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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1For ' This which is " being " only was in the beginning one only, without a second ; it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth ' (Kk. Up. VI, 3, 3) ; ' Verily, in the beginning this was Brahman, one only. Being one II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I 5. 46 1 it was not strong enough. It created the most excellent Kshattra, viz. those Kshattras among the Devas — Indra, Varu/za, Soma, Rudra, Par^anya, Yama, MWtyu, Lana' (Br/. Up. I, 4, 11); 'In the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing whatsoever else blinking. He thought, shall I send forth worlds' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, i, 1, 2) ; ' There was in truth Naraya/za only, not Brahma, not t^ana, nor heaven and earth, nor the nakshatras, nor the waters, nor Agni, nor Soma, nor Surya. Being alone he felt no delight. Of him merged in meditation' &c. (Mahani. Up. I, 1) — these and other texts prove that the highest cause is the Lord of all Lords, Naraya/za. For as the terms ' Being,' ' Brahman,' ' Self/ which are met with in sections treating of the same topic, are in one of those parallel sections particularised by the term 'Naraya^a,' it follows that they all mean Naraya^a. That the Lord only is the universal cause is shown by the following text also, c He the highest great lord of lords, the highest deity of deities — he is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord ' (Svet. Up. VI, 7, 9). Similarly the Manu Smrzti, 'Then the divine Self-existent (Brahma) — desirous to produce from his own body beings of many kind — first with a thought created the waters and placed his seed in them ' (Ma. I, 6-8). Itihasas and Pura/zas also declare the Supreme Person only to be the universal cause, ' Naraya^a, of whom the world is the body, of infinite nature, eternal, when desirous to create sent forth from a thousandth part of himself the souls in two divisions.' ' From Vishnu the world originated and in him it abides.' Nor is it possible to hold that the Lord is pure ' Being ' only, for such ' Being ' is admitted to be an element of the Lord ; and moreover all ' Being ' has difference. Nor can it be maintained that the Lord's connexion with all his auspicious qualities — knowledge, bliss, and so on — is occasional (adventitious) merely ; it rather is essential and hence eternal. Nor may you avail yourself of certain texts — viz. ' His high power (jakti) is revealed as manifold, as essential, and (so) his knowledge, strength and action ' 462 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
2Nor may you avail yourself of certain texts — viz. ' His high power (jakti) is revealed as manifold, as essential, and (so) his knowledge, strength and action ' 462 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. (5vet. Up. VI, 8) ; ' He who is all-knowing, all-cognising ' (Mu. Up. I, i, 9), and others — to the end of proving that what is essential is only the Lord's connexion with the potentialities (^akti) of knowledge, bliss, and so on. For in the wSveta^vatara-text the word ( essential ' independently qualifies ' knowledge, strength, and action ' no less than ' jakti ' ; and your explanation would necessitate so-called implication (laksha^a). Nor again can it be said that in words such as sarva^a (all-knowing), the formative suffix expresses potentiality only, as it admittedly does in other words such as pa^aka (cook) ; for grammar does not teach that all these (krit) affixes in general express potentiality or capability only. It rather teaches (cp. Pa/nni III, 2, 54) that a few krz't-affixes only have this limited meaning; and in the case of pa>£aka and similar words we must assume capability to be denoted, because there is no other explanation open to us. — If, moreover, the Lord were held to be only a part of the Sat it would follow that the Sat, as the whole, would be superior to the Lord just as the ocean is superior to a wave, and this would be in conflict with ever so many scriptural texts which make statements about the Lord, cp. e.g. ' Him the highest great lord of lords ' ; ' There is none seen like to him or superior ' (5vet. Up. VI, 7, 8). If, moreover, mere Being is held to be the Self of all and the general whole, and the Lord only a particular part of it, this would imply the stultification of all those texts which declare the Lord to be the general Self and the whole of which all beings are parts ; for jars and platters certainly cannot be held to be parts of, and to have their being in, pitchers (which themselves are only special things made of clay). Against this you perhaps will plead that as Being in general is fully present in all its parts, and hence also in that part which is the Lord, all other things may be viewed as having theJr Self in, and being parts of, him. — But from your principles we might with equal right draw the inference that as Being in general is fully present in the jar, the Lord is a part of the jar and has his Self in that ! From enunciations such as ' the jar is,' ' the cloth is/ it appears that Being II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 6. 463
3— But from your principles we might with equal right draw the inference that as Being in general is fully present in the jar, the Lord is a part of the jar and has his Self in that ! From enunciations such as ' the jar is,' ' the cloth is/ it appears that Being II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 6. 463 is an attribute of things, and cannot therefore be a substance and a cause. By the ' being ' of a thing we understand the attribute of its being suitable for some definite practical effect ; while its ' non-being ' means its suitability for an effect of an opposite nature. — Should it on the other hand be held that substances only have being, the (unacceptable) consequence would be that actions, and so on, are non- existent. And if (to avoid this consequence) it were said that the being of actions, and so on, depends on their connexion with substances, it would be difficult to show (what yet should be shown) that ' being ' is everywhere of one and the same nature. Moreover, if everything were non-different in so far as ' being/ there would be a universal consciousness of the nature of everything, and from this there would follow a general confusion of all good and evil (i. e. every one would have conscious experience of every- thing) This point we have explained before. For all these reasons non-difference can only have the meaning set forth by us. — Here the following doubt may arise. In the case of childhood, youth, and so on, we observe that different ideas and different terms are applied to different states of one and the same being ; in the case of clay, wood, gold, &c, on the other hand, we observe that different I ideas and terms are applied to different things. On what j ground then do you determine that in the case of causes l and effects, such as e. g. clay and jars, it is mere difference j of state on which the difference of ideas and terms is based ? — 1 To this question the next Sutra gives a reply. 16. And because (the cause) is perceived in the existence of the effect. This means — because gold which is the cause is perceived in the existence of its effects, such as earrings and the like ; i.e. on account of the recognition of gold which expresses itself in the judgment ( this earring is gold/ We do not on the other hand perceive the presence of clay, and so on, in gold, and so on. The case of the cause and the effect is thus analagous to that of the child and the youth : the word ' effect ' denotes nothing else but the causal substance which 464 vedAnta-sOtras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1For ' This which is " being " only was in the beginning one only, without a second ; it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth ' (Kk. Up. VI, 3, 3) ; ' Verily, in the beginning this was Brahman, one only. Being one II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I 5. 46 1 it was not strong enough. It created the most excellent Kshattra, viz. those Kshattras among the Devas — Indra, Varu/za, Soma, Rudra, Par^anya, Yama, MWtyu, Lana' (Br/. Up. I, 4, 11); 'In the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing whatsoever else blinking. He thought, shall I send forth worlds' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, i, 1, 2) ; ' There was in truth Naraya/za only, not Brahma, not t^ana, nor heaven and earth, nor the nakshatras, nor the waters, nor Agni, nor Soma, nor Surya. Being alone he felt no delight. Of him merged in meditation' &c. (Mahani. Up. I, 1) — these and other texts prove that the highest cause is the Lord of all Lords, Naraya/za. For as the terms ' Being,' ' Brahman,' ' Self/ which are met with in sections treating of the same topic, are in one of those parallel sections particularised by the term 'Naraya^a,' it follows that they all mean Naraya^a. That the Lord only is the universal cause is shown by the following text also, c He the highest great lord of lords, the highest deity of deities — he is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord ' (Svet. Up. VI, 7, 9). Similarly the Manu Smrzti, 'Then the divine Self-existent (Brahma) — desirous to produce from his own body beings of many kind — first with a thought created the waters and placed his seed in them ' (Ma. I, 6-8). Itihasas and Pura/zas also declare the Supreme Person only to be the universal cause, ' Naraya^a, of whom the world is the body, of infinite nature, eternal, when desirous to create sent forth from a thousandth part of himself the souls in two divisions.' ' From Vishnu the world originated and in him it abides.' Nor is it possible to hold that the Lord is pure ' Being ' only, for such ' Being ' is admitted to be an element of the Lord ; and moreover all ' Being ' has difference. Nor can it be maintained that the Lord's connexion with all his auspicious qualities — knowledge, bliss, and so on — is occasional (adventitious) merely ; it rather is essential and hence eternal. Nor may you avail yourself of certain texts — viz. ' His high power (jakti) is revealed as manifold, as essential, and (so) his knowledge, strength and action ' 462 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
2Nor may you avail yourself of certain texts — viz. ' His high power (jakti) is revealed as manifold, as essential, and (so) his knowledge, strength and action ' 462 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. (5vet. Up. VI, 8) ; ' He who is all-knowing, all-cognising ' (Mu. Up. I, i, 9), and others — to the end of proving that what is essential is only the Lord's connexion with the potentialities (^akti) of knowledge, bliss, and so on. For in the wSveta^vatara-text the word ( essential ' independently qualifies ' knowledge, strength, and action ' no less than ' jakti ' ; and your explanation would necessitate so-called implication (laksha^a). Nor again can it be said that in words such as sarva^a (all-knowing), the formative suffix expresses potentiality only, as it admittedly does in other words such as pa^aka (cook) ; for grammar does not teach that all these (krit) affixes in general express potentiality or capability only. It rather teaches (cp. Pa/nni III, 2, 54) that a few krz't-affixes only have this limited meaning; and in the case of pa>£aka and similar words we must assume capability to be denoted, because there is no other explanation open to us. — If, moreover, the Lord were held to be only a part of the Sat it would follow that the Sat, as the whole, would be superior to the Lord just as the ocean is superior to a wave, and this would be in conflict with ever so many scriptural texts which make statements about the Lord, cp. e.g. ' Him the highest great lord of lords ' ; ' There is none seen like to him or superior ' (5vet. Up. VI, 7, 8). If, moreover, mere Being is held to be the Self of all and the general whole, and the Lord only a particular part of it, this would imply the stultification of all those texts which declare the Lord to be the general Self and the whole of which all beings are parts ; for jars and platters certainly cannot be held to be parts of, and to have their being in, pitchers (which themselves are only special things made of clay). Against this you perhaps will plead that as Being in general is fully present in all its parts, and hence also in that part which is the Lord, all other things may be viewed as having theJr Self in, and being parts of, him. — But from your principles we might with equal right draw the inference that as Being in general is fully present in the jar, the Lord is a part of the jar and has his Self in that ! From enunciations such as ' the jar is,' ' the cloth is/ it appears that Being II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 6. 463
3— But from your principles we might with equal right draw the inference that as Being in general is fully present in the jar, the Lord is a part of the jar and has his Self in that ! From enunciations such as ' the jar is,' ' the cloth is/ it appears that Being II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 6. 463 is an attribute of things, and cannot therefore be a substance and a cause. By the ' being ' of a thing we understand the attribute of its being suitable for some definite practical effect ; while its ' non-being ' means its suitability for an effect of an opposite nature. — Should it on the other hand be held that substances only have being, the (unacceptable) consequence would be that actions, and so on, are non- existent. And if (to avoid this consequence) it were said that the being of actions, and so on, depends on their connexion with substances, it would be difficult to show (what yet should be shown) that ' being ' is everywhere of one and the same nature. Moreover, if everything were non-different in so far as ' being/ there would be a universal consciousness of the nature of everything, and from this there would follow a general confusion of all good and evil (i. e. every one would have conscious experience of every- thing) This point we have explained before. For all these reasons non-difference can only have the meaning set forth by us. — Here the following doubt may arise. In the case of childhood, youth, and so on, we observe that different ideas and different terms are applied to different states of one and the same being ; in the case of clay, wood, gold, &c, on the other hand, we observe that different I ideas and terms are applied to different things. On what j ground then do you determine that in the case of causes l and effects, such as e. g. clay and jars, it is mere difference j of state on which the difference of ideas and terms is based ? — 1 To this question the next Sutra gives a reply. 16. And because (the cause) is perceived in the existence of the effect. This means — because gold which is the cause is perceived in the existence of its effects, such as earrings and the like ; i.e. on account of the recognition of gold which expresses itself in the judgment ( this earring is gold/ We do not on the other hand perceive the presence of clay, and so on, in gold, and so on. The case of the cause and the effect is thus analagous to that of the child and the youth : the word ' effect ' denotes nothing else but the causal substance which 464 vedAnta-sOtras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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