Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1To this argumentation we make the following reply. We admit that release consists only in the cessation of Nescience, and that this cessation results entirely from the knowledge of Brahman. But a distinction has here to be made regarding the nature of this knowledge which 1 2 VEDANTA-stjTRAS. the Vedanta-texts aim at enjoining for the purpose of putting an end to Nescience. Is it merely the know- ledge of the sense of sentences which originates from the sentences ? or is it knowledge in the form of meditation (upasana) which has the knowledge just referred to as its antecedent ? It cannot be knowledge of the former kind ; for such knowledge springs from the mere apprehension of the sentence, apart from any special injunction, and more- over we do not observe that the cessation of Nescience is effected by such knowledge merely. Our adversary will perhaps attempt to explain things in the following way. The Vedanta-texts do not, he will say, produce that know- ledge which makes an end of Nescience, so long as the imagination of plurality is not dispelled. And the fact that such knowledge, even when produced, does not at once and for every one put a stop to the view of plurality by no means subverts my opinion ; for, to mention an analogous in- stance, the double appearance of the moon — presenting itself to a person affected with a certain weakness of vision — does not come to an end as soon as the oneness of the moon has been apprehended by reason. Moreover, even without having come to an end, the view of plurality is powerless to effect further bondage, as soon as the root, i. e. Nescience, has once been cut. But this defence we are unable to admit. It is impossible that knowledge should not arise when its means, i. e. the texts conveying knowledge, are once present. And we observe that even when there exists an antagonistic imagination (interfering with the rise of know- ledge), information given by competent persons, the pres- ence of characteristic marks (on which a correct inference may be based), and the like give rise to knowledge which sublates the erroneous imagination. Nor can we admit that even after the sense of texts has been apprehended, the view of plurality may continue owing to some small remainder of beginningless imagination. For as this ima- gination which constitutes the means for the view of plurality is itself false, it is necessarily put an end to by the rise of true knowledge. If this did not take place, that imagination would never come to an end, since there is no I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I 3
2For as this ima- gination which constitutes the means for the view of plurality is itself false, it is necessarily put an end to by the rise of true knowledge. If this did not take place, that imagination would never come to an end, since there is no I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I 3 other means but knowledge to effect its cessation. To say- that the view of plurality, which is the effect of that imagi- nation, continues even after its root has been cut, is mere nonsense. The instance of some one seeing the moon double is not analogous. For in his case the non-cessation of wrong knowledge explains itself from the circumstance that the cause of wrong knowledge, viz. the real defect of the eye which does not admit of being sublated by know- ledge, is not removed, although that which would sublate wrong knowledge is near. On the other hand, effects, such as fear and the like, may come to an end because they can be sublated by means of knowledge of superior force. Moreover, if it were true that knowledge arises through the dispelling of the imagination of plurality, the rise of know- ledge would really never be brought about. For the imagination of plurality has through gradual growth in the course of beginningless time acquired an infinite strength, and does not therefore admit of being dispelled by the comparatively weak conception of non^duality. Hence we conclude that the knowledge which the Vedanta-texts aim at inculcating is a knowledge other than the mere knowledge of the sense of sentences, and denoted by ' dhy&na,' ' upasana ' (i. e. meditation), and similar terms. With this agree scriptural texts such as ' Having known it, let him practise meditation' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 21); 'He who, having searched out the Self, knows it' (Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Meditate on the Self as Om' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 6) ; ' Having known that, he is freed from the jaws of death' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 15); 'Let a man meditate on the Self only as his world' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 15); 'The Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be medi- tated on ' (Bri. Up. IV, $, 6) ; ' That we must search out, that we must try to understand ' [Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1). (According to the principle of the oneness of purport of the different ^akhas) all these texts must be viewed as agreeing in meaning with the injunction of meditation contained in the passage quoted from the Bri. Up. ; and what they enjoin is therefore meditation. In the first and second passages quoted, the words 'having known' and 1 4 VEDANTA-Stf TRAS.
3Up. ; and what they enjoin is therefore meditation. In the first and second passages quoted, the words 'having known' and 1 4 VEDANTA-Stf TRAS. 6 having searched out ' (vi^vzaya ; anuvidya) contain a mere reference to (not injunction of) the apprehension of the meaning of texts, such apprehension subserving medi- tation; while the injunction of meditation (which is the true purport of the passages) is conveyed by the clauses ' let him practise meditation' (pra^a^ kurvita) and 'he knows it.' In the same way the clause ' the Self is to be heard' is a mere anuvada, i.e. a mere reference to what is already established by other means ; for a person who has read the Veda observes that it contains instruction about matters connected with certain definite purposes, and then on his own account applies himself to methodical * hearing,' in order definitely to ascertain these matters ; ' hearing ' thus is established already. In the same way the clause 'the Self is to be reflected upon' is a mere anuvada of reflection which is known as a means of con- firming what one has 'heard.' It is therefore meditation only which all those texts enjoin. In agreement with this a later Sutra also says, ' Repetition more than once, on account of instruction' (Ve. Su. IV, i, i). That the knowledge intended to be enjoined as the means of final release is of the nature of meditation, we conclude from the circumstance that the terms 'knowing' and 'meditating' are seen to be used in place of each other in the earlier and later parts of Vedic texts. Compare the following passages : * Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman,' and 'he who knows this shines and warms through his celebrity, fame, and glory of countenance' {Kh. Up. Ill, 1 8, i ; 6). And ' He does not know him, for he is not complete,' and ' Let men meditate on him as the Self (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7). And ' He who knows what he knows,' and ' Teach me the deity on which you meditate ' [Kh. Up. IV, i, 6 ; 2, a). ' Meditation ' means steady remembrance, i. e. a con- tinuity of steady remembrance, uninterrupted like the flow of oil; in agreement with the scriptural passage which declares steady remembrance to be the means of release, ' on the attainment of remembrance all the ties are loosened ' (Kk. Up. VII, 26, 2). Such remembrance is of I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 1 5
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1To this argumentation we make the following reply. We admit that release consists only in the cessation of Nescience, and that this cessation results entirely from the knowledge of Brahman. But a distinction has here to be made regarding the nature of this knowledge which 1 2 VEDANTA-stjTRAS. the Vedanta-texts aim at enjoining for the purpose of putting an end to Nescience. Is it merely the know- ledge of the sense of sentences which originates from the sentences ? or is it knowledge in the form of meditation (upasana) which has the knowledge just referred to as its antecedent ? It cannot be knowledge of the former kind ; for such knowledge springs from the mere apprehension of the sentence, apart from any special injunction, and more- over we do not observe that the cessation of Nescience is effected by such knowledge merely. Our adversary will perhaps attempt to explain things in the following way. The Vedanta-texts do not, he will say, produce that know- ledge which makes an end of Nescience, so long as the imagination of plurality is not dispelled. And the fact that such knowledge, even when produced, does not at once and for every one put a stop to the view of plurality by no means subverts my opinion ; for, to mention an analogous in- stance, the double appearance of the moon — presenting itself to a person affected with a certain weakness of vision — does not come to an end as soon as the oneness of the moon has been apprehended by reason. Moreover, even without having come to an end, the view of plurality is powerless to effect further bondage, as soon as the root, i. e. Nescience, has once been cut. But this defence we are unable to admit. It is impossible that knowledge should not arise when its means, i. e. the texts conveying knowledge, are once present. And we observe that even when there exists an antagonistic imagination (interfering with the rise of know- ledge), information given by competent persons, the pres- ence of characteristic marks (on which a correct inference may be based), and the like give rise to knowledge which sublates the erroneous imagination. Nor can we admit that even after the sense of texts has been apprehended, the view of plurality may continue owing to some small remainder of beginningless imagination. For as this ima- gination which constitutes the means for the view of plurality is itself false, it is necessarily put an end to by the rise of true knowledge. If this did not take place, that imagination would never come to an end, since there is no I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I 3
2For as this ima- gination which constitutes the means for the view of plurality is itself false, it is necessarily put an end to by the rise of true knowledge. If this did not take place, that imagination would never come to an end, since there is no I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I 3 other means but knowledge to effect its cessation. To say- that the view of plurality, which is the effect of that imagi- nation, continues even after its root has been cut, is mere nonsense. The instance of some one seeing the moon double is not analogous. For in his case the non-cessation of wrong knowledge explains itself from the circumstance that the cause of wrong knowledge, viz. the real defect of the eye which does not admit of being sublated by know- ledge, is not removed, although that which would sublate wrong knowledge is near. On the other hand, effects, such as fear and the like, may come to an end because they can be sublated by means of knowledge of superior force. Moreover, if it were true that knowledge arises through the dispelling of the imagination of plurality, the rise of know- ledge would really never be brought about. For the imagination of plurality has through gradual growth in the course of beginningless time acquired an infinite strength, and does not therefore admit of being dispelled by the comparatively weak conception of non^duality. Hence we conclude that the knowledge which the Vedanta-texts aim at inculcating is a knowledge other than the mere knowledge of the sense of sentences, and denoted by ' dhy&na,' ' upasana ' (i. e. meditation), and similar terms. With this agree scriptural texts such as ' Having known it, let him practise meditation' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 21); 'He who, having searched out the Self, knows it' (Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Meditate on the Self as Om' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 6) ; ' Having known that, he is freed from the jaws of death' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 15); 'Let a man meditate on the Self only as his world' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 15); 'The Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be medi- tated on ' (Bri. Up. IV, $, 6) ; ' That we must search out, that we must try to understand ' [Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1). (According to the principle of the oneness of purport of the different ^akhas) all these texts must be viewed as agreeing in meaning with the injunction of meditation contained in the passage quoted from the Bri. Up. ; and what they enjoin is therefore meditation. In the first and second passages quoted, the words 'having known' and 1 4 VEDANTA-Stf TRAS.
3Up. ; and what they enjoin is therefore meditation. In the first and second passages quoted, the words 'having known' and 1 4 VEDANTA-Stf TRAS. 6 having searched out ' (vi^vzaya ; anuvidya) contain a mere reference to (not injunction of) the apprehension of the meaning of texts, such apprehension subserving medi- tation; while the injunction of meditation (which is the true purport of the passages) is conveyed by the clauses ' let him practise meditation' (pra^a^ kurvita) and 'he knows it.' In the same way the clause ' the Self is to be heard' is a mere anuvada, i.e. a mere reference to what is already established by other means ; for a person who has read the Veda observes that it contains instruction about matters connected with certain definite purposes, and then on his own account applies himself to methodical * hearing,' in order definitely to ascertain these matters ; ' hearing ' thus is established already. In the same way the clause 'the Self is to be reflected upon' is a mere anuvada of reflection which is known as a means of con- firming what one has 'heard.' It is therefore meditation only which all those texts enjoin. In agreement with this a later Sutra also says, ' Repetition more than once, on account of instruction' (Ve. Su. IV, i, i). That the knowledge intended to be enjoined as the means of final release is of the nature of meditation, we conclude from the circumstance that the terms 'knowing' and 'meditating' are seen to be used in place of each other in the earlier and later parts of Vedic texts. Compare the following passages : * Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman,' and 'he who knows this shines and warms through his celebrity, fame, and glory of countenance' {Kh. Up. Ill, 1 8, i ; 6). And ' He does not know him, for he is not complete,' and ' Let men meditate on him as the Self (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7). And ' He who knows what he knows,' and ' Teach me the deity on which you meditate ' [Kh. Up. IV, i, 6 ; 2, a). ' Meditation ' means steady remembrance, i. e. a con- tinuity of steady remembrance, uninterrupted like the flow of oil; in agreement with the scriptural passage which declares steady remembrance to be the means of release, ' on the attainment of remembrance all the ties are loosened ' (Kk. Up. VII, 26, 2). Such remembrance is of I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 1 5
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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