Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

ld also say, Is he a good man ? it will make this inquiry from the information which it derived through sense. But that which it says on this occasion, it will now possess from itself, containing in itself a role by which it forms a judgment ofp. 407 good. How then does it contain the good in it¬ self? May we not say, so far as it is boniform, and is corroborated to the perception of a thing of this kind, in consequence of intellect shining upon it? For the pure part of the soul is this, and receives the supervening vestiges of intellect. Why, how¬ ever, is not this intellect, but the rest beginning from the sensitive power is soul ? May we not say, because it is necessary that soul should consist in the discursive energies of reason ? But all these^ are the works of the reasoning power. Why, how¬ ever, do we not grant to this part the power of intellectually perceiving itself, and thus become liberated from doubt ? Is it because we assign to it the office of considering, and being busily em¬ ployed about externals ; but we conceive it to be the province of intellect, to survey both itself, and the forms which it contains ? If, however, some one should say, what therefore prevents this part from considering things pertaining to itself, by ano¬ ther power ? He who says this, does not investigate either the dianoetic or reasoning power, but assumes a pure intellect. What then prevents a pure intel¬ lect from existing in the soul ? We reply, nothing prevents this. But farther still, it is necessary top. 408 inquire, whether this pure intellect is something belonging to soul? 1 We reply, it does not belong to the soul, and yet it is our intellect, being dif¬ ferent from the dianoetic power, and proceeding on its summit. At the same time, however, it is ours, though we must not con-numerate it with the parts of the soul. Or we may say, that it is ours, and yet not ours. Hence we use, and do not use it ; but we always employ the dianoetic power. And it is ours indeed, when we use it, but not ours when we do not use it .* But what is it to use a

- - * z The intellect which is ours when we use it, and not ours when we do not, is a partial intellect of the Mi nerval series, which is proximately participated by daemoniacal souls, and illuminates ours when we convert ourselves to it, and render our rational part intellectual.

* Both the sense of this passage, and the version of Ficinus require that instead of αλλ’ eri bei Xeyeiv, ψυχής τουτο3 we should read, aXX' ert bei Xeyeiv, ei tl ψυχής τούτο ;

which is ours when we use it, and not ours when we do not, is a partial intellect of the Mi nerval series, which is proximately participated by daemoniacal souls, and illuminates ours when we convert ourselves to it, and render our rational part intellectual. This in the Phaedrus is said to be the governor of the soul, and to be the only thing which perceives real being. But the soul also perceives it in con¬ junction with this intellect, when she is nourished by the sum¬ mit of her reasoning power and by science. This intellect, likewise, is spoken of in the Tim* us, and is denominated intel¬ ligence. For it is there said, that true being is apprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason . Hence, as Proclus beautifully observes, “ when reason intellectually perceives eternal being, as reason indeed, it energizes transitively, but as perceiving intellectually , it energizes with simplicity, underp. 409pure intellect? Is it to pronounce ourselves as be¬ coming either such an intellect, or conformable to standing each thing as simple, yet not understanding all things at once, but passing from some things to others. At the same time, however, it perceives each of the things which it sees transitively as one simple thing.”

In another part of his Commentary on the Timaeus, (p. 321.) he also admirably observes respecting this partial intellect as follows : “ What the impartible is in each partial soul (i. e. in a soul such as ours) is truly dubious. For it must not be admitted, that there is an intellect in each, and this partial. May we not say, therefore, that each partial soul is essentially suspended from a certain daemon ; and as every daemon has a daemoniacal intellect above itself, a partial soul also has this same intellect arranged as an impartible essence prior to it¬ self? Hence, the daemoniacal soul participates piimarily of this intellect ; but the partial souls that are under it, seconda» rily ; and which also causes them to be partial. For each partial soul has the partible as its peculiarity, but has the im¬ partible in common with the drnmons that are above these souls and whose peculiarity is the impartible. Hence, too, d®mons remain on high, but partial souls at a certain time descend, and divide themselves about bodies, as being more adapted to these.

s the im¬ partible in common with the drnmons that are above these souls and whose peculiarity is the impartible. Hence, too, d®mons remain on high, but partial souls at a certain time descend, and divide themselves about bodies, as being more adapted to these. For if in partial souls, the genus of differ¬ ence is exuberant, which is the reason why they are not always able to energize according to all their powers, it is necessary that they should be in a greater degree adapted to a life divisi¬ ble about body, and in a greater degree be separated from an impartible essence ; by this means preserving an analogy to each of the extremes. Just as it is necessary that the most divine of souls, through their similitude to intellect, should in a greater degree be exempt from partible natures, but be more united to the impartible essences above them, and from whichp. 410 it? For we are not intellect. We subsist, there¬ fore, conformable or according to it, the first rea¬ soning power being the recipient of it. For we are sentient through sense, and we ourselves per¬ ceive sensibly. Are we therefore thus dianoetically perceived, and do we thus dianoetically energize ? Or shall we say that we indeed are reasoning beings, and that we intellectually perceive the con¬ ceptions which are in dianoia ? For we are this. But the conceptions arising from the energies of intellect, are in such a way above us, as those they are connascently suspended. They also have an intellec¬ tual arrangement among souls. And it is reasonable to sup¬ pose, that the intellect of each daemon, so far as it is a whole and one, is the intellect of the daemon which proximately [i. c. immediately] participates it, but that it comprehends in itself the number of souls that are under it, and the intellectual paradigms of them. Each partial soul, therefore, will have its appropriate paradigm in this intellect, and not simply the whole of this intellect, in the same manner as the daemon who is essentially the leader of these souls. Defining, therefore, more accurately, we may say, that the impartible of each par¬ tial soul, is the form that is above it, which is comprehended in the one intellect that is allotted the government of the demoniacal series, under which each partial soul is arranged. And thus both the assertions are true, viz.