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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1If all acts of cognition had one and the same object only, everything would be apprehended by one act of cognition ; and from this it would follow that there are no persons either deaf or blind ! Nor does, as a matter of fact, the eye apprehend mere Being only ; for what it does apprehend is colour and the coloured thing, and those other qualities (viz. extension, &c), which inhere in the thing together with colour. Nor does feeling do so ; for it has for its objects things palp- able. Nor have the ear and the other senses mere Being for their object ; but they relate to what is distinguished by a special sound or taste or smell. Hence there is not any source of knowledge causing us to apprehend mere Being. If moreover the senses had for their object mere Being free from all difference, it would follow that Scripture which has the same object would (not be originative of knowledge but) perform the function of a mere anuvada, i. e. it would merely make statements about something, the knowledge of which is already established by some other means. And further, according to your own doctrine, mere Being, i. e. Brahman, would hold the position of an object with regard to the instruments of knowledge ; and thus there would cling to it all the imperfections indicated by yourself — non- intelligent nature, perishableness and so on. — From all this we conclude that perception has for its object only what is distinguished by difference manifesting itself in generic character and so on, which constitute the make or structure of a thing. (That the generic character of a thing is nothing else but its particular structure follows) from the 46 vedAnta-s^tras.
2(That the generic character of a thing is nothing else but its particular structure follows) from the 46 vedAnta-s^tras. fact that we do not perceive anything, different from structure, which could be claimed as constituting the object of the cognition that several individuals possess one and the same general form. And as our theory sufficiently accounts for the ordinary notions as to generic character, and as moreover even those who hold generic character to be something different from structure admit that there is such a thing as (common) structure, we adhere to the conclusion that generic character is nothing but structure. By ' structure ' we understand special or distinctive form ; and we acknowledge different forms of that kind according to the different classes of things. And as the current judgments as to things being different from one another can be explained on the basis of the apprehension of generic character, and as no additional entity is observed to exist, and as even those who maintain the existence of such an additional thing admit the existence of generic character, we further conclude that difference (bheda) is nothing but generic character (^ati). — But if this were so, the judgment as to difference would immediately follow from the judgment as to generic character, as soon as the latter is apprehended ! — Quite true, we reply. As a matter of fact the judgment of difference is immediately formulated on the basis of the judgment as to generic character. For 'the generic character ' of a cow, e.g., means just the exclusion of everything else : as soon as that character is apprehended all thought and speech referring to other creatures belonging to the same wider genus (which includes buffaloes and so on also) come to an end. It is through the apprehension of difference only that the idea of non-difference comes to an end. Plurality is not unreal. Next as to the assertion that all difference presented in our cognition — as of jars, pieces of cloth and the like — is unreal because such difference does not persist. This view, we maintain, is altogether erroneous, springs in fact from the neglect of distinguishing between persistence and non- persistence on the one hand, and the relation between what sublates and what is sublated on the other hand. Where I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 47
3This view, we maintain, is altogether erroneous, springs in fact from the neglect of distinguishing between persistence and non- persistence on the one hand, and the relation between what sublates and what is sublated on the other hand. Where I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 47 two cognitions are mutually contradictory, there the latter relation holds good, and there is non-persistence of what is sublated. But jars, pieces of cloth and the like, do not contradict one another, since they are separate in place and time. If on the other hand the non-existence of a thing is cognised at the same time and the same place where and when its existence is cognised, we have a mutual contra- diction of two cognitions, and then the stronger one sublates the other cognition which thus comes to an end. But when of a thing that is perceived in connexion with some place and time, the non-existence is perceived in connexion with some other place and time, there arises no contradiction ; how then should, the one cognition sublate the other ? or how can it be said that of a thing absent at one time and place there is absence at other times and places also ? In the case of the snake-rope, there arises a cognition of non-existence in connexion with the given place and time ; hence there is contradiction, one judgment sublates the other and the sublated cognition comes to an end. But the circumstance of something which is seen at one time and in one place not persisting at another time and in another place is not observed to be invariably accompanied by falsehood, and hence mere non- persistence of this kind does not constitute a reason for unreality. To say, on the other hand, that what is is real because it persists, is to prove what is proved already, and requires no further proof. Being and Consciousness are not one. Hence mere Being does not alone constitute reality. And as the distinction between consciousness and its objects — which rests just on this relation of object and that for which the object is — is proved by perception, the assertion that only consciousness has real existence is also dis- posed of. The true meaning of Svayamprak&satva. We next take up the point as to the self-luminousness of consciousness (above, p. 33). The contention that conscious- ness is not an object holds good for the knowing Self at the 48 vedanta-sOtras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1If all acts of cognition had one and the same object only, everything would be apprehended by one act of cognition ; and from this it would follow that there are no persons either deaf or blind ! Nor does, as a matter of fact, the eye apprehend mere Being only ; for what it does apprehend is colour and the coloured thing, and those other qualities (viz. extension, &c), which inhere in the thing together with colour. Nor does feeling do so ; for it has for its objects things palp- able. Nor have the ear and the other senses mere Being for their object ; but they relate to what is distinguished by a special sound or taste or smell. Hence there is not any source of knowledge causing us to apprehend mere Being. If moreover the senses had for their object mere Being free from all difference, it would follow that Scripture which has the same object would (not be originative of knowledge but) perform the function of a mere anuvada, i. e. it would merely make statements about something, the knowledge of which is already established by some other means. And further, according to your own doctrine, mere Being, i. e. Brahman, would hold the position of an object with regard to the instruments of knowledge ; and thus there would cling to it all the imperfections indicated by yourself — non- intelligent nature, perishableness and so on. — From all this we conclude that perception has for its object only what is distinguished by difference manifesting itself in generic character and so on, which constitute the make or structure of a thing. (That the generic character of a thing is nothing else but its particular structure follows) from the 46 vedAnta-s^tras.
2(That the generic character of a thing is nothing else but its particular structure follows) from the 46 vedAnta-s^tras. fact that we do not perceive anything, different from structure, which could be claimed as constituting the object of the cognition that several individuals possess one and the same general form. And as our theory sufficiently accounts for the ordinary notions as to generic character, and as moreover even those who hold generic character to be something different from structure admit that there is such a thing as (common) structure, we adhere to the conclusion that generic character is nothing but structure. By ' structure ' we understand special or distinctive form ; and we acknowledge different forms of that kind according to the different classes of things. And as the current judgments as to things being different from one another can be explained on the basis of the apprehension of generic character, and as no additional entity is observed to exist, and as even those who maintain the existence of such an additional thing admit the existence of generic character, we further conclude that difference (bheda) is nothing but generic character (^ati). — But if this were so, the judgment as to difference would immediately follow from the judgment as to generic character, as soon as the latter is apprehended ! — Quite true, we reply. As a matter of fact the judgment of difference is immediately formulated on the basis of the judgment as to generic character. For 'the generic character ' of a cow, e.g., means just the exclusion of everything else : as soon as that character is apprehended all thought and speech referring to other creatures belonging to the same wider genus (which includes buffaloes and so on also) come to an end. It is through the apprehension of difference only that the idea of non-difference comes to an end. Plurality is not unreal. Next as to the assertion that all difference presented in our cognition — as of jars, pieces of cloth and the like — is unreal because such difference does not persist. This view, we maintain, is altogether erroneous, springs in fact from the neglect of distinguishing between persistence and non- persistence on the one hand, and the relation between what sublates and what is sublated on the other hand. Where I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 47
3This view, we maintain, is altogether erroneous, springs in fact from the neglect of distinguishing between persistence and non- persistence on the one hand, and the relation between what sublates and what is sublated on the other hand. Where I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 47 two cognitions are mutually contradictory, there the latter relation holds good, and there is non-persistence of what is sublated. But jars, pieces of cloth and the like, do not contradict one another, since they are separate in place and time. If on the other hand the non-existence of a thing is cognised at the same time and the same place where and when its existence is cognised, we have a mutual contra- diction of two cognitions, and then the stronger one sublates the other cognition which thus comes to an end. But when of a thing that is perceived in connexion with some place and time, the non-existence is perceived in connexion with some other place and time, there arises no contradiction ; how then should, the one cognition sublate the other ? or how can it be said that of a thing absent at one time and place there is absence at other times and places also ? In the case of the snake-rope, there arises a cognition of non-existence in connexion with the given place and time ; hence there is contradiction, one judgment sublates the other and the sublated cognition comes to an end. But the circumstance of something which is seen at one time and in one place not persisting at another time and in another place is not observed to be invariably accompanied by falsehood, and hence mere non- persistence of this kind does not constitute a reason for unreality. To say, on the other hand, that what is is real because it persists, is to prove what is proved already, and requires no further proof. Being and Consciousness are not one. Hence mere Being does not alone constitute reality. And as the distinction between consciousness and its objects — which rests just on this relation of object and that for which the object is — is proved by perception, the assertion that only consciousness has real existence is also dis- posed of. The true meaning of Svayamprak&satva. We next take up the point as to the self-luminousness of consciousness (above, p. 33). The contention that conscious- ness is not an object holds good for the knowing Self at the 48 vedanta-sOtras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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