Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

e. But this is because we are divided, and look to divided peculiarities. In short, so far as it is the one , it is exempt from all things, and is without any multi¬ tude ; but so far as it is the principle of all things, it is all things prior to all.

Nor is it intellect. For thus it would be all things ; intellect being all things. Nor is it being. For being likewise is all things.

III. What then will the one be ; and what nature will it possess ? Or may we not say that it is not at all wonderful, it should not be easy to tell what it is, since neither is it easy to tell what being is, or what form is. But our knowledge is fixed in forms. When, however, the soul directs its atten¬ tion to that wdiich is formless, then being unable to comprehend that which is not bounded, and as it were impressed with forms by a former of a various nature, it falls from the apprehension of it, and is afraid it will possess [nothing from the view]. Hence, it becomes weary in endeavours of this kind, and gladly descends from the survey fre¬ quently falling from all things, till it arrives at something sensible, and as it were rests in a solid substance ; just as the sight also, when wearied with the perception of small objects, eagerly con¬ verts itself to such as are large. When, however, the soul wishes to perceive by itself, and sees itself alone, then in consequence of being one with the object of its perception, it does not think that itp. 476 yet possesses that which it investigates, because it is not different from that which it intellectually perceives. At the same time, it is requisite that he should act in this manner, who intends to phi¬ losophize about the one. Since, therefore, that which we investigate is one, and we direct our attention to the principle of all things, to the good, and the first, we ought not to be far removed from the natures which are about the first of things, nor fall from them to the last of all things, but pro¬ ceeding to such as are first, we should elevate our¬ selves from sensibles which have an ultimate sub¬ sistence. The soul, likewise, should for this pur¬ pose be liberated from all vice, in consequence of hastening to the [vision of the] good ; and should ascend to the principle which is in herself, and become one instead of many things, in order that she may survey the principle 1 of all things, and the one .

ose be liberated from all vice, in consequence of hastening to the [vision of the] good ; and should ascend to the principle which is in herself, and become one instead of many things, in order that she may survey the principle 1 of all things, and the one . Hence it is requisite, that the soul of him who ascends to the good should then become intel¬ lect, and that he should commit his soul to, and establish it in intellect, in order, that what intellect;

* For αρχήν here, it is necessary to read αρχ ψ ; and it is also requisite to alter the punctuation conformably to tbs above translation.

p. 477

sees, his soul may vigilantly receive, and may ihrough intellect survey the one; not employing apy^oneof the Senses, nor receiving any thing from them, but with a pure intellect, and with the sum¬ mit [and as it were, flower] qf intellect, beholding that which is most pure. When, therefore, he who applies himself to the survey of a thing of this kind, imagines that there is either magnitude, or figure, or bulk about this nature, he lias not intellect for the leader of the vision ; because intellect is not naturally adapted to perceive things of this kind, but such an energy is the energy of sense, and of opinion following sense. But in order to perceive the one , it is necessary to receive from intellect a declaration of what intellect is able to accomplish. Intellect, however, is able to see either things prior to itself, or things pertaining to itself, or things effected by itself. And the things indeed contained in itself, are pure; but those prior to itself are still purer and more simple ; or rather this must be asserted of that which is prior to it. Hence, that which is prior to it, is not intellect, but something more excellent. For intellect is a certain one among the number of beings ; but that is not a certain one, but is prior to every thing. Nor is itp. 478 being ; for being has, as it were, the form of the one.1 But that is formless, and is even without intelligible form. For the nature of the one being generative of all things, is not any one of them. Neither, therefore, is it a certain thing, nor a qua· lity, nor a quantity, nor intellect, nor soul, nor that which is moved, nor again that which stands stiH. Nor is it in place, or in time ; but is by itself uni¬ form, or rather without form, being prior to all form, to motion and to permanency. For these subsist about being which also cause it to be mul¬ titudinous.

is moved, nor again that which stands stiH. Nor is it in place, or in time ; but is by itself uni¬ form, or rather without form, being prior to all form, to motion and to permanency. For these subsist about being which also cause it to be mul¬ titudinous. Why, however, if it is not moved, does it not stand still ? Because it is necessary that one or both of these should subsist about being. And that which stands still, stands still through permanency, and is not the same with it. Hence permanency is accidental to it, and it no longer remains simple. For when we say that the one is the cause of all things, we do not predicate any thing as an accident to it, but rather as something which happens to us, because we possess something

8 Instead of του ovros here, it is necessary to read τον eyes. For it is absurd to suppose Plotinus would say, that being has as it were the form of being , and yet Ficinus so translates it ; if Nam ens velut for mam ipsam entis habet.”

p. 479

p. 4

from it, the ant in the mean time subsisting in itself. It is necessary, however, when speaking accurately of the one , neither to call it that , nor this. But we running as it were externally round it, are desirous of explaining the manner in which vre are affected about it. And at one time, indeed, we draw near to it, but at another time fall from it, by our doubts about it.

IV. In this affair, however, a doubt especially arises, because the perception of the highest God is not effected by science, nor by intelligence, like other intelligibles, but by the presence of him, which is a mode of knowledge superior to that of science. But the soul suffers an apostacy from the one , and is not entirely one when it receives scien¬ tific knowledge. For science is reason, and «reason is multitudinous. The soul, therefore, in this case, deviates from the one, and falls into number and multitude. Hence it is necessary to run above science, and in no respect to depart from a subsis¬ tence which is profoundly one ; but it is requisite to abandon science, the objects of science, every other thing, and every beautiful spectacle. Forp. 480 fcvery thing beautiful is posterior to the supreme* and is derived from him, in the same manner as all diurnal light is derived from the sun. Hence Plato says, he is neither effable, nor to be described by writing.