Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Again, what the text says as to everything being known by the knowledge of one thing (' By the seeing indeed of the Self/ &c.) is possible only in the case of a Supreme Self which constitutes the Self of all. What C c 2 388 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. the Purvapakshin said as to everything being known through the cognition of the one individual soul, since all individual souls are of the same type — this also cannot be upheld ; for as long as there is a knowledge of the soul only and not also of the world of non-sentient things, there is no knowledge of everything. And when the text enumerates different things ('this Brahman class, this Kshatra class/ &c), and then concludes 'all this is that Self' — where the 'this* denotes the entire Universe of animate and inanimate beings as known through Perception, Inference, and so on — universal unity such as declared here is possible only through a highest Self which is the Self of all. It is not, on the other hand, possible that what the word ' this ' denotes, i. e. the whole world of intelligent and non-intelligent creatures, should be one with the personal soul as long as it remains what it is, whether connected with or disassociated from non-sentient matter. In the same spirit the passage, 'All things abandon him who views all things elsewhere than in the Self,' finds fault with him who views anything apart from the universal Self. The qualities also which in the earlier Maitreyi- brahma^a (II, 4, 12) are predicated of the being under discussion, viz. greatness, endlessness, unlimitedness, cannot belong to any one else but the highest Self. That Self therefore is the topic of the Brahma^a. We further demur to our antagonist's maintaining that the entire Brahma^a treats of the individual soul because that soul is at the outset represented as the object of enquiry, this being inferred from its connexion with husband, wife, wealth, &c. For if the clause ' for the love (literally, for the desire) of the Self' refers to the individual Self, we cannot help connecting (as, in fact, we must do in any case) that Self with the Self referred to in the subsequent clause, ' the Self indeed is to be seen/ &c. ; the connexion having to be conceived in that way that the information given in the former clause somehow subserves the cognition of the Self enjoined in the latter clause. 'For the desire of the Self would then mean 'for the attainment of the objects desired by the Self/ But if it I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 9. 389
2'For the desire of the Self would then mean 'for the attainment of the objects desired by the Self/ But if it I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 9. 389 is first said that husband, wife, &c, are dear because they fulfil the wishes of the individual Self, it could hardly be said further on that the nature of that Self must be enquired into ; for what, in the circumstances of the case, naturally is to be enquired into and searched for are the dear objects but not the true nature of him to whom those objects are dear, apart from the objects themselves. It would certainly be somewhat senseless to declare that since husband, wife, &c, are dear because they fulfil the desires of the individual soul, therefore, setting aside those dear objects, we must enquire into the true nature of that soul apart from all the objects of its desire. On the contrary, it having been declared that husband, wife, &c, are dear not on account of husband, wife, &c, but on account of the Self, they should not be dropped, but included in the further investigation, just because they subserve the Self. And should our opponent (in order to avoid the difficulty of establishing a satisfactory connexion between the different clauses) maintain that the clause, 'but everything is dear for the love of the Self/ is not connected with the following clause, 1 the Self is to be seen/ &c, we point out that this would break the whole connexion of the Brahma^a. And if we allowed such a break, we should then be unable to point out what is the use of the earlier part of the Brahma^a. We must therefore attempt to explain the connexion in such a way as to make it clear why all search for dear objects — husband, wife, children, wealth, &c. — should be abandoned and the Self only should be searched for. This explanation is as follows. After having stated that wealth, and so on, are no means to obtain immortality which consists in permanent absolute bliss, the text declares that the pleasant experiences which we derive from wealth, husband, wife, &c, and which are not of a permanent nature and always alloyed with a great deal of pain, are caused not by wealth, husband, wife, &c, themselves, but rather by the highest Self whose nature is absolute bliss. He therefore who being himself of the nature of perfect bliss causes other beings and things also to be the abodes of partial bliss, he — the highest Self — is to be constituted 3 9° vedanta-s6tr as.
3He therefore who being himself of the nature of perfect bliss causes other beings and things also to be the abodes of partial bliss, he — the highest Self — is to be constituted 3 9° vedanta-s6tr as. the object of knowledge. The clauses, c not for the wish of the husband a husband is dear/ &c, therefore must be understood as follows — a husband, a wife, a son, &c, are not dear to us in consequence of a wish or purpose on their part, ' may I, for my own end or advantage be dear to him,' but they are dear to us for the wish of the Self, i. e. to the end that there may be accomplished the desire of the highest Self — which desire aims at the devotee obtaining what is dear to him. For the highest Self pleased with the works of his devotees imparts to different things such dearness, i. e. joy-giving quality as corresponds to those works, that 'dearness' being bound in each case to a definite place, time, nature and degree. This is in accordance with the scriptural text, ' For he alone bestows bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). Things are not dear, or the contrary, to us by themselves, but only in so far as the highest Self makes them such. Compare the text, 'The same thing which erst gave us delight later on becomes the source of grief; and what was the cause of wrath afterwards tends to peace. Hence there is nothing that in itself is of the nature either of pleasure or of pain.' But, another view of the meaning of the text is proposed, even if the Self in the clause 'for the desire of the Self were accepted as denoting the individual Self, yet the clause ' the Self must be seen ' would refer to the highest Self only. For in that case also the sense would be as follows — because the possession of husband, wife, and other so-called dear things is aimed at by a person to whom they are dear, not with a view of bringing about what is desired by them (viz. husband, wife, &c), but rather to the end of bringing about what is desired by himself ; therefore that being which is, to the individual soul, absolutely and unlimitedly dear, viz. the highest Self, must be constituted the sole object of cognition, not such objects as husband, wife, wealth, &c, the nature of which depends on various external circumstances and the possession of which gives rise either to limited pleasure alloyed with pain or to mere pain. — But against this we remark that as, in the section under discussion, the words designating the I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 20. 39 1 individual Self denote the highest Self also1, the term 'Self in both clauses, 'For the desire of the Self' and ' The Self is to be seen/ really refers to one and the same being (viz. the highest Self), and the interpretation thus agrees with the one given above. — In order to prove the tenet that words denoting the individual soul at the same time denote the highest Self, by means of arguments made use of by other teachers also, the Sutrakara sets forth the two following Sutras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Again, what the text says as to everything being known by the knowledge of one thing (' By the seeing indeed of the Self/ &c.) is possible only in the case of a Supreme Self which constitutes the Self of all. What C c 2 388 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. the Purvapakshin said as to everything being known through the cognition of the one individual soul, since all individual souls are of the same type — this also cannot be upheld ; for as long as there is a knowledge of the soul only and not also of the world of non-sentient things, there is no knowledge of everything. And when the text enumerates different things ('this Brahman class, this Kshatra class/ &c), and then concludes 'all this is that Self' — where the 'this* denotes the entire Universe of animate and inanimate beings as known through Perception, Inference, and so on — universal unity such as declared here is possible only through a highest Self which is the Self of all. It is not, on the other hand, possible that what the word ' this ' denotes, i. e. the whole world of intelligent and non-intelligent creatures, should be one with the personal soul as long as it remains what it is, whether connected with or disassociated from non-sentient matter. In the same spirit the passage, 'All things abandon him who views all things elsewhere than in the Self,' finds fault with him who views anything apart from the universal Self. The qualities also which in the earlier Maitreyi- brahma^a (II, 4, 12) are predicated of the being under discussion, viz. greatness, endlessness, unlimitedness, cannot belong to any one else but the highest Self. That Self therefore is the topic of the Brahma^a. We further demur to our antagonist's maintaining that the entire Brahma^a treats of the individual soul because that soul is at the outset represented as the object of enquiry, this being inferred from its connexion with husband, wife, wealth, &c. For if the clause ' for the love (literally, for the desire) of the Self' refers to the individual Self, we cannot help connecting (as, in fact, we must do in any case) that Self with the Self referred to in the subsequent clause, ' the Self indeed is to be seen/ &c. ; the connexion having to be conceived in that way that the information given in the former clause somehow subserves the cognition of the Self enjoined in the latter clause. 'For the desire of the Self would then mean 'for the attainment of the objects desired by the Self/ But if it I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 9. 389
2'For the desire of the Self would then mean 'for the attainment of the objects desired by the Self/ But if it I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 9. 389 is first said that husband, wife, &c, are dear because they fulfil the wishes of the individual Self, it could hardly be said further on that the nature of that Self must be enquired into ; for what, in the circumstances of the case, naturally is to be enquired into and searched for are the dear objects but not the true nature of him to whom those objects are dear, apart from the objects themselves. It would certainly be somewhat senseless to declare that since husband, wife, &c, are dear because they fulfil the desires of the individual soul, therefore, setting aside those dear objects, we must enquire into the true nature of that soul apart from all the objects of its desire. On the contrary, it having been declared that husband, wife, &c, are dear not on account of husband, wife, &c, but on account of the Self, they should not be dropped, but included in the further investigation, just because they subserve the Self. And should our opponent (in order to avoid the difficulty of establishing a satisfactory connexion between the different clauses) maintain that the clause, 'but everything is dear for the love of the Self/ is not connected with the following clause, 1 the Self is to be seen/ &c, we point out that this would break the whole connexion of the Brahma^a. And if we allowed such a break, we should then be unable to point out what is the use of the earlier part of the Brahma^a. We must therefore attempt to explain the connexion in such a way as to make it clear why all search for dear objects — husband, wife, children, wealth, &c. — should be abandoned and the Self only should be searched for. This explanation is as follows. After having stated that wealth, and so on, are no means to obtain immortality which consists in permanent absolute bliss, the text declares that the pleasant experiences which we derive from wealth, husband, wife, &c, and which are not of a permanent nature and always alloyed with a great deal of pain, are caused not by wealth, husband, wife, &c, themselves, but rather by the highest Self whose nature is absolute bliss. He therefore who being himself of the nature of perfect bliss causes other beings and things also to be the abodes of partial bliss, he — the highest Self — is to be constituted 3 9° vedanta-s6tr as.
3He therefore who being himself of the nature of perfect bliss causes other beings and things also to be the abodes of partial bliss, he — the highest Self — is to be constituted 3 9° vedanta-s6tr as. the object of knowledge. The clauses, c not for the wish of the husband a husband is dear/ &c, therefore must be understood as follows — a husband, a wife, a son, &c, are not dear to us in consequence of a wish or purpose on their part, ' may I, for my own end or advantage be dear to him,' but they are dear to us for the wish of the Self, i. e. to the end that there may be accomplished the desire of the highest Self — which desire aims at the devotee obtaining what is dear to him. For the highest Self pleased with the works of his devotees imparts to different things such dearness, i. e. joy-giving quality as corresponds to those works, that 'dearness' being bound in each case to a definite place, time, nature and degree. This is in accordance with the scriptural text, ' For he alone bestows bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). Things are not dear, or the contrary, to us by themselves, but only in so far as the highest Self makes them such. Compare the text, 'The same thing which erst gave us delight later on becomes the source of grief; and what was the cause of wrath afterwards tends to peace. Hence there is nothing that in itself is of the nature either of pleasure or of pain.' But, another view of the meaning of the text is proposed, even if the Self in the clause 'for the desire of the Self were accepted as denoting the individual Self, yet the clause ' the Self must be seen ' would refer to the highest Self only. For in that case also the sense would be as follows — because the possession of husband, wife, and other so-called dear things is aimed at by a person to whom they are dear, not with a view of bringing about what is desired by them (viz. husband, wife, &c), but rather to the end of bringing about what is desired by himself ; therefore that being which is, to the individual soul, absolutely and unlimitedly dear, viz. the highest Self, must be constituted the sole object of cognition, not such objects as husband, wife, wealth, &c, the nature of which depends on various external circumstances and the possession of which gives rise either to limited pleasure alloyed with pain or to mere pain. — But against this we remark that as, in the section under discussion, the words designating the I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 20. 39 1 individual Self denote the highest Self also1, the term 'Self in both clauses, 'For the desire of the Self' and ' The Self is to be seen/ really refers to one and the same being (viz. the highest Self), and the interpretation thus agrees with the one given above. — In order to prove the tenet that words denoting the individual soul at the same time denote the highest Self, by means of arguments made use of by other teachers also, the Sutrakara sets forth the two following Sutras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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