Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor
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the weight, are unable to fly on high, though they have received wings for this purpose from nature. But others are in a small degree elevated from things subordinate, the more excellent part of the soul recalling them from plea¬ sure to a more worthy pursuit. As they are, how¬ ever, unable to look on high, and as not possessing any thing else which can afford them rest, they betake themselves together with the name of virtue to actions and the election of things inferior, from which they at first endeavoured to raise themselves, though in vain. In the third class is the race of divine men , who through a more excellent power, and with piercing eyes, acutely perceive supernal light, to the vision of which they raise themselves above the clouds and darkness as it were of this lower world, and there abiding despise every thing in these regions of sense ; being no otherwise de¬ lighted with the place which is truly and properly their own, than he who after many wanderings is at length restored to his lawful country.
II. What then is this place? And how may some one arrive at it? He, indeed, will arrive thither, who is by nature amatory, and who is truly a philosopher in disposition from the beginning. For as being amatory, he will be parturient about the beautiful, yet will not be satisfied with the beauty which is in body, but will fly from thence to the beauty of soul, to virtues and sciences, studies and laws, and will again from these ascend to the cause of the beauty contained in soul. If, also, there is a beauty prior to this, he will ascend to it, till he at length arrives at that which is first, and which is beautiful from itself. Having like» wise arrived hither, he will be liberated from his parturiency, but not before. But how will he ascend, whence does he derive the power of ascending, and what is the reasoning which will conduct this love [to the desired end ?] Is it the following ? This beauty which is in bodies, is ad¬ ventitious to bodies. For the morphce , or forms themselves of bodies, are in them as in matter. The subject, therefore, is changed, and from being beautiful becomes deformed. Hence reason says that body is beautiful by participation. What is it then which causes body to be beautiful ? This,
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♦ indeed, is effected in one way by the presence of beauty, but in another by soul, which fashions body, and inserts in it a viorphe , or form of such a kind.
is beautiful by participation. What is it then which causes body to be beautiful ? This,
p. 287
♦ indeed, is effected in one way by the presence of beauty, but in another by soul, which fashions body, and inserts in it a viorphe , or form of such a kind. What then? Is soul of itself beautiful or not? Certainly not ; since if it were, one soul would not be wise and beautiful, but another unwise and base* Hence, the beauty which is in soul is derived from wisdom. Who is it, therefore, that imparts wis¬ dom to the soul ? Is it not necessarily intellect ? But it is an intellect, which is not at one time in¬ tellect, and at another deprived of it : for it is true intellect, and which is therefore beautiful from it¬ self. Is it then necessary to stop here as at that which is first, or is it requisite to pass beyond intellect ? Intellect, indeed, as with reference to us precedes the first principle of things, announcing as it were in the vestibules of the good ’ that all things subsist in itself ; as being a multitudinous impres¬ sion of the good w7hich entirely abides in unity.
III. This nature, however, of intellect must be considered, which reason announces to be truly being, and true essence, previously confirming, by proceeding in another way, [what we have before asserted] that it is necessary there should be a cerp. 288tain nature of this kind. Perhaps* therefore, it is ridiculous to investigate whether intellect ranks in the order of beings ; though perhaps some persons may be dubious concerning this. And they may be in a still greater degree dubious whether there is such an intellect as we have maintained there is, and which is separate 1 [from soul]. Likewise, whether this intellect is [real] beings, and whether it contains the nature of forms, about which we now propose to speak. We see, therefore, that all the things which are said to exist are composites, and that no one of them is simple, whether they are fashioned by art, or constituted by nature. For artificial substances consist of brass, or wood, or stone, and do not yet obtain perfection from these, till they are elaborated by the several arts, one of which produces a statue, another a bed, and ano¬ ther a house, and each effects this by the insertion of the form which it contains. Moreover, with respect to the things which are constituted by na¬ ture, such of them as are composed of many parti¬ culars, and which are said to be co-mingled, may
• be analyzed into the form which is inherent in all ct to the things which are constituted by na¬ ture, such of them as are composed of many parti¬ culars, and which are said to be co-mingled, may
* For αχώριστοι here, it is necessary to read χωριστός.
• be analyzed into the form which is inherent in all
* For αχώριστοι here, it is necessary to read χωριστός.
substances that are minded together. Thus man o o may be analyzed into soul and body ; and body into the four elements. But finding that each of these is a composite, consisting of matter and that which gives it form (for the matter of the elements is of itself formless) you will again also investigate respecting the soul, whether it now ranks among simple natures, or whether one thing in it has the relation of matter, but another, viz. the intellect which it contains, the relation of form ; one indeed being analogous to the morphe in brass, but the other to the artist who produces that morphe . He, likewise, who transfers these very same things to the universe, will also here ascend to intellect, and will admit that it is truly the maker and demiurgus [of all things]. He will, likewise, say that the sub¬ ject matter receiving forms, becomes either fire or water, or air, or earth ; but that these forms pro» ceed from another cause, and that this is soul. Again, also, he will assert, that soul imparts morphe to the four elements of the wOrld ; but that intel¬ lect becomes the supplier of productive principles
I
to soul ; just as productive principles being inserted from the arts in the souls of artists enable them to energize [according to art]. With respect to in-
Plot. T
p. 290
tellect, also, one which is as the form of the soul is analogous to rnorphe , but another which imparts this form, is analogous to the maker of the statue, in whom all things are inherent which he imparts.
The things, however, which body receives, are now
♦ nothing more than images and imitations.
IV. Why, therefore, is it necessary to ascend to soul, and yet not admit that it is the first of things ? Is it not because in the first place, indeed, intellect is different from, and more excellent than soul ? But that which is more excellent is prior by nature. For soul when perfect, does not, as some fancy it does, generate intellect. For whence will that which is in capacity become in energy, unless there is a cause which leads into energy ? Since if it becomes in energy casually, it is possible that it may not proceed into energy. Hence, it is neces¬ sary that first natures should be established in energy, and that they should be unindigent and perfect. But imperfect natures are posterior to them.