Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

in mo¬ tion. It becomes, however, more apparent when this thing is in motion. For motion contributes more to the knowledge, and transition to the nature of time than rest. And the quantity of the motion of a thing is more known than the quantity of its rest. Hence [some philosophers] have been in¬ duced to say that time is the measure of motion,.

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instead of saying that it is measured by motion. In the next place, it is requisite to add what that is which is measured by motion, and not to adduce that which accidentally takes place about it, and this alternately. Perhaps, however, they do not intend to say that this takes place alternately, and we do not understand their meaning ; but they clearly asserting that time is a measure according to that which is measured, we do not apprehend their conceptions on this subject. The cause however, why we do not, is because they have not clearly shown in their writings what time is, whether it is a measure, or that which is measured, as if they were writing to those who were acquainted with their opinions, and to their auditors. Plato, indeed, does not say that the essence of time is either a measure, or that which is measured by something, but asserts in order to render it mani¬ fest, that the circulation [of the universe] is allotted something which is the smallest [i. e. the centre,] for the purpose of unfolding the smallest part of time ; so that from hence both the quality and quantity of time may be known. Wishing, how¬ ever, to manifest the essence of time, he says that it was generated together with the universe, andp. 217 that it is a moveable image of its paradigm eter¬ nity ; because neither does time remain, life not remaining, in conjunction with which it runs and is convolved. But he says, it was generated together with the universe, because such a life as this pro» duced the universe, and one life fabricated both the world and time. If, therefore, this life could be converted into one, time which exists in this life would immediately cease, and also the universe, in consequence of no longer possessing this life.

If, however, some one assuming the prior and posterior of the life which is here, should assert this to be time, because this is something, but that the more true motion which has prior and posterior is not any thing, his assertion would be most ab¬ surd.

e.

If, however, some one assuming the prior and posterior of the life which is here, should assert this to be time, because this is something, but that the more true motion which has prior and posterior is not any thing, his assertion would be most ab¬ surd. For he would ascribe to inanimate motion the prior and posterior, and also time together with it, but he would not grant this to the motion through the imitation of which the inferior motion exists ; though from this superior motion prior and posterior primarily subsist, since it is a self¬ operative motion. As, likewise, it generates its several energies, thus too it produces that which is successive, and together with the generation a trans-

Ition of energies. Why, therefore, do we refer this motion of the universe to the comprehension of the more true motion, and assert that it is in time, but do not refer to this the motion of soul which subsists in itself, and proceeds in a perpetual course? Shall we say it is because that which is prior to it is eternity, which neither runs in con¬ junction, nor is co-extended with this motion ? This first motion, therefore, is referred to time which also it generates, and which together with its own energy it possesses. How, therefore, is time every where ? Because this life and motion are not absent from any part of the world, as neither does the life which is in us desert any part of us. If, however, some one should say that time consists in a non¬ hypostasis, or non-hyparxis, for we are deceived about its essence, in the same manner as when we say of God that he was or will be ; for thus he will be and was in the same manner as that in which it is said he will be , [i. e. in the same manner as time ;] to assertions of this kind there belongs another mode of discussion. With respect to all that has been said, however, it is necessary to. ob¬ serve, that when any one assumes the quantity ofp. 219 space passed over by a man that is moved, he also assumes the quantity of the motion, and when he assumes the quantity of the motion, such for instance as is produced in walking, he directs his attention to the boundary s of motion existing in the man prior to this motion, in order that he may judge whether he has walked to the full extent of this boundary. And the body, indeed, which has been moved in so much time, he refers to so much motion ; for this is the cause of its being moved ; and to the time of this motion. But he refers this motion of the body to the motion of the soul which produced an equality of interval.

ndeed, which has been moved in so much time, he refers to so much motion ; for this is the cause of its being moved ; and to the time of this motion. But he refers this motion of the body to the motion of the soul which produced an equality of interval. To what, there¬ fore, will he refer the motion of the soul ? For that whatever it may be to which he may wush to refer it, will be now without interval. Hence, this sub¬ sists primarily, and is that in which the rest are contained ; but it is itself no longer contained in any thing else. For there is not any thing by which it can be contained. This, therefore, is primarily ; and the like takes place in the soul of

1 The word used by Plotinus here is ^ayημ a, which signifies in the Physics of Aristotle, the boundary of motion.

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the universe. Is then time in us also ? May we not say that it is in every such soul, that it subsists uniformly in every similar soul, and that all of them are [in a certain respect] one ? Hence, time will not be divulsed, since neither is eternity, which according to another characteristic is in all uniform natures.

p. 221

ON THE

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL#

I. Whether each [part] of us is immortal, or the whole perishes, or one part of us is dissipated and corrupted, but another part perpetually remains, which part is the man himself, may be learnt by considering conformably to nature as follows : Man, indeed, is not something simple, but there is in him a soul, and he has also a body, whether it is annexed to us as an instrument, or after some other manner. However this may be, it must be ad¬ mitted, that the nature and essence of each of these must be thus divided. Since the body, therefore, is itself a composite, reason shows that it cannot remain [perpetually the same] ; and sense likewise sees that it is dissolved and wastes away, and receives all-various destructions ; since each of thep. 222 things inherent in it tends to its own [i. e. to the whole from which it was derived], and one thing belonging to it corrupts another, and changes and perishes into something else. This, too, is espe¬ cially the case when the soul, which causes the parts to be in friendly union with each other, is not present with the corporeal masses. If each body, likewise, is left by itself, it will not be one, since it is capable of being dissolved into form and matter, from which it is also necessary that simple bodies should have their composition.