Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

at the impartible of each par¬ tial soul, is the form that is above it, which is comprehended in the one intellect that is allotted the government of the demoniacal series, under which each partial soul is arranged. And thus both the assertions are true, viz. that the intellect alone of each of these souls ranks among things which are al¬ ways established on high, and that every partial soul is the medium of the impartible above it, and the partible nature posterior to it/'

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arising frofm the energies of sense are beneath us. And we are this peculiarity of soul, viz. the middle of a twofold power, the worse and the better ; sense being the worse, but intellect the better power. And with respect to sense, indeed, it seems that we always grant it to be ours ; for we are always sentient ; but this is dubious with re¬ spect to intellect, because we do not always use it s and because it is separate. But it is separate be¬ cause it does not verge to us, but we rather looking on high, tend to it. Sense, however, is our mes¬ senger, but intellect is our king. <

IV, We also reign when we energize according to it. But wre energize according to it in a twofold respect; either because letters as it were, which are as laws, are inscribed in us by intellect ; or be1- cause we are filled with it ; or when it is present, are able to see and be sentient of it. We also know by such a spectacle, that we are able to learn other things through a thing of this kind ; so that we either learn the nature of the power which knows such an object as this, learning by the powerp. 412 itself ; or we become a thing of this kind.1 Hence, that which knows itself is twofold ; one indeed be¬ ing the dianoetic part of the soul, but the other be¬ ing superior to this. And, therefore, that which knows itself has a subsistence conformable to pure intellect itself. It also intellectually perceives it¬ self through this, not as any longer man, but as having entirely become something else ; and hastily withdrawing itself to that which is on high, it alone draws upward together with itself, the more excel¬ lent part of the soul, which is alone able to be winged with intelligence, in order that he who pos¬ sesses it may there deposit what he knew.

1 Instead of και ore μη avro aet. in this place, it is necessary to lead, και on μη αντψ γρωμζθα a ei.

nd hastily withdrawing itself to that which is on high, it alone draws upward together with itself, the more excel¬ lent part of the soul, which is alone able to be winged with intelligence, in order that he who pos¬ sesses it may there deposit what he knew. Does not the dianoetic part, therefore, know that it is dianoetic, and that it receives the knowledge of things external ; that it forms a judgment also of the things wdiich it investigates, and this by the rules in itself which it derives from intellect? Does it not also know that there is something better than itself which does not a investigate, but possesses every thing in itself? If, therefore, it says that it is from intellect, and is the second after, and the

* i. e. We become intellect.

a For ο ζητεί here, it is necessary to read » μη ζητεί.

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image of intellect, having all things as it were writ¬ ten in itself, as there he who writes and has written, will he, who thus knows himself, stop as far as to these things ? Shall we, however, employing ano¬ ther power, survey intellect knowing itself, or shall we assuming it, since it also is ours, and we are of it, thus both know intellect, and ourselves? Or is not the latter of these necessary, if we are to know what that is in intellect, for itself to know it¬ self? Then, however, some one becomes himself intellect, w hen dismissing other things pertaining to himself, he beholds intellect through intellect, and by it also surveys himself, just as intellect likewise beholds itself.

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V. Does intellect, therefore, by one part of itself behold another part ? In this case, however, one part will be that which sees, but another, that which is seen. And this is not for the same thing to see itself. What then ? If the whole is a thing of such a kind as to consist of similar parts, so that the perceiver differs in no respect from the thing perceived, in this case, the perceiver seeing that part which is the same with itself, will also see itself. For the perceiver does not at all differ fromp. 414 the thing perceived. Or may we not indeed in the first place say that this division of intellect is ab¬ surd? For how is the division to be made? since it cannot be casually. Who likewise is it that divides it? Is it he who arranges himself in the order of the perceiver, or he who arranges himself as the thing perceived ? In the next place, how will the perceiver know himself, when in perceiving he arranges himself in the order of that which is seen ? For that w hich sees was not supposed to be in that which is seen.

ver, or he who arranges himself as the thing perceived ? In the next place, how will the perceiver know himself, when in perceiving he arranges himself in the order of that which is seen ? For that w hich sees was not supposed to be in that which is seen. Or will not he who thus knows himself, understand himself to be that which is per¬ ceived, but not that which perceives ? So that he will not know all, nor the whole of himself. For that which he knows he knows as a thing seen, hut not as a thing that sees, and thus he wall be the perceiver of another thing, and not of himself. May he not, however, of himself add, that he is also that which sees, in order that he may perfectly know himself? But if he comprehends in himself that which sees, he also at the same time compre¬ hends the things that are seen. If, therefore, in the perceiver the things perceived are contained, if indeed, they are impressions of the things seen, he will not contain the things themselves. But if hep. 415 possesses the things themselves, he does not see them through dividing himself [into the perceiver and the thing perceived ;] but prior to the division of himself, he both beheld and possessed them. If, however, this be the case, it is necessary that contemplation should be the same with the object of contemplation, and intellect the same with the intelligible. For if it is not the same, there will not be truth. For unless this is admitted, he who is said to possess beings, will only possess an imf pression different from beings, which is not truth. For truth ought not to be of another thing, but that which it says, that also it should be. Thus, there¬ fore, intellect, the intelligible, and being are one ; and this is the first being, and the first intellect, possessing beings ; or rather, it is the same with beings. If, however, intelligence and the intelli¬ gible are one, how on this account does that which is intellective intellectually perceive itself? For intelligence, indeed, as it were, comprehends the intelligible, or is the same with it Intellect, how¬ ever, which intellectually perceives itself, is not yet manifest. But intelligence and the intelligible are the same ; for the intelligible is a certain energy, since it is neither power, nor void of life, nor againp. 416 is its life adventitious, nor its intellection in some¬ thing different from itself, as in a stone, or a cer¬ tain inanimate thing, and it is also the first essence.