Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

nd that she is the one itself? Or must we not say, that as when she imparts other things to bodies, such as morphe and form, it is not herself which she imparts, but things different from herself, thus also it is requisite to think if she imparts the one, that she imparts it as something different from herself ; and that look¬ ing to the one , she causes each of her productions to be one, in the same manner as looking to man^p. 470 she fabricates man, assuming together with mao the one contained in man.1 For of the things which are denominated one, each is in such a man¬ ner one as is the being which it possesses/ So that things which are in a less degree beings, pos¬ sess in a less degree the one ; but those that have more of entity have also more of the one . More~ over, soul being different from the one , possesses more of it in proportion as it is more truly soul, yet is not the one itself, \ For soul is one, and in a certain respect the one which it possesses is an accident. And these are two things, soul and one, in the same manner as body and one. That indeed which is discrete multitude, as a choir, is more re¬ mote from the oney but that which is continuous is nearer to it. But soul which has more alliance with, participates more abundantly of the one . If, how'ever, because soul cannot exist unless it is one, x The original here is defective, which deficiency may be supplied from the version of Ficinus, by reading ωσι rep και v pos άνθρωπον βλεπονσαν άνθρωπόν δημωνργει, instead of ώσ¬ περ και πρθ5 άνθρωπον άνθρωπον.

% i. e. The nature of its being depends on the nature of the unity which it participates ; so that its being is more or less excellent according as this unity partakes in » greater or less degree of the one itself*p. 471 it should , be said that soul and the one are the same, we reply in the first place, that other things also are what they are in conjunction with being one, but at the same time the one is different from them. For body and one are not the same ; but body participates of the one . In the next place, each soul is a multitude, though it does not consist of parts. For there are many powers in it, viz. those of reasoning, appetition, and apprehension, which are connected by unity as by a bond. Soul, therefore, being itself one imparts the one to other things. But she also suffers [i. e. participates] this one from something else.

II.

many powers in it, viz. those of reasoning, appetition, and apprehension, which are connected by unity as by a bond. Soul, therefore, being itself one imparts the one to other things. But she also suffers [i. e. participates] this one from something else.

II. Shall we say, therefore, that in each of the things which subsist according to a part, the essence of it and the one are not the same ? In true being indeed, and true essence, essence, being, and the one , are the same. So that he who dis¬ covers being in these, will also discover the one , and will find that essence itself is the one itself \ Thus, for instance, if essence is intellect, the one also is here intellect, viz. an intellect which is pri¬ marily being, and primarily one. And when it imparts existence to other things, thus, and so farp. 472 as it imparts this, it also imparts the one . For what else besides intellect and being, can the one of these be said to be ? For either the one is the same with being, as a man is the same thing as one man ; or it is as a certain number of each thing, as when you speak of a certain two. And thus the one is asserted of a certain thing alone. If, there¬ fore, number pertains to beings, it is evident that the one also pertains to them : and what it is must be investigated. But if the one is nothing more than the energy of the soul attempting to number, the one will have no existence in things themselves. Reason however has said, that whatever loses the one , loses entirely at the same time its existence. It is necessary, therefore, to consider whether each thing that has a being, and each thing that is one are the same, and whether in short, being and the one are the same. If, however, the being of each thing is multitude, but it is impossible for the one to be multitude, each of these will be different from the other. Man, therefore, is an animal, is rational, and has many parts, and this multitude is bound together by unity. Hence, man is one thing, and unity another ; since the former is partible, but the latter impartible. Moreover, being which ranks asp. 473 a whole, and contains all beings in itself, will rather be many beings [than one], and will be different from the one. But by assumption and participa¬ tion, it will possess the one. Being, likewise, has life and intellect : for it is not deprived of life. Hence, being is many things. If also it is intel¬ lect, it is thus again necessary that it should be multitudinous ; and this in a still greater degree, if it comprehends in itself forms or ideas.

ise, has life and intellect : for it is not deprived of life. Hence, being is many things. If also it is intel¬ lect, it is thus again necessary that it should be multitudinous ; and this in a still greater degree, if it comprehends in itself forms or ideas. For idea is not unity, but is rather number. And this is true both of each idea, and of that which is all ideas collectively. Idea, likewise, is in such a manner one, as the world is one. In short, the one is the first of things, but intellect, forms, and being are not the first. For each form consists of many things, and is a composite, and posterior. For those things from which each form consists have a priority of subsistence. But that it is not possible that intellect can be the first of things, is evident from the following considerations. It is necessary that intellect should consist in intellectual perception ; and that the most excellent intellect, and which does not look to what is external to, should intellectually perceive that which is prior to itself. For being converted to itself, it is [at tbfp. 474 same time] converted to the principle of itself And if indeed it is both intellective and intelligible, it will be twofold and not simple, and therefore not the one. But if it looks to something different from itself, it will entirely look to that which is more excellent than, and prior to itself. If, however, it both looks to itself, and to that w'hich is better than itself, it will thus also be secondary. And it is requisite to admit that such an intellect as this, is present indeed with the good , and with that which is first, and that it beholds it. It likewise associates with, and intellectually perceives itself, and knows that it is itself all things. By no means, therefore, since it is thus various, is it the one. Neither,, therefore, will the one be all things ; * since if it were, it would no longer be the one .

* It is well observed by Damascius in his MS. treatise r epi αρχών, that neither the one nor all things accords in reality with the nature of the one . For these are opposed to each other, and distribute our conceptions. For if we look to the simple and the one , we destroy its immensely great perfection : and if we conceive all things subsisting together, we abolish the one and thesimple. But this is because we are divided, and look to divided peculiarities. In short, so far as it is the one , it is exempt from all things, and is without any multi¬ tude ; but so far as it is the principle of all things, it is all things prior to all.