Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1When we say * blue (is) (the) lotus ' we employ two words with the intention of expressing the unity of one thing, and hence do not aim at expressing a duality of attributes, viz. the quality of blueness and the I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 3. 219 generic character of a lotus* If this latter point was aimed at, it would follow that the sentence would convey the oneness of the two aspects of the thing, viz* its being blue and its being a lotus ; but this is not possible, for the thing (denoted by the two terms) is not characterised by (the denotation of) the word 'lotus/ in so far as itself characterised by blueness ; for this would imply a re- ciprocal inherence (samavaya) of class-characteristics and quality *. What the co-ordination of the two words conveys is, therefore, only the oneness of a substance characterised by the quality of blueness, and at the same time by the class attributes of a lotus. In the same way, when we say 'this (person is) that Devadatta' the co-ordination of the words cannot possibly mean that Devadatta in so far as distinguished by his connexion with a past time and a distant place is one with Devadatta in so far as dis- tinguished by his connexion with the present time and a near place ; what it means to express is only that there is oneness on the part of a personal substance — which sub- stance is characterised by connexion with both places and moments of time. It is true indeed that when we at first hear the one word * blue ' we form the idea of the attribute of blueness, while, after having apprehended the relation of co-ordination (expressed in ' blue is the lotus '), this idea no longer presents itself, for this would imply a contra- diction ; but all the same ' implication ' does not take place. The essence of co-ordination consists, in all cases, therein that it suppresses the distinguishing elements in the words co-ordinated. And as thus our explanation cannot be charged with ' implication/ it cannot be objected to. All this, we rejoin, is unfounded. What the words in all sentences whatsoever aim at conveying is only a particular connexion of the things known to be denoted by those words. Words such as 'blue/ standing in co-ordination with others, express that some matter possessing the attri- 1 I. e. we should not in that case be able to decide whether the quality (i. e., here, the blueness) inheres in the class (i. e,, here, the lotus), or vice versa;. 2 20 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
2Words such as 'blue/ standing in co-ordination with others, express that some matter possessing the attri- 1 I. e. we should not in that case be able to decide whether the quality (i. e., here, the blueness) inheres in the class (i. e,, here, the lotus), or vice versa;. 2 20 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. bute of blueness, &c, as known from the ordinary use of language, is connected with some other matter. When, e. g., somebody says ' bring the blue lotus/ a thing is brought which possesses the attribute of blueness. And when we are told that 'a herd of elephants excited with passion lives in the Vindhya-forest/ we again understand that what is meant is something possessing several attributes denoted by several words. Analogously we have to understand, as the thing intimated by Vedanta-texts in the form of co- ordination, Brahman as possessing such and such attributes. — It is an error to assume that, where a sentence aims at setting forth attributes, one attribute is to be taken as qualifying the thing in so far as qualified by another attribute ; the case rather is that the thing itself is equally qualified by all attributes. For co-ordination means the application, to one thing, of several words having different reasons of application ; and the effect of co-ordination is that one and the same thing, because being connected — positively or negatively — with some attribute other than that which is conveyed by one word, is also known through other words. As e. g. when it is said that ' Devadatta (is) dark-complexioned, young, reddish-eyed, not stupid, not poor, of irreproachable character/ Where two co-ordinate words express two attributes which cannot exist combined in one thing, one of the two words is to be taken in a secondary sense, while the other retains its primary mean- ing, as e. g. in the case of the sentence, ' The V&hika man is an ox.' But in the case of the * blue lotus ' and the like, where there is nothing contradictory in the connexion of the two attributes with one thing, co-ordination expresses the fact of one thing being characterised by two attributes. — Possibly our opponent will here make the following remark. A thing in so far as defined by its correlation to some one attribute is something different from the thing in so far as defined by its correlation to some second attri- bute ; hence, even if there is equality of case affixes (as in * nilam utpalam'), the words co-ordinated are incapable of expressing oneness, and cannot, therefore, express the one- ness of a thing qualified by several attributes; not any I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 3. 221
3221 more than the juxtaposition of two words such as i jar ' and ' cloth ' — both having the same case-ending — can prove that these two things are one. A statement of co-ordination, therefore, rather aims at expressing the oneness of a thing in that way that it presents to the mind the essential nature of the thing by means of (words denoting) its attributes. — This would be so, we reply, if it were only the fact of a thing's standing in correlation to two attributes that is in the way of its unity. But this is not the case ; for what stands in the way of such unity is the fact of there being several attributes which are not capable of being combined in one thing. Such incapability is, in the case of the generic character of a jar and that of a piece of cloth, proved by other means of knowledge; but there is no contradiction between a thing being blue and its being a lotus ; not any more than there is between a man and the stick or the earrings he wears, or than there is between the colour, taste, smell, &c, of one and the same thing. Not only is there no contradiction, but it is this very fact of one thing possessing two attributes which makes possible co-ordination — the essence of which is that, owing to a difference of causes of application, several words express one and the same thing. For if there were nothing but essential unity of being, what reason would there be for the employment of several words ? If the purport of the attributes were, not to intimate their connexion with the thing, but merely to suggest the thing itself, one attribute would suffice for such suggestion, and anything further would be meaningless. If, on the other hand, it were assumed that the use of a further * suggestive ' attribute is to bring out a difference of aspect in the thing suggested, such difference of aspect would imply differentiation in the thing (which you maintain to be free from all difference). — . Nor is there any shade even of { implication ' in the judg- ment, ' This person is that Devadatta ' ; for there is abso- lutely no contradiction between the past Devadatta, who was connected with some distant place, and the present Devadatta, who is connected with the place before us. For this very reason those who maintain the permanency of 222 VEDANTA-sfiTR AS. things prove the oneness of a thing related to two moments of time on the basis of the judgment of recognition ('this is that ') ; if there really were a contradiction between the two representations it would follow that all things are (not permanent but) momentary only. The fact is that the contradiction involved in one thing being connected with two places is removed by the difference of the correlative moments of time. We therefore hold to the conclusion that co-ordinated words denote one thing qualified by the possession of several attributes.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1When we say * blue (is) (the) lotus ' we employ two words with the intention of expressing the unity of one thing, and hence do not aim at expressing a duality of attributes, viz. the quality of blueness and the I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 3. 219 generic character of a lotus* If this latter point was aimed at, it would follow that the sentence would convey the oneness of the two aspects of the thing, viz* its being blue and its being a lotus ; but this is not possible, for the thing (denoted by the two terms) is not characterised by (the denotation of) the word 'lotus/ in so far as itself characterised by blueness ; for this would imply a re- ciprocal inherence (samavaya) of class-characteristics and quality *. What the co-ordination of the two words conveys is, therefore, only the oneness of a substance characterised by the quality of blueness, and at the same time by the class attributes of a lotus. In the same way, when we say 'this (person is) that Devadatta' the co-ordination of the words cannot possibly mean that Devadatta in so far as distinguished by his connexion with a past time and a distant place is one with Devadatta in so far as dis- tinguished by his connexion with the present time and a near place ; what it means to express is only that there is oneness on the part of a personal substance — which sub- stance is characterised by connexion with both places and moments of time. It is true indeed that when we at first hear the one word * blue ' we form the idea of the attribute of blueness, while, after having apprehended the relation of co-ordination (expressed in ' blue is the lotus '), this idea no longer presents itself, for this would imply a contra- diction ; but all the same ' implication ' does not take place. The essence of co-ordination consists, in all cases, therein that it suppresses the distinguishing elements in the words co-ordinated. And as thus our explanation cannot be charged with ' implication/ it cannot be objected to. All this, we rejoin, is unfounded. What the words in all sentences whatsoever aim at conveying is only a particular connexion of the things known to be denoted by those words. Words such as 'blue/ standing in co-ordination with others, express that some matter possessing the attri- 1 I. e. we should not in that case be able to decide whether the quality (i. e., here, the blueness) inheres in the class (i. e,, here, the lotus), or vice versa;. 2 20 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
2Words such as 'blue/ standing in co-ordination with others, express that some matter possessing the attri- 1 I. e. we should not in that case be able to decide whether the quality (i. e., here, the blueness) inheres in the class (i. e,, here, the lotus), or vice versa;. 2 20 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. bute of blueness, &c, as known from the ordinary use of language, is connected with some other matter. When, e. g., somebody says ' bring the blue lotus/ a thing is brought which possesses the attribute of blueness. And when we are told that 'a herd of elephants excited with passion lives in the Vindhya-forest/ we again understand that what is meant is something possessing several attributes denoted by several words. Analogously we have to understand, as the thing intimated by Vedanta-texts in the form of co- ordination, Brahman as possessing such and such attributes. — It is an error to assume that, where a sentence aims at setting forth attributes, one attribute is to be taken as qualifying the thing in so far as qualified by another attribute ; the case rather is that the thing itself is equally qualified by all attributes. For co-ordination means the application, to one thing, of several words having different reasons of application ; and the effect of co-ordination is that one and the same thing, because being connected — positively or negatively — with some attribute other than that which is conveyed by one word, is also known through other words. As e. g. when it is said that ' Devadatta (is) dark-complexioned, young, reddish-eyed, not stupid, not poor, of irreproachable character/ Where two co-ordinate words express two attributes which cannot exist combined in one thing, one of the two words is to be taken in a secondary sense, while the other retains its primary mean- ing, as e. g. in the case of the sentence, ' The V&hika man is an ox.' But in the case of the * blue lotus ' and the like, where there is nothing contradictory in the connexion of the two attributes with one thing, co-ordination expresses the fact of one thing being characterised by two attributes. — Possibly our opponent will here make the following remark. A thing in so far as defined by its correlation to some one attribute is something different from the thing in so far as defined by its correlation to some second attri- bute ; hence, even if there is equality of case affixes (as in * nilam utpalam'), the words co-ordinated are incapable of expressing oneness, and cannot, therefore, express the one- ness of a thing qualified by several attributes; not any I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 3. 221
3221 more than the juxtaposition of two words such as i jar ' and ' cloth ' — both having the same case-ending — can prove that these two things are one. A statement of co-ordination, therefore, rather aims at expressing the oneness of a thing in that way that it presents to the mind the essential nature of the thing by means of (words denoting) its attributes. — This would be so, we reply, if it were only the fact of a thing's standing in correlation to two attributes that is in the way of its unity. But this is not the case ; for what stands in the way of such unity is the fact of there being several attributes which are not capable of being combined in one thing. Such incapability is, in the case of the generic character of a jar and that of a piece of cloth, proved by other means of knowledge; but there is no contradiction between a thing being blue and its being a lotus ; not any more than there is between a man and the stick or the earrings he wears, or than there is between the colour, taste, smell, &c, of one and the same thing. Not only is there no contradiction, but it is this very fact of one thing possessing two attributes which makes possible co-ordination — the essence of which is that, owing to a difference of causes of application, several words express one and the same thing. For if there were nothing but essential unity of being, what reason would there be for the employment of several words ? If the purport of the attributes were, not to intimate their connexion with the thing, but merely to suggest the thing itself, one attribute would suffice for such suggestion, and anything further would be meaningless. If, on the other hand, it were assumed that the use of a further * suggestive ' attribute is to bring out a difference of aspect in the thing suggested, such difference of aspect would imply differentiation in the thing (which you maintain to be free from all difference). — . Nor is there any shade even of { implication ' in the judg- ment, ' This person is that Devadatta ' ; for there is abso- lutely no contradiction between the past Devadatta, who was connected with some distant place, and the present Devadatta, who is connected with the place before us. For this very reason those who maintain the permanency of 222 VEDANTA-sfiTR AS. things prove the oneness of a thing related to two moments of time on the basis of the judgment of recognition ('this is that ') ; if there really were a contradiction between the two representations it would follow that all things are (not permanent but) momentary only. The fact is that the contradiction involved in one thing being connected with two places is removed by the difference of the correlative moments of time. We therefore hold to the conclusion that co-ordinated words denote one thing qualified by the possession of several attributes.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
No commentary for this page.