Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— To this objection the following Sutra replies. 4. But that (i.e. the authoritativeness of Scripture with regard to Brahman) exists on account of the con- nexion (of Scripture with the highest aim of man). The word 'but* is meant to rebut the objection raised. That, i. e. the authoritativeness of Scripture with regard to Brahman, is possible, on account of samanvaya, i. e. con- nexion with the highest aim of man — that is to say because the scriptural texts are connected with, i. e. have for their subject, Brahman, which constitutes the highest aim of man. For such is the connected meaning of the whole aggregate of words which constitutes the Upanishads — ' That from whence these beings are born ' (Taitt. Up. Ill, 1, 1). ' Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second ' (Kh. Up. VI, 2), &c. &c. And of aggregates of words which are capable of giving information about accomplished things known through the ordinary means of ascertaining the meaning of words, and which connectedly refer to a Brahman which is the cause of the origination, subsistence, and destruction of the entire world, is antagonistic to all imperfection and so on, we have no right to say that, owing to the absence of a purport in the form of activity or cessation of activity, they really refer to something other than Brahman. For all instruments of knowledge have their end in determining the knowledge of their own special objects : their action does not adapt itself to a final purpose, but the latter rather adapts itself to the means of knowledge. Nor is it true that where there is no connexion with activity or cessation of activity all aim is absent ; for in such cases we observe connexion with what constitutes the general aim, i. e. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. I 75 the benefit of man. Statements of accomplished matter of fact — such as ' a son is born to thee.' ' This is no snake '— evidently have an aim, viz. in so far as they either give rise to joy or remove pain and fear.
2e. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. I 75 the benefit of man. Statements of accomplished matter of fact — such as ' a son is born to thee.' ' This is no snake '— evidently have an aim, viz. in so far as they either give rise to joy or remove pain and fear. Against this view the Purvapakshin now argues as follows. The Vedanta-texts do not impart knowledge of Brahman ; for unless related to activity or the cessation of activity, Scripture would be unmeaning, devoid of all purpose. Perception and the other means of knowledge indeed have their aim and end in supplying knowledge of the nature of accomplished things and facts ; Scripture, on the other hand, must be supposed to aim at some practical purpose. For neither in ordinary speech nor in the Veda do we ever observe the employment of sentences devoid of a practical purpose : the employment of sentences not having such a purpose is in fact impossible. And what constitutes such purpose is the attainment of a desired, or the avoidance of a non-desired object, to be effected by some action or abstention from action. ' Let a man desirous of wealth attach himself to the court of a prince ' ; ' a man with a weak digestion must not drink much water'; Met him who is desirous of the heavenly world offer sacrifices ' ; and so on. With regard to the assertion that such sentences also as refer to accomplished things — ' a son is born to thee ' and so on — are connected with certain a:ims of man, viz. joy or the cessation of fear, we ask whether in such cases the attain- ment of man's purpose results from the thing or fact itself, as e. g. the birth of a son, or from the knowledge of that thing or fact. — You will reply that as a thing although actually existing is of no use to man as long as it is not known to him, man's purpose is accomplished by his knowledge of the thing. — It then appears, we rejoin, that man's purpose is effected through mere knowledge, even if there is no actual thing ; and from this it follows that Scripture, although connected with certain aims, is not a means of knowledge for the actual existence of things. In all cases, therefore, sentences have a practical purpose ; they determine either some form of activity or cessation from activity^ or else some form of knowledge. No sentence, 1 76 VEDANTA-S#TRAS. therefore, can have for its purport an accomplished thing, and hence the Vedanta-texts do not convey the knowledge of Brahman as such an accomplished entity.
3No sentence, 1 76 VEDANTA-S#TRAS. therefore, can have for its purport an accomplished thing, and hence the Vedanta-texts do not convey the knowledge of Brahman as such an accomplished entity. At this point somebody propounds the following view. The Vedanta-texts are an authoritative means for the cog- nition of Brahman, because as a matter of fact they also aim at something to be done. What they really mean to teach is that Brahman, which in itself is pure homogeneous know- ledge, without a second, not connected with a world, but is, owing to beginningless Nescience, viewed as connected with a world, should be freed from this connexion. And it is through this process of dissolution of the world that Brahman becomes the object of an injunction. — But which texts embody this injunction, according to which Brahman in its pure form is to be realised through the dissolution of this apparent world with its distinction of knowing subjects and objects of knowledge? — Texts such as the following: ' One should not see (i. e. represent to oneself) the seer of seeing, one should not think the thinker of thinking ' (Bri. Up. Ill, 4, 2) ; for this means that we should realise Brahman in the form of pure Seeing (knowledge), free from the distinction of seeing agents and objects of sight. Brahman is indeed accomplished through itself, but all the same it may constitute an object to be accomplished, viz. in so far as it is being disengaged from the apparent world. This view (the Mima^saka rejoins) is unfounded. He who maintains that injunction constitutes the meaning of sentences must be able to assign the injunction itself, the qualification of the person to whom the injunction is addressed, the object of the injunction, the means to carry it out, the special mode of the procedure, and the person carrying out the injunction. Among these things the qualification of the person to whom the injunction addresses itself is something not to be enjoined (but existing previously to the injunction), and is of the nature either of cause (nimitta) or a result aimed at (phala). We then have to decide what, in the case under discussion (i. e. the alleged injunction set forth by the antagonist), constitutes the qualification of the person to whom the injunction addresses I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. I 77
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— To this objection the following Sutra replies. 4. But that (i.e. the authoritativeness of Scripture with regard to Brahman) exists on account of the con- nexion (of Scripture with the highest aim of man). The word 'but* is meant to rebut the objection raised. That, i. e. the authoritativeness of Scripture with regard to Brahman, is possible, on account of samanvaya, i. e. con- nexion with the highest aim of man — that is to say because the scriptural texts are connected with, i. e. have for their subject, Brahman, which constitutes the highest aim of man. For such is the connected meaning of the whole aggregate of words which constitutes the Upanishads — ' That from whence these beings are born ' (Taitt. Up. Ill, 1, 1). ' Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second ' (Kh. Up. VI, 2), &c. &c. And of aggregates of words which are capable of giving information about accomplished things known through the ordinary means of ascertaining the meaning of words, and which connectedly refer to a Brahman which is the cause of the origination, subsistence, and destruction of the entire world, is antagonistic to all imperfection and so on, we have no right to say that, owing to the absence of a purport in the form of activity or cessation of activity, they really refer to something other than Brahman. For all instruments of knowledge have their end in determining the knowledge of their own special objects : their action does not adapt itself to a final purpose, but the latter rather adapts itself to the means of knowledge. Nor is it true that where there is no connexion with activity or cessation of activity all aim is absent ; for in such cases we observe connexion with what constitutes the general aim, i. e. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. I 75 the benefit of man. Statements of accomplished matter of fact — such as ' a son is born to thee.' ' This is no snake '— evidently have an aim, viz. in so far as they either give rise to joy or remove pain and fear.
2e. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. I 75 the benefit of man. Statements of accomplished matter of fact — such as ' a son is born to thee.' ' This is no snake '— evidently have an aim, viz. in so far as they either give rise to joy or remove pain and fear. Against this view the Purvapakshin now argues as follows. The Vedanta-texts do not impart knowledge of Brahman ; for unless related to activity or the cessation of activity, Scripture would be unmeaning, devoid of all purpose. Perception and the other means of knowledge indeed have their aim and end in supplying knowledge of the nature of accomplished things and facts ; Scripture, on the other hand, must be supposed to aim at some practical purpose. For neither in ordinary speech nor in the Veda do we ever observe the employment of sentences devoid of a practical purpose : the employment of sentences not having such a purpose is in fact impossible. And what constitutes such purpose is the attainment of a desired, or the avoidance of a non-desired object, to be effected by some action or abstention from action. ' Let a man desirous of wealth attach himself to the court of a prince ' ; ' a man with a weak digestion must not drink much water'; Met him who is desirous of the heavenly world offer sacrifices ' ; and so on. With regard to the assertion that such sentences also as refer to accomplished things — ' a son is born to thee ' and so on — are connected with certain a:ims of man, viz. joy or the cessation of fear, we ask whether in such cases the attain- ment of man's purpose results from the thing or fact itself, as e. g. the birth of a son, or from the knowledge of that thing or fact. — You will reply that as a thing although actually existing is of no use to man as long as it is not known to him, man's purpose is accomplished by his knowledge of the thing. — It then appears, we rejoin, that man's purpose is effected through mere knowledge, even if there is no actual thing ; and from this it follows that Scripture, although connected with certain aims, is not a means of knowledge for the actual existence of things. In all cases, therefore, sentences have a practical purpose ; they determine either some form of activity or cessation from activity^ or else some form of knowledge. No sentence, 1 76 VEDANTA-S#TRAS. therefore, can have for its purport an accomplished thing, and hence the Vedanta-texts do not convey the knowledge of Brahman as such an accomplished entity.
3No sentence, 1 76 VEDANTA-S#TRAS. therefore, can have for its purport an accomplished thing, and hence the Vedanta-texts do not convey the knowledge of Brahman as such an accomplished entity. At this point somebody propounds the following view. The Vedanta-texts are an authoritative means for the cog- nition of Brahman, because as a matter of fact they also aim at something to be done. What they really mean to teach is that Brahman, which in itself is pure homogeneous know- ledge, without a second, not connected with a world, but is, owing to beginningless Nescience, viewed as connected with a world, should be freed from this connexion. And it is through this process of dissolution of the world that Brahman becomes the object of an injunction. — But which texts embody this injunction, according to which Brahman in its pure form is to be realised through the dissolution of this apparent world with its distinction of knowing subjects and objects of knowledge? — Texts such as the following: ' One should not see (i. e. represent to oneself) the seer of seeing, one should not think the thinker of thinking ' (Bri. Up. Ill, 4, 2) ; for this means that we should realise Brahman in the form of pure Seeing (knowledge), free from the distinction of seeing agents and objects of sight. Brahman is indeed accomplished through itself, but all the same it may constitute an object to be accomplished, viz. in so far as it is being disengaged from the apparent world. This view (the Mima^saka rejoins) is unfounded. He who maintains that injunction constitutes the meaning of sentences must be able to assign the injunction itself, the qualification of the person to whom the injunction is addressed, the object of the injunction, the means to carry it out, the special mode of the procedure, and the person carrying out the injunction. Among these things the qualification of the person to whom the injunction addresses itself is something not to be enjoined (but existing previously to the injunction), and is of the nature either of cause (nimitta) or a result aimed at (phala). We then have to decide what, in the case under discussion (i. e. the alleged injunction set forth by the antagonist), constitutes the qualification of the person to whom the injunction addresses I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. I 77
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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