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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Like the dimness of the reflected face, the imperfection adhering to the soul is a mere error; for otherwise it would follow that the soul can never obtain release. And as this error of the souls has proceeded from all eternity, the question as to its cause is not to be raised. This, we reply, is the view of teachers who have no insight into the true nature of aduality, and are prompted by the wish of capturing the admiration and applause of those who believe in the doctrine of duality. For if, as a first alternative, you should maintain that the abode of Nescience is constituted by the soul in its essential, not fictitiously imagined, form ; this means that Brahman itself is the abode of Nescience. If, in the second place, you should say that the abode of Nescience is the soul, viewed as different from Brahman and fictitiously imagined in it, this would mean that the Non-intelligent (gdidz) is the abode of Nescience. For those who hold the view of Non-duality do not acknowledge a third aspect different from these two (i. e. from Brahman which is pure intelligence, and the Non-intelligent fictitiously superimposed on Brahman). And if, as a third alternative, it be maintained that the abode of Nescience is the soul in its essential nature, this nature being however qualified by the fictitiously imagined aspect ; we must negative this also, since that which has an absolutely homogeneous nature cannot in any way be shown to be qualified, apart from Nescience. The soul is qualified in so far only as it is the abode of Nescience, and you therefore define 438 VEDANTA-StiTRAS.
2The soul is qualified in so far only as it is the abode of Nescience, and you therefore define 438 VEDANTA-StiTRAS. nothing. — Moreover, the theory of Nescience abiding within the individual soul is resorted to for the purpose of establishing a basis for the distinction of bondage and release, but it really is quite unable to effect this. For if by Release be understood the destruction of Nescience, it follows that when one soul attains Release and Nescience is thus destroyed, the other souls also will be released. — But Nescience persists because other souls are not re- leased ! — Well then the one soul also is not released since Nescience is not destroyed ! — But we assume a different Nescience for each soul ; that soul whose Nescience is destroyed will be released, and that whose Nescience is not destroyed will remain in Bondage I — You now argue on the assumption of a special avidya for each soul. But what about the distinction of souls implied therein? Is that distinction essential to the nature of the soul, or is it the figment of Nescience? The former alternative is excluded, as it is admitted that the soul essentially is pure, non-differenced intelligence ; and because on that alter- native the assumption of avidya to account for the distinction of souls would be purposeless. On the latter alternative two subordinate alternatives arise — Does this avidya which gives rise to the fictitious distinction of souls belong to Brahman ? or to the individual souls ? — If you say 'to Brahman,' your view coincides with mine. — Well then, ' to the souls ' ! — But have you then quite forgotten that Nescience is assumed for the purpose of accounting for the distinction of souls ? — Let us then view the matter as follows — those several avidyas which are assumed for the purpose of establishing the distinction of souls bound and released, to those same avidyas the distinction of souls is due. — But here you reason in a manifest circle: the avidyas are established on the basis of the distinction of souls, and the distinction of souls is established when the avidyas are established. Nor does the argument of the seed and sprout apply to the present question. For in the case of seeds and plants each several seed gives rise to a different plant ; while in the case under discussion you adopt the impossible procedure of establishing the II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1$. 439
3Nor does the argument of the seed and sprout apply to the present question. For in the case of seeds and plants each several seed gives rise to a different plant ; while in the case under discussion you adopt the impossible procedure of establishing the II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1$. 439 several avidyas on the basis of the very souls which are assumed to be due to those avidyas. And if you attempt to give to the argument a somewhat different turn, by maintaining that it is the avidyas abiding in the earlier souls which fictitiously give rise to the later souls, we point out that this implies the souls being short-lived only, and moreover that each soul would have to take upon itself the consequences of deeds not its own and escape the consequences of its own deeds. The same reasoning disposes of the hypothesis that it is Brahman which effects the fictitious existence of the subsequent souls by means of the avidyas abiding within the earlier souls. And if there is assumed a beginningless flow of avidy&s, it follows that there is also a beginningless flow of the condition of the souls dependent on those avidyas, and that steady uniformity of the state of the souls which is supposed to hold good up to the moment of Release could thus not be established. Concerning your assertion that, as Nescience is something unreal and hence altogether unproved, it is not disestablished by such defects as mutual dependence which touch real things only ; we remark that in that case Nescience would cling even to released souls and the highest Brahman itself. — But impure Nescience cannot cling to what has for its essence pure cognition !— Is Nescience then to be dealt with by rational arguments ? If so, it will follow that, on account of the arguments set forth (mutual dependence, and so on), it likewise does not cling to the individual souls. We further put the following question — When the Nescience abiding in the individual soul passes away, owing to the rise of the knowledge of truth, does then the soul also perish or does it not perish ? In the former case Release is nothing else but destruction of the essential nature of the soul ; in the latter case the soul does not attain Release even on the destruction of Nescience, since it continues to exist as soul different from Brahman. — You have further maintained that the distinction of souls as pure and impure, &c, admits of being accounted for in the same way as the dimness or clearness, and so on, of the different images of a face as 44-0 vedanta-sCtras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Like the dimness of the reflected face, the imperfection adhering to the soul is a mere error; for otherwise it would follow that the soul can never obtain release. And as this error of the souls has proceeded from all eternity, the question as to its cause is not to be raised. This, we reply, is the view of teachers who have no insight into the true nature of aduality, and are prompted by the wish of capturing the admiration and applause of those who believe in the doctrine of duality. For if, as a first alternative, you should maintain that the abode of Nescience is constituted by the soul in its essential, not fictitiously imagined, form ; this means that Brahman itself is the abode of Nescience. If, in the second place, you should say that the abode of Nescience is the soul, viewed as different from Brahman and fictitiously imagined in it, this would mean that the Non-intelligent (gdidz) is the abode of Nescience. For those who hold the view of Non-duality do not acknowledge a third aspect different from these two (i. e. from Brahman which is pure intelligence, and the Non-intelligent fictitiously superimposed on Brahman). And if, as a third alternative, it be maintained that the abode of Nescience is the soul in its essential nature, this nature being however qualified by the fictitiously imagined aspect ; we must negative this also, since that which has an absolutely homogeneous nature cannot in any way be shown to be qualified, apart from Nescience. The soul is qualified in so far only as it is the abode of Nescience, and you therefore define 438 VEDANTA-StiTRAS.
2The soul is qualified in so far only as it is the abode of Nescience, and you therefore define 438 VEDANTA-StiTRAS. nothing. — Moreover, the theory of Nescience abiding within the individual soul is resorted to for the purpose of establishing a basis for the distinction of bondage and release, but it really is quite unable to effect this. For if by Release be understood the destruction of Nescience, it follows that when one soul attains Release and Nescience is thus destroyed, the other souls also will be released. — But Nescience persists because other souls are not re- leased ! — Well then the one soul also is not released since Nescience is not destroyed ! — But we assume a different Nescience for each soul ; that soul whose Nescience is destroyed will be released, and that whose Nescience is not destroyed will remain in Bondage I — You now argue on the assumption of a special avidya for each soul. But what about the distinction of souls implied therein? Is that distinction essential to the nature of the soul, or is it the figment of Nescience? The former alternative is excluded, as it is admitted that the soul essentially is pure, non-differenced intelligence ; and because on that alter- native the assumption of avidya to account for the distinction of souls would be purposeless. On the latter alternative two subordinate alternatives arise — Does this avidya which gives rise to the fictitious distinction of souls belong to Brahman ? or to the individual souls ? — If you say 'to Brahman,' your view coincides with mine. — Well then, ' to the souls ' ! — But have you then quite forgotten that Nescience is assumed for the purpose of accounting for the distinction of souls ? — Let us then view the matter as follows — those several avidyas which are assumed for the purpose of establishing the distinction of souls bound and released, to those same avidyas the distinction of souls is due. — But here you reason in a manifest circle: the avidyas are established on the basis of the distinction of souls, and the distinction of souls is established when the avidyas are established. Nor does the argument of the seed and sprout apply to the present question. For in the case of seeds and plants each several seed gives rise to a different plant ; while in the case under discussion you adopt the impossible procedure of establishing the II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1$. 439
3Nor does the argument of the seed and sprout apply to the present question. For in the case of seeds and plants each several seed gives rise to a different plant ; while in the case under discussion you adopt the impossible procedure of establishing the II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1$. 439 several avidyas on the basis of the very souls which are assumed to be due to those avidyas. And if you attempt to give to the argument a somewhat different turn, by maintaining that it is the avidyas abiding in the earlier souls which fictitiously give rise to the later souls, we point out that this implies the souls being short-lived only, and moreover that each soul would have to take upon itself the consequences of deeds not its own and escape the consequences of its own deeds. The same reasoning disposes of the hypothesis that it is Brahman which effects the fictitious existence of the subsequent souls by means of the avidyas abiding within the earlier souls. And if there is assumed a beginningless flow of avidy&s, it follows that there is also a beginningless flow of the condition of the souls dependent on those avidyas, and that steady uniformity of the state of the souls which is supposed to hold good up to the moment of Release could thus not be established. Concerning your assertion that, as Nescience is something unreal and hence altogether unproved, it is not disestablished by such defects as mutual dependence which touch real things only ; we remark that in that case Nescience would cling even to released souls and the highest Brahman itself. — But impure Nescience cannot cling to what has for its essence pure cognition !— Is Nescience then to be dealt with by rational arguments ? If so, it will follow that, on account of the arguments set forth (mutual dependence, and so on), it likewise does not cling to the individual souls. We further put the following question — When the Nescience abiding in the individual soul passes away, owing to the rise of the knowledge of truth, does then the soul also perish or does it not perish ? In the former case Release is nothing else but destruction of the essential nature of the soul ; in the latter case the soul does not attain Release even on the destruction of Nescience, since it continues to exist as soul different from Brahman. — You have further maintained that the distinction of souls as pure and impure, &c, admits of being accounted for in the same way as the dimness or clearness, and so on, of the different images of a face as 44-0 vedanta-sCtras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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