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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1There the clause ' Being only this was in the beginning, one only,' establishes that one being as the general material cause ; the word ' without a second ' negatives the existence of a second operative cause ; and the clauses ' it thought, may I be many, may I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 2. 1 59 I grow forth,' and cit sent forth fire/ establish that one being (as the cause and substance of everything). If, then, it is said that Brahman is that which is the root of the world's origination, subsistence, and reabsorption, those three processes sufficiently indicate Brahman as that entity which is their material and operative cause ; and as being the material and the operative cause implies greatness (brzhattva) manifesting itself in various powers, such as omniscience, and so on, Brahman thus is something already known ; and as hence origination, &c, of the world are marks of something already known, the objection founded above on the absence of knowledge of another aspect of Brahman is seen to be invalid. — Nor is there really any objection to the origination, &c, of the world being taken as characteristic marks of Brahman in so far as they are distinctive attributes. For taken as attributes they indi- cate Brahman as something different from what is opposed to those attributes. Several attributes which do not con- tradict each other may serve quite well as characteristic marks defining one thing, the nature of which is not other- wise known, without the plurality of the attributes in any way involving plurality of the thing defined ; for as those attributes are at once understood to belong to one substrate, we naturally combine them within that one substrate. Such attributes, of course, as the possession of mutilated horns (mentioned above), which are contradictorily opposed to each other, necessarily lead to the assumption of several individual cows to which they severally belong ; but the origination, &c, of the world are processes separated from each other by difference of time only, and may therefore, without contradiction, be connected with one Brahman in succession. — The text ' from whence these beings,' &c, teaches us that Brahman is the cause of the origination, &c, of the world, and of this Brahman thus known the other text ' The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman,' tells us that its essential nature marks it off from every- thing else. The term ' True ' expresses Brahman in so far as possessing absolutely non-conditioned existence, and thus distinguishes it from non-intelligent matter, the abode 1 60 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
2The term ' True ' expresses Brahman in so far as possessing absolutely non-conditioned existence, and thus distinguishes it from non-intelligent matter, the abode 1 60 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. of change, and the souls implicated in matter ; for as both of these enter into different states of existence called by different names, they do not enjoy unconditioned being. The term ' knowledge ' expresses the characteristic of permanently non-contracted intelligence, and thus distin- guishes Brahman from the released souls whose intelligence is sometimes in a contracted state. And the term 'Infinite' denotes that, whose nature is free from all limitation of place, time, and particular substantial nature ; and as Brahman's essential nature possesses attributes, infinity belongs both to the essential nature and to the attributes. The qualification of Infinity excludes all those individual souls whose essential nature and attributes are not unsur- passable, and who are distinct from the two classes of beings already excluded by the two former terms (viz. * true being ' and * knowledge '). — The entire text therefore defines Brahman — which is already known to be the cause of the origination, &c, of the world — as that which is in kind different from all other things ; and it is therefore not true that the two texts under discussion have no force because mutually depending on each other. And from this it follows that a knowledge of Brahman may be gained on the ground of its characteristic marks — such as its being the cause of the origination, &c, of the world, free from all evil, omniscient, all-powerful, and so on. To those, on the other hand, who maintain that the object of enquiry is a substance devoid of all difference, neither the first nor the second Sutra can be acceptable ; for the Brahman, the enquiry into which the first Sutra proposes, is, according to authoritative etymology, some- thing of supreme greatness ; and according to the second Sutra it is the cause of the origin, subsistence, and final destruction of the world. The same remark holds good with regard to all following Sutras, and the scriptural texts on which they are based — none of them confirm the theory of a substance devoid of all difference. Nor, again, does Reasoning prove such a theory ; for Reasoning has for its object things possessing a ' proving ' attribute which constantly goes together with an attribute ' to be proved.' I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. l6l
3Nor, again, does Reasoning prove such a theory ; for Reasoning has for its object things possessing a ' proving ' attribute which constantly goes together with an attribute ' to be proved.' I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. l6l And even if, in agreement with your view, we explained the second Sutra as meaning ' Brahman is that whence proceeds the error of the origination, &c, of the world,' we should not thereby advance your theory of a substance devoid of all difference. For, as you teach, the root of all error is Nescience, and Brahman is that which witnesses (is conscious of) Nescience, and the essence of witnessing consciousness consists in being pure light (intelligence), and the essence of pure light or intelligence is that, distin- guishing itself from the Non-intelligent, it renders itself, as well as what is different from it, capable of becoming the object of empiric thought and speech (vyavahara). All this implies the presence of difference — if there were no differ- ence, light or intelligence could not be what it is, it would be something altogether void, without any meaning. — Here terminates the adhikara^a of ' origination and so on.' An objection to the purport of the preceding Sutras here presents itself. — The assertion that Brahman, as the cause of the origination, &c, of the world, must be known through the Vedanta-texts is unfounded ; for as Brahman may be inferred as the cause of the world through ordinary reasoning, it is not something requiring to be taught by authoritative texts. — To this objection the next Sutra replies. 3. Because Scripture is the source (of the know- ledge of Brahman). Because Brahman, being raised above all contact with the senses, is not an object of perception and the other means of proof, but to be known through Scripture only ; therefore the text ' Whence these creatures are born/ &c, has to be accepted as instructing us regarding the true nature of Brahman. — But, our opponent points out, Scrip- ture cannot be the source of our knowledge of Brahman, because Brahman is to be known through other means. For it is an acknowledged principle that Scripture has a meaning only with regard to what is not established by other sources of knowledge. — But what, to raise a prima facie counter objection, are those other sources of know- [48] M 1 62 vedAnta-s^tras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1There the clause ' Being only this was in the beginning, one only,' establishes that one being as the general material cause ; the word ' without a second ' negatives the existence of a second operative cause ; and the clauses ' it thought, may I be many, may I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 2. 1 59 I grow forth,' and cit sent forth fire/ establish that one being (as the cause and substance of everything). If, then, it is said that Brahman is that which is the root of the world's origination, subsistence, and reabsorption, those three processes sufficiently indicate Brahman as that entity which is their material and operative cause ; and as being the material and the operative cause implies greatness (brzhattva) manifesting itself in various powers, such as omniscience, and so on, Brahman thus is something already known ; and as hence origination, &c, of the world are marks of something already known, the objection founded above on the absence of knowledge of another aspect of Brahman is seen to be invalid. — Nor is there really any objection to the origination, &c, of the world being taken as characteristic marks of Brahman in so far as they are distinctive attributes. For taken as attributes they indi- cate Brahman as something different from what is opposed to those attributes. Several attributes which do not con- tradict each other may serve quite well as characteristic marks defining one thing, the nature of which is not other- wise known, without the plurality of the attributes in any way involving plurality of the thing defined ; for as those attributes are at once understood to belong to one substrate, we naturally combine them within that one substrate. Such attributes, of course, as the possession of mutilated horns (mentioned above), which are contradictorily opposed to each other, necessarily lead to the assumption of several individual cows to which they severally belong ; but the origination, &c, of the world are processes separated from each other by difference of time only, and may therefore, without contradiction, be connected with one Brahman in succession. — The text ' from whence these beings,' &c, teaches us that Brahman is the cause of the origination, &c, of the world, and of this Brahman thus known the other text ' The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman,' tells us that its essential nature marks it off from every- thing else. The term ' True ' expresses Brahman in so far as possessing absolutely non-conditioned existence, and thus distinguishes it from non-intelligent matter, the abode 1 60 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
2The term ' True ' expresses Brahman in so far as possessing absolutely non-conditioned existence, and thus distinguishes it from non-intelligent matter, the abode 1 60 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. of change, and the souls implicated in matter ; for as both of these enter into different states of existence called by different names, they do not enjoy unconditioned being. The term ' knowledge ' expresses the characteristic of permanently non-contracted intelligence, and thus distin- guishes Brahman from the released souls whose intelligence is sometimes in a contracted state. And the term 'Infinite' denotes that, whose nature is free from all limitation of place, time, and particular substantial nature ; and as Brahman's essential nature possesses attributes, infinity belongs both to the essential nature and to the attributes. The qualification of Infinity excludes all those individual souls whose essential nature and attributes are not unsur- passable, and who are distinct from the two classes of beings already excluded by the two former terms (viz. * true being ' and * knowledge '). — The entire text therefore defines Brahman — which is already known to be the cause of the origination, &c, of the world — as that which is in kind different from all other things ; and it is therefore not true that the two texts under discussion have no force because mutually depending on each other. And from this it follows that a knowledge of Brahman may be gained on the ground of its characteristic marks — such as its being the cause of the origination, &c, of the world, free from all evil, omniscient, all-powerful, and so on. To those, on the other hand, who maintain that the object of enquiry is a substance devoid of all difference, neither the first nor the second Sutra can be acceptable ; for the Brahman, the enquiry into which the first Sutra proposes, is, according to authoritative etymology, some- thing of supreme greatness ; and according to the second Sutra it is the cause of the origin, subsistence, and final destruction of the world. The same remark holds good with regard to all following Sutras, and the scriptural texts on which they are based — none of them confirm the theory of a substance devoid of all difference. Nor, again, does Reasoning prove such a theory ; for Reasoning has for its object things possessing a ' proving ' attribute which constantly goes together with an attribute ' to be proved.' I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. l6l
3Nor, again, does Reasoning prove such a theory ; for Reasoning has for its object things possessing a ' proving ' attribute which constantly goes together with an attribute ' to be proved.' I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. l6l And even if, in agreement with your view, we explained the second Sutra as meaning ' Brahman is that whence proceeds the error of the origination, &c, of the world,' we should not thereby advance your theory of a substance devoid of all difference. For, as you teach, the root of all error is Nescience, and Brahman is that which witnesses (is conscious of) Nescience, and the essence of witnessing consciousness consists in being pure light (intelligence), and the essence of pure light or intelligence is that, distin- guishing itself from the Non-intelligent, it renders itself, as well as what is different from it, capable of becoming the object of empiric thought and speech (vyavahara). All this implies the presence of difference — if there were no differ- ence, light or intelligence could not be what it is, it would be something altogether void, without any meaning. — Here terminates the adhikara^a of ' origination and so on.' An objection to the purport of the preceding Sutras here presents itself. — The assertion that Brahman, as the cause of the origination, &c, of the world, must be known through the Vedanta-texts is unfounded ; for as Brahman may be inferred as the cause of the world through ordinary reasoning, it is not something requiring to be taught by authoritative texts. — To this objection the next Sutra replies. 3. Because Scripture is the source (of the know- ledge of Brahman). Because Brahman, being raised above all contact with the senses, is not an object of perception and the other means of proof, but to be known through Scripture only ; therefore the text ' Whence these creatures are born/ &c, has to be accepted as instructing us regarding the true nature of Brahman. — But, our opponent points out, Scrip- ture cannot be the source of our knowledge of Brahman, because Brahman is to be known through other means. For it is an acknowledged principle that Scripture has a meaning only with regard to what is not established by other sources of knowledge. — But what, to raise a prima facie counter objection, are those other sources of know- [48] M 1 62 vedAnta-s^tras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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