Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1e. if its non-existence is not, how can it give rise to the idea of its non-existence ? Nor can it do so if not being ; for if consciousness itself is not, how can it furnish D 2 36 VEDANTA-sfjTRAS. a proof for its own non-existence ? Nor can the non- existence of consciousness be apprehended through any- thing else ; for consciousness cannot be the object of anything else. Any instrument of knowledge proving the non-existence of consciousness, could do so only by making consciousness its object — ' this is consciousness ' ; but con- sciousness, as being self-established, does not admit of that objectivation which is implied in the word 'this/ and hence its previous non-existence cannot be proved by anything lying outside itself. As consciousness thus does not admit of antecedent non-existence, it further cannot be held to originate, and hence also all those other states of being which depend on origination cannot be predicated of it. As consciousness is begin ningless, it further does not admit of any plurality within itself; for we observe in this case the presence of something which is contrary to what invariably accompanies plurality (this something being ' beginninglessness' which is contrary to the quality of having a beginning — which quality invariably accompanies plurality). For we never observe a thing characterised by plurality to be without a beginning. — And moreover differ- ence, origination, &c, are objects of consciousness, like colour and other qualities, and hence cannot be attributes of consciousness. Therefore, consciousness being essentially consciousness only, nothing else that is an object of con- sciousness can be its attribute. The conclusion is that consciousness is free from difference of any kind. The apparent difference between Consciousness and the conscious subject is due to the unreal ahamkara. From this it further follows that there is no substrate of consciousness — different from consciousness itself — such as people ordinarily mean when speaking of a ' knower.' It is self-luminous consciousness itself which constitutes the so-called ' knower.' This follows therefrom also that con- sciousness is not ncn-intelligent (gadd) ; for non-intelligence invariably accompanies absence of Selfhood (anatmatva) ; I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 37 hence, non-intelligence being absent in consciousness, con- sciousness is not non-Self, that means, it is the Self.
237 hence, non-intelligence being absent in consciousness, con- sciousness is not non-Self, that means, it is the Self. But, our adversary again objects, the consciousness which expresses itself in the judgment '/know/ proves that the quality of being a c knower ' belongs to consciousness ! — By no means, we reply. The attribution to consciousness of this quality rests on error, no less than the attribution, to the shell, of the quality of being silver. Consciousness cannot stand in the relation of an agent toward itself: the attribute of being a knowing agent is erroneously imputed to it — an error analogous to that expressed in the judg- ment ' I am a man,' which identifies the Self of a person with the outward aggregate of matter that bears the external characteristics of humanity. To be a 'knower ' means to be the agent in the action of knowing ; and this is something essentially changeful and non-intelligent (g&d%), having its abode in the aha//zkara, which is itself a thing subject to change. How, on the other hand, could such agency possibly belong to the changeless ' witness ' (of all change, i.e. consciousness) whose nature is pure Being? That agency cannot be an attribute of the Self follows therefrom also that, like colour and other qualities, agency depends, for its own proof, on seeing, i. e. consciousness. That the Self does not fall within the sphere (is not an object of), the idea of ' T is proved thereby also that in deep sleep, swoon, and similar states, the idea of the ' I ' is absent, while the consciousness of the Self persists. Moreover, if the Self were admitted to be an agent and an object of the idea of ' 1/ it would be difficult to avoid the conclusion that like the body it is non-intelligent, something merely outward (' being for others only, not for itself) and destitute of Selfhood. That from the body, which is the object of the idea of ' 1/ and known to be an agent, there is different that Self which enjoys the results of the body's actions, viz. the heavenly word, and so on, is acknowledged by all who admit the validity of the instru- ments of knowledge ; analogously, therefore, we must admit that different from the knower whom we understand by the term ' 1/ is the c witnessing ' inward Self. The non- 38 vedAnta-s6tras.
3the heavenly word, and so on, is acknowledged by all who admit the validity of the instru- ments of knowledge ; analogously, therefore, we must admit that different from the knower whom we understand by the term ' 1/ is the c witnessing ' inward Self. The non- 38 vedAnta-s6tras. intelligent aha^kara thus merely serves to manifest the nature of non-changing consciousness, and it effects this by being its abode ; for it is the proper quality of manifest- ing agents to manifest the objects manifested, in so far as the latter abide in them. A mirror, e. g., or a sheet of water, or a certain mass of matter, manifests a face or the disc of the moon (reflected in the mirror or water) or the generic character of a cow (impressed on the mass of matter) in so far as all those things abide in them. — In this way, then, there arises the erroneous view that finds expression in the judgment ' I know/ — Nor must you, in the way of objection, raise the question how self-luminous consciousness is to be manifested by the non-intelligent aha/^kctra, which rather is itself manifested by conscious- ness ; for we observe that the surface of the hand, which itself is manifested by the rays of sunlight falling on it, at the same time manifests those rays. This is clearly seen in the case of rays passing through the interstices of net- work: the light of those rays is intensified by the hand on which they fall, and which at the same time is itself manifested by the rays. It thus appears that the { knowing agent/ who is denoted by the ' 1/ in the judgment ' I know,' constitutes no real attribute of the Self, the nature of which is pure intelligence. This is also the reason why the consciousness of Egoity does not persist in the states of deep sleep and final release : in those states this special form of consciousness passes away, and the Self appears in its true nature, i. e. as pure consciousness. Hence a person who has risen from deep, dreamless sleep reflects, 'Just now I was unconscious of myself.' Summing up of the purvapaksha view. As the outcome of all this, we sum up our view as follows. — Eternal, absolutely non-changing consciousness, whose nature is pure non-differenced intelligence, free from all distinction whatever, owing to error illusorily manifests itself (vivarttate) as broken up into manifold distinctions — knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, acts of knowledge. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 39 And the purpose for which we enter on the consideration of the Vedanta-texts is utterly to destroy what is the root of that error, i.e. Nescience, and thus to obtain a firm knowledge of the oneness of Brahman, whose nature is mere intelligence — free, pure, eternal. THE GREAT SIDDHANTA.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1e. if its non-existence is not, how can it give rise to the idea of its non-existence ? Nor can it do so if not being ; for if consciousness itself is not, how can it furnish D 2 36 VEDANTA-sfjTRAS. a proof for its own non-existence ? Nor can the non- existence of consciousness be apprehended through any- thing else ; for consciousness cannot be the object of anything else. Any instrument of knowledge proving the non-existence of consciousness, could do so only by making consciousness its object — ' this is consciousness ' ; but con- sciousness, as being self-established, does not admit of that objectivation which is implied in the word 'this/ and hence its previous non-existence cannot be proved by anything lying outside itself. As consciousness thus does not admit of antecedent non-existence, it further cannot be held to originate, and hence also all those other states of being which depend on origination cannot be predicated of it. As consciousness is begin ningless, it further does not admit of any plurality within itself; for we observe in this case the presence of something which is contrary to what invariably accompanies plurality (this something being ' beginninglessness' which is contrary to the quality of having a beginning — which quality invariably accompanies plurality). For we never observe a thing characterised by plurality to be without a beginning. — And moreover differ- ence, origination, &c, are objects of consciousness, like colour and other qualities, and hence cannot be attributes of consciousness. Therefore, consciousness being essentially consciousness only, nothing else that is an object of con- sciousness can be its attribute. The conclusion is that consciousness is free from difference of any kind. The apparent difference between Consciousness and the conscious subject is due to the unreal ahamkara. From this it further follows that there is no substrate of consciousness — different from consciousness itself — such as people ordinarily mean when speaking of a ' knower.' It is self-luminous consciousness itself which constitutes the so-called ' knower.' This follows therefrom also that con- sciousness is not ncn-intelligent (gadd) ; for non-intelligence invariably accompanies absence of Selfhood (anatmatva) ; I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 37 hence, non-intelligence being absent in consciousness, con- sciousness is not non-Self, that means, it is the Self.
237 hence, non-intelligence being absent in consciousness, con- sciousness is not non-Self, that means, it is the Self. But, our adversary again objects, the consciousness which expresses itself in the judgment '/know/ proves that the quality of being a c knower ' belongs to consciousness ! — By no means, we reply. The attribution to consciousness of this quality rests on error, no less than the attribution, to the shell, of the quality of being silver. Consciousness cannot stand in the relation of an agent toward itself: the attribute of being a knowing agent is erroneously imputed to it — an error analogous to that expressed in the judg- ment ' I am a man,' which identifies the Self of a person with the outward aggregate of matter that bears the external characteristics of humanity. To be a 'knower ' means to be the agent in the action of knowing ; and this is something essentially changeful and non-intelligent (g&d%), having its abode in the aha//zkara, which is itself a thing subject to change. How, on the other hand, could such agency possibly belong to the changeless ' witness ' (of all change, i.e. consciousness) whose nature is pure Being? That agency cannot be an attribute of the Self follows therefrom also that, like colour and other qualities, agency depends, for its own proof, on seeing, i. e. consciousness. That the Self does not fall within the sphere (is not an object of), the idea of ' T is proved thereby also that in deep sleep, swoon, and similar states, the idea of the ' I ' is absent, while the consciousness of the Self persists. Moreover, if the Self were admitted to be an agent and an object of the idea of ' 1/ it would be difficult to avoid the conclusion that like the body it is non-intelligent, something merely outward (' being for others only, not for itself) and destitute of Selfhood. That from the body, which is the object of the idea of ' 1/ and known to be an agent, there is different that Self which enjoys the results of the body's actions, viz. the heavenly word, and so on, is acknowledged by all who admit the validity of the instru- ments of knowledge ; analogously, therefore, we must admit that different from the knower whom we understand by the term ' 1/ is the c witnessing ' inward Self. The non- 38 vedAnta-s6tras.
3the heavenly word, and so on, is acknowledged by all who admit the validity of the instru- ments of knowledge ; analogously, therefore, we must admit that different from the knower whom we understand by the term ' 1/ is the c witnessing ' inward Self. The non- 38 vedAnta-s6tras. intelligent aha^kara thus merely serves to manifest the nature of non-changing consciousness, and it effects this by being its abode ; for it is the proper quality of manifest- ing agents to manifest the objects manifested, in so far as the latter abide in them. A mirror, e. g., or a sheet of water, or a certain mass of matter, manifests a face or the disc of the moon (reflected in the mirror or water) or the generic character of a cow (impressed on the mass of matter) in so far as all those things abide in them. — In this way, then, there arises the erroneous view that finds expression in the judgment ' I know/ — Nor must you, in the way of objection, raise the question how self-luminous consciousness is to be manifested by the non-intelligent aha/^kctra, which rather is itself manifested by conscious- ness ; for we observe that the surface of the hand, which itself is manifested by the rays of sunlight falling on it, at the same time manifests those rays. This is clearly seen in the case of rays passing through the interstices of net- work: the light of those rays is intensified by the hand on which they fall, and which at the same time is itself manifested by the rays. It thus appears that the { knowing agent/ who is denoted by the ' 1/ in the judgment ' I know,' constitutes no real attribute of the Self, the nature of which is pure intelligence. This is also the reason why the consciousness of Egoity does not persist in the states of deep sleep and final release : in those states this special form of consciousness passes away, and the Self appears in its true nature, i. e. as pure consciousness. Hence a person who has risen from deep, dreamless sleep reflects, 'Just now I was unconscious of myself.' Summing up of the purvapaksha view. As the outcome of all this, we sum up our view as follows. — Eternal, absolutely non-changing consciousness, whose nature is pure non-differenced intelligence, free from all distinction whatever, owing to error illusorily manifests itself (vivarttate) as broken up into manifold distinctions — knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, acts of knowledge. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 39 And the purpose for which we enter on the consideration of the Vedanta-texts is utterly to destroy what is the root of that error, i.e. Nescience, and thus to obtain a firm knowledge of the oneness of Brahman, whose nature is mere intelligence — free, pure, eternal. THE GREAT SIDDHANTA.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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