Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1' On the latter alternative there would be no final release. In the former case we have to ask of what nature Reality is. ' It is of [48] I 1 1 4 vedanta-sOtras. an essentially clear and distinct nature.' Does this nature then exist previously (to the cessation of indistinctness), or not? If it does, there is no room whatever either for indistinctness the effect of avidya, or for its cessation. If it does not previously exist, then Release discloses itself as something to be effected, and therefore non-eternal. — And that such non-knowledge is impossible because there is no definable substrate for it we have shown above. — He, moreover, who holds the theory of error resting on a non-real defect, will find it difficult to prove the impossibility of error being without any substrate ; for, if the cause of error may be unreal, error may be supposed to take place even in case of its substrate being unreal. And the consequence of this would be the theory of a general Void. The assertion, again, that non-knowledge as a positive entity is proved by Inference, also is groundless. But the inference was actually set forth ! — True ; but it was set forth badly. For the reason you employed for proving a^ana is a so-called contradictory one (i. e. it proves the contrary of what it is meant to prove), in so far as it proves what is not desired and what is different from a£#ana (for what it proves is that there is a certain knowledge •, viz. that all knowledge resting on valid means of proof has non-knowledge for its antecedent). (And with regard to this knowledge again we must ask whether it also has non- knowledge for its antecedent.) If the reason (relied on in all this argumentation) does not prove, in this case also, the antecedent existence of positive non-knowledge, it is too general (and hence not to be trusted in any case). If, on the other hand, it does prove antecedent non- knowledge, then this latter non-knowledge stands in the way of the non-knowledge (wThich you try to prove by inference) being an object of consciousness, and thus the whole supposition of agvzana as an entity becomes useless. The proving instance, moreover, adduced by our oppo- nent, has no proving power; for the light of a lamp does not possess .the property of illumining things not illumined I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I I 5
2The proving instance, moreover, adduced by our oppo- nent, has no proving power; for the light of a lamp does not possess .the property of illumining things not illumined I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I I 5 before. Everywhere illumining power belongs to know- ledge only ; there may be light, but if there is not also knowledge there is no lighting up of objects. The senses also are only causes of the origination of knowledge, and possess no illumining power. The function of the light of the lamp on the other hand is a merely auxiliary one, in so far as it dispels the darkness antagonistic to the organ of sight which gives rise to knowledge ; and it is only with a view to this auxiliary action that illumining power is conventionally ascribed to the lamp. — But in using the light of the lamp as a proving instance, we did not mean to maintain that it possesses illumining power equal to that of light ; we introduced it merely with reference to the illumining power of knowledge, in so far as preceded by the removal of what obscures its object ! — We refuse to accept this explanation. Illumining power does not only mean the dispelling of what is antagonistic to it, but also the defining of things, i. e. the rendering them capable of being objects of empirical thought and speech ; and this belongs to knowledge only (not to the light of the lamp). If you allow the power of illumining what was not illumined, to auxiliary factors also, you must first of all allow it to the senses which are the most eminent factors of that kind ; and as in their case there exists no different thing to be terminated by their activity, (i. e. nothing analogous to the a^ana to be terminated by knowledge), this whole argu- mentation is beside the point. There are also formal inferences, opposed to the conclu- sion of the purvapakshin. — Of the a^Tzana under discussion, Brahman, which is mere knowledge, is not the substrate, just because it is a^Tzana ; as shown by the case of the non- knowledge of the shell (mistaken for silver) and similar cases ; for such non-knowledge abides within the knowing subject. — The a^Tzana under discussion does not obscure knowledge, just because it is a^ana ; as shown by the cases of the shell, &c. ; for such non-knowledge hides the object. — Agn&m. is not terminated by knowledge, because it does not hide the object of knowledge ; whatever non- knowledge is terminated by knowledge, is such as to hide I 2 I 1 6 vedanta-s6tr as.
3; for such non-knowledge hides the object. — Agn&m. is not terminated by knowledge, because it does not hide the object of knowledge ; whatever non- knowledge is terminated by knowledge, is such as to hide I 2 I 1 6 vedanta-s6tr as. the object of knowledge ; as e. g. the non-knowledge of the shell. — Brahman is not the substrate of a^ana, because it is devoid of the character of knowing subject ; like jars and similar things. — Brahman is not hidden by a^Tzana, because it is not the object of knowledge ; whatever is hidden by non-knowledge is the object of knowledge ; so e. g. shells and similar things. — Brahman is not connected with non- knowledge to be terminated by knowledge, because it is not the object of knowledge ; whatever is connected with non-knowledge to be terminated by knowledge is an object of knowledge ; as e. g. shells and the like. — Knowledge based on valid means of proof, has not for its antecedent, non-knowledge other than the antecedent non-existence of knowledge ; just because it is knowledge based on valid proof; like that valid knowledge which proves the a^wana maintained by you. — Knowledge does not destroy a real thing, because it is knowledge in the absence of some specific power strengthening it; whatever is capable of destroying things is — whether it be knowledge or a^Tzana — strengthened by some specific power ; as e. g. the know- • ledge of the Lord and of Yogins; and as the a^zzana consisting in a pestle (the blow of which destroys the pot). — A^ana which has the character of a positive entity cannot be destroyed by knowledge ; just because it is a positive entity, like jars and similar things. But, it now may be said, we observe that fear and other affections, which are positive entities and produced by previous cognitions, are destroyed by sublative acts of cognition ! — Not so, we reply. Those affections are not destroyed by knowledge ; they rather pass away by them- selves, being of a momentary (temporary) nature only, and on the cessation of their cause they do not arise again. That they are of a momentary nature only, follows from their being observed only in immediate connexion with the causes of their origination, and not otherwise. If they were not of a temporary nature, each element of the stream of cognitions, which are the cause of fear and the like, would give rise to a separate feeling of fear, and the result would be that there would be consciousness of many distinct I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I I 7
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1' On the latter alternative there would be no final release. In the former case we have to ask of what nature Reality is. ' It is of [48] I 1 1 4 vedanta-sOtras. an essentially clear and distinct nature.' Does this nature then exist previously (to the cessation of indistinctness), or not? If it does, there is no room whatever either for indistinctness the effect of avidya, or for its cessation. If it does not previously exist, then Release discloses itself as something to be effected, and therefore non-eternal. — And that such non-knowledge is impossible because there is no definable substrate for it we have shown above. — He, moreover, who holds the theory of error resting on a non-real defect, will find it difficult to prove the impossibility of error being without any substrate ; for, if the cause of error may be unreal, error may be supposed to take place even in case of its substrate being unreal. And the consequence of this would be the theory of a general Void. The assertion, again, that non-knowledge as a positive entity is proved by Inference, also is groundless. But the inference was actually set forth ! — True ; but it was set forth badly. For the reason you employed for proving a^ana is a so-called contradictory one (i. e. it proves the contrary of what it is meant to prove), in so far as it proves what is not desired and what is different from a£#ana (for what it proves is that there is a certain knowledge •, viz. that all knowledge resting on valid means of proof has non-knowledge for its antecedent). (And with regard to this knowledge again we must ask whether it also has non- knowledge for its antecedent.) If the reason (relied on in all this argumentation) does not prove, in this case also, the antecedent existence of positive non-knowledge, it is too general (and hence not to be trusted in any case). If, on the other hand, it does prove antecedent non- knowledge, then this latter non-knowledge stands in the way of the non-knowledge (wThich you try to prove by inference) being an object of consciousness, and thus the whole supposition of agvzana as an entity becomes useless. The proving instance, moreover, adduced by our oppo- nent, has no proving power; for the light of a lamp does not possess .the property of illumining things not illumined I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I I 5
2The proving instance, moreover, adduced by our oppo- nent, has no proving power; for the light of a lamp does not possess .the property of illumining things not illumined I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I I 5 before. Everywhere illumining power belongs to know- ledge only ; there may be light, but if there is not also knowledge there is no lighting up of objects. The senses also are only causes of the origination of knowledge, and possess no illumining power. The function of the light of the lamp on the other hand is a merely auxiliary one, in so far as it dispels the darkness antagonistic to the organ of sight which gives rise to knowledge ; and it is only with a view to this auxiliary action that illumining power is conventionally ascribed to the lamp. — But in using the light of the lamp as a proving instance, we did not mean to maintain that it possesses illumining power equal to that of light ; we introduced it merely with reference to the illumining power of knowledge, in so far as preceded by the removal of what obscures its object ! — We refuse to accept this explanation. Illumining power does not only mean the dispelling of what is antagonistic to it, but also the defining of things, i. e. the rendering them capable of being objects of empirical thought and speech ; and this belongs to knowledge only (not to the light of the lamp). If you allow the power of illumining what was not illumined, to auxiliary factors also, you must first of all allow it to the senses which are the most eminent factors of that kind ; and as in their case there exists no different thing to be terminated by their activity, (i. e. nothing analogous to the a^ana to be terminated by knowledge), this whole argu- mentation is beside the point. There are also formal inferences, opposed to the conclu- sion of the purvapakshin. — Of the a^Tzana under discussion, Brahman, which is mere knowledge, is not the substrate, just because it is a^Tzana ; as shown by the case of the non- knowledge of the shell (mistaken for silver) and similar cases ; for such non-knowledge abides within the knowing subject. — The a^Tzana under discussion does not obscure knowledge, just because it is a^ana ; as shown by the cases of the shell, &c. ; for such non-knowledge hides the object. — Agn&m. is not terminated by knowledge, because it does not hide the object of knowledge ; whatever non- knowledge is terminated by knowledge, is such as to hide I 2 I 1 6 vedanta-s6tr as.
3; for such non-knowledge hides the object. — Agn&m. is not terminated by knowledge, because it does not hide the object of knowledge ; whatever non- knowledge is terminated by knowledge, is such as to hide I 2 I 1 6 vedanta-s6tr as. the object of knowledge ; as e. g. the non-knowledge of the shell. — Brahman is not the substrate of a^ana, because it is devoid of the character of knowing subject ; like jars and similar things. — Brahman is not hidden by a^Tzana, because it is not the object of knowledge ; whatever is hidden by non-knowledge is the object of knowledge ; so e. g. shells and similar things. — Brahman is not connected with non- knowledge to be terminated by knowledge, because it is not the object of knowledge ; whatever is connected with non-knowledge to be terminated by knowledge is an object of knowledge ; as e. g. shells and the like. — Knowledge based on valid means of proof, has not for its antecedent, non-knowledge other than the antecedent non-existence of knowledge ; just because it is knowledge based on valid proof; like that valid knowledge which proves the a^wana maintained by you. — Knowledge does not destroy a real thing, because it is knowledge in the absence of some specific power strengthening it; whatever is capable of destroying things is — whether it be knowledge or a^Tzana — strengthened by some specific power ; as e. g. the know- • ledge of the Lord and of Yogins; and as the a^zzana consisting in a pestle (the blow of which destroys the pot). — A^ana which has the character of a positive entity cannot be destroyed by knowledge ; just because it is a positive entity, like jars and similar things. But, it now may be said, we observe that fear and other affections, which are positive entities and produced by previous cognitions, are destroyed by sublative acts of cognition ! — Not so, we reply. Those affections are not destroyed by knowledge ; they rather pass away by them- selves, being of a momentary (temporary) nature only, and on the cessation of their cause they do not arise again. That they are of a momentary nature only, follows from their being observed only in immediate connexion with the causes of their origination, and not otherwise. If they were not of a temporary nature, each element of the stream of cognitions, which are the cause of fear and the like, would give rise to a separate feeling of fear, and the result would be that there would be consciousness of many distinct I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I I 7
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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