45. But as in the case of light and so on. Not so is the highest The 'but' discards the objection. — 'Like light and so on.' The individual soul is a part of the highest Self; as the light issuing from a luminous thing such as fire or the sun is a part of that body ; or as the generic characteristics of a cow or horse, and the white or black colour of things so coloured, are attributes and hence parts of the things in which those attributes inhere ; or as the body is a part of an embodied being. For by a part we understand that which constitutes one place (dej-a) of some thing, and hence a distinguishing attribute (vuesha^a) is a part of the thing distinguished by that attribute. Hence those analysing a thing of that kind discriminate between the distinguishing element or part of it, and the distinguished element or part. Now although the distinguishing attribute and the thing distinguished thereby stand to each other in the relation of part and whole, yet we observe them to differ in essential character. Hence there is no contradiction between the individual and the highest Self — the former of which is a vi^esha^a of the latter — standing to each other in the relation of part and whole, and their being at the same time of essentially different nature. This the Sutra declares c not so is the highest/ i. e. the highest Self is not of the same nature as the individual soul. For as the luminous body is of a nature different from that of its light, thus the highest Self differs from the individual soul which is a part of it. It is this difference of character — due to the individual soul being the distinguishing element and the highest Self being the substance distinguished thereby — to which all those texts refer which declare difference. Those texts, on the other hand, which declare non-difference are O02 564 vedanta-s6tras. based on the circumstance that attributes which are incapable of separate existence are ultimately bound to the substance which they distinguish, and hence are fundamentally valid. That in declarations such as * Thou art that ' and ' this Self is Brahman/ the words thou and Self, no less than the words that and Brahman, denote Brahman in. so far as having the individual souls for its body, and that thus the two sets of words denote fundamentally one and the same thing, has been explained previously. 46. And Smrzti texts declare this.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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