The Vedânta-Sûtras with the Commentary of Râmânuja, Part III — SBE Vol. 48 (trans. George Thibaut, 1904)

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 1 47

down by Devadatta with one stroke' — meaning thereby that Devadatta himself and the action of cutting down are comprised among the things cut down! — The second alternative, on the other hand — according to which the knowing subject is not Brahman itself, but a knower superimposed upon it — would imply that that subject is the agent in an act of knowledge resulting in his own destruction ; and this is impossible since no person aims at destroying himself. And should it be said that the destruction of the knowing agent belongs to the very nature of Brahman itself1, it would follow that we can assume neither plurality nor the erroneous view of plurality, nor avidya. as the root of that erroneous view. — All this confirms our theory, viz. that since bondage springs from a^ana in the form of an eternal stream of karman, it can be destroyed only through knowledge of the kind maintained by us. Such knowledge is to be attained only through the due daily performance of religious duties as prescribed for a man's caste and ajrama, such performance being sanctified by the accompanying thought of the true nature of the Self, and having the character of propitiation of the highest Person. Now, that mere works produce limited and non-permanent results only, and that on the other hand works not aiming at an immediate result but meant to please the highest Person, bring about knowledge of the character of devout meditation, and thereby the unlimited and permanent result of the intuition of Brahman being the Self of all — these are points not to be known without an insight into the nature of works, and hence, without this, the attitude described — which is preceded by the abandonment of mere works — cannot be reached. For these reasons the enquiry into Brahman has to be entered upon after the enquiry into the nature of works.

1 And, on that account, belongs to what constitutes man's highest aim.

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r 48 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

The Ved§ntin aiming to ascertain the nature of Brahman from Scripture, need not be disconcerted by the Mimâms&-theory of all speech having informing power with regard to actions only.

1 And, on that account, belongs to what constitutes man's highest aim.

L 2

r 48 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

The Ved§ntin aiming to ascertain the nature of Brahman from Scripture, need not be disconcerted by the Mimâms&-theory of all speech having informing power with regard to actions only.

Here another prima facie view1 finally presents itself. The power of words to denote things cannot be ascertained in any way but by observing the speech and actions of experienced people. Now as such speech and action always implies the idea of something to be done (karya), words are means of knowledge only with reference to things to be done ; and hence the matter inculcated by the Veda also is only things to be done. From this it follows that the Vedanta-texts cannot claim the position of authoritative means of knowledge with regard to Brahman, which is (not a thing to be done but) an accomplished fact. — Against this view it must not be urged that in the case of sentences expressive of accomplished facts — as e. g. that a son is born to somebody — the idea of a particular thing may with certainty be inferred as the cause of certain outward signs — such as e. g. a pleased expression of countenance— which are generally due to the attainment of a desired object ; for the possible causes of joy, past, present, and future, are infinite in number, and in the given case other causes of joy, as e. g. the birth having taken place in an auspicious moment, or having been an easy one, &c, may easily be imagined. Nor, again, can it be maintained that the denotative power of words with regard to accomplished things may be ascertained in the way of our inferring either the meaning of one word from the known meaning of other words, or the meaning of the radical part of a word from the known meaning of a formative element ; for the fact is that we are only able to infer on the basis of a group of words known to denote a certain thing to be done, what the meaning of some particular constituent of that group may be. — Nor, again, when a person, afraid of what he thinks to be a snake, is ob-

1 This view is held by the Prabhakara Mimawsakas.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 1 49

— Nor, again, when a person, afraid of what he thinks to be a snake, is ob-

1 This view is held by the Prabhakara Mimawsakas.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 1 49

served to dismiss his fear on being told that the thing is not a snake but only a rope, can we determine thereby that what terminates his fear is the idea of the non-existence of a snake. For there are many other ideas which may account for the cessation of his fear — he may think, e. g., ' this is a thing incapable of moving, devoid of poison, without consciousness ' — the particular idea present to his mind we are therefore not able to determine. — The truth is that from the fact of all activity being invariably dependent on the idea of something to be done, we learn that the meaning which words convey is something prompting activity. All words thus denoting something to be done, the several words of a sentence express only some particular action to be performed, and hence it is not possible to determine that they possess the power of denoting their own meaning only, in connexion with the meaning of the other words of the sentence. — (Nor must it be said that what moves to action is not the idea of the thing to be done, but the idea of the means to do it ; for) the idea of the means to bring about the desired end causes action only through the idea of the thing to be done, not through itself; as is evident from the fact that the idea of means past, future, and even present (when divorced from the idea of an end to be accomplished), does not prompt to action. As long as a man does not reflect 'the means towards the desired end are not to be accomplished without an effort of mine ; it must therefore be accomplished through my activity'; so long he does not begin to act. What causes activity is thus only the idea of things to be done ; and as hence words denote such things only, the Veda also can tell us only about things to be done, and is not therefore in a position to give information about the attainment of an infinite and permanent result, such result being constituted by Brahman, which is (not a thing to be done, but) an accomplished entity. The Veda does, on the other hand, actually teach that mere works have a permanent result (' Imperishable is the merit of him who offers the Hturmasya-sacrifices/ and so on) ; and hence it follows that to enter on anp. 1 enquiry into Brahman for the reason that the knowledge of Brahman has an infinite and permanent result, while the result of works is limited and non-permanent, is an altogether unjustified proceeding.