Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Hence the ahawkara is no more I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 63 a knower than it is something subjective ; otherwise there would be an evident contradiction. As knowing cannot be attributed to the aha/^kara, which is an object of know- ledge, so knowership also cannot be ascribed to it ; for of that also it is the object. Nor can it be maintained that to be a knower is something essentially changing. For to be a knower is to be the substrate of the quality of know- ledge, and as the knowing Self is eternal, knowledge which is an essential quality of the Self is also eternal. That the Self is eternal will be declared in the Sutra, II, 3, 17 ; and in II, 3, 18 the term '^-/za' (knower) will show that it is an essential quality of the Self to be the abode of knowledge. That a Self whose essential nature is knowledge should be the substrate of the (quality of) knowledge — just as gems and the like are the substrate of light — gives rise to no contradiction whatever. Knowledge (the quality) which is in itself unlimited, is capable of contraction and expansion, as we shall show later on. In the so-called kshetra^Tza-condition of the Self, knowledge is, owing to the influence of work (karman), of a contracted nature, as it more or less adapts itself to work of different kinds, and is variously determined by the different senses. With reference to this various flow of knowledge as due to the senses, it is spoken of as rising and setting, and the Self possesses the quality of an agent. As this quality is not, however, essential, but originated by action, the Self is essentially unchanging. This changeful quality of being a knower can belong only to the Self whose essential nature is knowledge ; not possibly to the non-intelligent aha/^kara. But, you will perhaps say, the aha;^kara, although of non-intelligent nature, may become a knower in so far as by approximation to intelligence it becomes a reflection of the latter. How, we ask in return, is this becoming a reflection of intelligence imagined to take place? Does consciousness become a reflection of the aha/^kara, or does the aha^kara become a reflection of consciousness? The former alternative is inadmissible, since you will not allow to consciousness the quality of being a knower ; and so is the latter since, as explained 64 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
2Does consciousness become a reflection of the aha/^kara, or does the aha^kara become a reflection of consciousness? The former alternative is inadmissible, since you will not allow to consciousness the quality of being a knower ; and so is the latter since, as explained 64 VEDANTA-StjTRAS. above, the non-intelligent aha^kara can never become a knower. Moreover, neither consciousness nor the aha/^kara are objects of visual perception. Only things seen by the eye have reflections. — Let it then be said that as an iron ball is heated by contact with fire, so the consciousness of being a knower is imparted to the ahawkara through its contact with Intelligence. — This view too is inadmissible ; for as you do not allow real knowership to Intelligence, knowership or the consciousness of knowership cannot be imparted to the aha^kara by contact with Intelligence ; and much less even can knowership or the consciousness of it be imparted to Intelligence by contact with the essen- tially non-intelligent aha/^kara. Nor can we accept what you say about ' manifestation.' Neither the aha^kara, you say, nor Intelligence is really a knowing subject, but the aha/^kara manifests consciousness abiding within itself (within the aha^kara), as the mirror manifests the image abiding within it. But the essentially non-intelligent ahawkara evidently cannot ' manifest ' the self-luminous Self. As has been said ' That the non-intelligent aha^kara should manifest the self-luminous Self, has no more sense than to say that a spent coal manifests the Sun.' The truth is that all things depend for their proof on self- luminous consciousness ; and now you maintain that one of these things, viz. the non-intelligent aha^kara — which itself depends for its light on consciousness — manifests con- sciousness, whose essential light never rises or sets, and which is the cause that proves everything ! Whoever knows the nature of the Self will justly deride such a view! The relation of ' manifestation ' cannot hold good between consciousness and the aha/^kara for the further reason also that there is a contradiction in nature between the two, and because it would imply consciousness not to be conscious- ness. As has been said, ' One cannot manifest the other, owing to contradictoriness ; and if the Self were something to be manifested, that would imply its being non-intelligent like a jar/ Nor is the matter improved by your intro- ducing the hand and the sunbeams (above, p. 38), and to say that as the sunbeams, while manifesting the hand, are at the I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 65
338), and to say that as the sunbeams, while manifesting the hand, are at the I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 65 same time manifested by the hand, so consciousness, while manifesting the aha;^kara? is at the same time itself mani- fested by the latter. The sunbeams are in reality not manifested by the hand at all. What takes place is that the motion of the sunbeams is reversed (reflected) by the opposed hand; they thus become more numerous, and hence are perceived more clearly ; but this is due alto- gether to the multitude of beams, not to any manifesting power on the part of the hand. What could, moreover, be the nature of that ' manifes- tation ' of the Self consisting of Intelligence, which would be effected through the aha^kara ? It cannot be origin- ation ; for you acknowledge that what is self-established cannot be originated by anything else. Nor can it be ' illumination ' (making to shine forth), since consciousness cannot — according to you — be the object of another con- sciousness. For the same reason it cannot be any action assisting the means of being conscious of consciousness. For such helpful action could be of two kinds only. It would either be such as to cause the connexion of the object to be known with the sense-organs ; as e. g. any action which, in the case of the apprehension of a species or of one's own face, causes connexion between the organ of sight and an individual of the species, or a looking-glass. Or it would be such as to remove some obstructive impurity, in the mind of the knowing person ; of this kind is the action of calmness and self-restraint with reference to scrip- ture which is the means of apprehending the highest reality. Moreover, even if it were admitted that consciousness may be an object of consciousness, it could not be maintained that the ' I ' assists the means whereby that consciousness is effected. For if it did so, it could only be in the way of removing any obstacles impeding the origination of such- consciousness ; analogous to the way in which a lamp assists the eye by dispelling the darkness which impedes the origination of the apprehension of colour. But in the case under discussion we are unable to imagine such obstacles. There is nothing pertaining to consciousness which obstructs the origination of the knowledge of con- [48] F 65 VEDANTA-sfjTRAS. sciousness and which could be removed by the aha^kara. — There is something, you will perhaps reply, viz. Nescience ! Not so, we reply. That Nescience is removed by the aha^kara cannot be admitted; knowledge alone can put an end to Nescience. Nor can consciousness be the abode of Nescience, because in that case Nescience would have the same abode and the same object as knowledge.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Hence the ahawkara is no more I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 63 a knower than it is something subjective ; otherwise there would be an evident contradiction. As knowing cannot be attributed to the aha/^kara, which is an object of know- ledge, so knowership also cannot be ascribed to it ; for of that also it is the object. Nor can it be maintained that to be a knower is something essentially changing. For to be a knower is to be the substrate of the quality of know- ledge, and as the knowing Self is eternal, knowledge which is an essential quality of the Self is also eternal. That the Self is eternal will be declared in the Sutra, II, 3, 17 ; and in II, 3, 18 the term '^-/za' (knower) will show that it is an essential quality of the Self to be the abode of knowledge. That a Self whose essential nature is knowledge should be the substrate of the (quality of) knowledge — just as gems and the like are the substrate of light — gives rise to no contradiction whatever. Knowledge (the quality) which is in itself unlimited, is capable of contraction and expansion, as we shall show later on. In the so-called kshetra^Tza-condition of the Self, knowledge is, owing to the influence of work (karman), of a contracted nature, as it more or less adapts itself to work of different kinds, and is variously determined by the different senses. With reference to this various flow of knowledge as due to the senses, it is spoken of as rising and setting, and the Self possesses the quality of an agent. As this quality is not, however, essential, but originated by action, the Self is essentially unchanging. This changeful quality of being a knower can belong only to the Self whose essential nature is knowledge ; not possibly to the non-intelligent aha/^kara. But, you will perhaps say, the aha;^kara, although of non-intelligent nature, may become a knower in so far as by approximation to intelligence it becomes a reflection of the latter. How, we ask in return, is this becoming a reflection of intelligence imagined to take place? Does consciousness become a reflection of the aha/^kara, or does the aha^kara become a reflection of consciousness? The former alternative is inadmissible, since you will not allow to consciousness the quality of being a knower ; and so is the latter since, as explained 64 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
2Does consciousness become a reflection of the aha/^kara, or does the aha^kara become a reflection of consciousness? The former alternative is inadmissible, since you will not allow to consciousness the quality of being a knower ; and so is the latter since, as explained 64 VEDANTA-StjTRAS. above, the non-intelligent aha^kara can never become a knower. Moreover, neither consciousness nor the aha/^kara are objects of visual perception. Only things seen by the eye have reflections. — Let it then be said that as an iron ball is heated by contact with fire, so the consciousness of being a knower is imparted to the ahawkara through its contact with Intelligence. — This view too is inadmissible ; for as you do not allow real knowership to Intelligence, knowership or the consciousness of knowership cannot be imparted to the aha^kara by contact with Intelligence ; and much less even can knowership or the consciousness of it be imparted to Intelligence by contact with the essen- tially non-intelligent aha/^kara. Nor can we accept what you say about ' manifestation.' Neither the aha^kara, you say, nor Intelligence is really a knowing subject, but the aha/^kara manifests consciousness abiding within itself (within the aha^kara), as the mirror manifests the image abiding within it. But the essentially non-intelligent ahawkara evidently cannot ' manifest ' the self-luminous Self. As has been said ' That the non-intelligent aha^kara should manifest the self-luminous Self, has no more sense than to say that a spent coal manifests the Sun.' The truth is that all things depend for their proof on self- luminous consciousness ; and now you maintain that one of these things, viz. the non-intelligent aha^kara — which itself depends for its light on consciousness — manifests con- sciousness, whose essential light never rises or sets, and which is the cause that proves everything ! Whoever knows the nature of the Self will justly deride such a view! The relation of ' manifestation ' cannot hold good between consciousness and the aha/^kara for the further reason also that there is a contradiction in nature between the two, and because it would imply consciousness not to be conscious- ness. As has been said, ' One cannot manifest the other, owing to contradictoriness ; and if the Self were something to be manifested, that would imply its being non-intelligent like a jar/ Nor is the matter improved by your intro- ducing the hand and the sunbeams (above, p. 38), and to say that as the sunbeams, while manifesting the hand, are at the I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 65
338), and to say that as the sunbeams, while manifesting the hand, are at the I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 65 same time manifested by the hand, so consciousness, while manifesting the aha;^kara? is at the same time itself mani- fested by the latter. The sunbeams are in reality not manifested by the hand at all. What takes place is that the motion of the sunbeams is reversed (reflected) by the opposed hand; they thus become more numerous, and hence are perceived more clearly ; but this is due alto- gether to the multitude of beams, not to any manifesting power on the part of the hand. What could, moreover, be the nature of that ' manifes- tation ' of the Self consisting of Intelligence, which would be effected through the aha^kara ? It cannot be origin- ation ; for you acknowledge that what is self-established cannot be originated by anything else. Nor can it be ' illumination ' (making to shine forth), since consciousness cannot — according to you — be the object of another con- sciousness. For the same reason it cannot be any action assisting the means of being conscious of consciousness. For such helpful action could be of two kinds only. It would either be such as to cause the connexion of the object to be known with the sense-organs ; as e. g. any action which, in the case of the apprehension of a species or of one's own face, causes connexion between the organ of sight and an individual of the species, or a looking-glass. Or it would be such as to remove some obstructive impurity, in the mind of the knowing person ; of this kind is the action of calmness and self-restraint with reference to scrip- ture which is the means of apprehending the highest reality. Moreover, even if it were admitted that consciousness may be an object of consciousness, it could not be maintained that the ' I ' assists the means whereby that consciousness is effected. For if it did so, it could only be in the way of removing any obstacles impeding the origination of such- consciousness ; analogous to the way in which a lamp assists the eye by dispelling the darkness which impedes the origination of the apprehension of colour. But in the case under discussion we are unable to imagine such obstacles. There is nothing pertaining to consciousness which obstructs the origination of the knowledge of con- [48] F 65 VEDANTA-sfjTRAS. sciousness and which could be removed by the aha^kara. — There is something, you will perhaps reply, viz. Nescience ! Not so, we reply. That Nescience is removed by the aha^kara cannot be admitted; knowledge alone can put an end to Nescience. Nor can consciousness be the abode of Nescience, because in that case Nescience would have the same abode and the same object as knowledge.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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