Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

intellectually perceive itself, nor is there any intellectual perception of it,

XIV. How, therefore, can we speak of it? W e are able indeed to say something of it, but we do not speak it. Nor have we either any know¬ ledge, or intellectual perception of it. How, there¬ fore, do we speak of it, if we do not possess it ? May we not say, that though we do not possess it by knowledge, yet we are not entirely deprived of the possession of it ; but we possess it in such a way that we can speak of it, but cannot speak it ? For we can say what it is not, but we cannot say what it is ; so that we speak of it from things pos¬ terior to it. We are not, however, prevented from possessing it, though we cannot say what it is. But in the same manner as those w7ho energize enthusiastically, and become divinely inspired, per¬ ceive indeed, that they have something greater in c£ee, therefore, it is requisite to add €%ei και πον eivcu. But the meaning of Plotinus in this place is, that if the most simple of all things had an intellectual perception of itself, it would be in itself ; and consequently would be somewhere. For an intellectual essence because self-subsistent, is said to be in it¬ self. For so far as it is the cause of, it comprehends itself; but so far as it is caused, it is comprehended by itself.

themselves, though they do not know what it is ; but of the things by which they are excited they speak, and from these receive a certain sensation of the moving power, which is different from them ; — in this manner also we appear to be affected about that which is perfectly simple, when possess¬ ing a pure intellect we employ it, and conclude that this is the inward intellect which is the source of essence, and of other things which belong to this arrangement. We are sensible, therefore, that the nature ■which is perfectly simple is not these things, but that it is something more excellent, more ample, and great, than that which we deno¬ minate being, because it is also superior to reason, intellect, and sense, imparting, but not being these.

XV. But how does it impart them? Shall we say by possessing, or by not possessing them ? If, however, it indeed possesses them, it is not simple. But if it does not possess them, how does multitude proceed from it ? For perhaps some one may ad¬ mit that one simple thing may proceed from it, though even in this case it may be inquired how any thing can proceed from that which is entirelyp. 444 one* At tiie same time, however, it may be said, that one simple thing may flow from it, in 2one may ad¬ mit that one simple thing may proceed from it, though even in this case it may be inquired how any thing can proceed from that which is entirelyp. 444 one* At tiie same time, however, it may be said, that one simple thing may flow from it, in the same manner as a surrounding splendor from light. But how do many things proceed from it ? May we not say, that what proceeds from is not the same with it ? If, therefore, it is not the same with, it is not better than it. [For what is better, or in short, more excellent than the one ? It is therefore infe¬ rior to it. But this is more indigent].® For what is in a greater degree indigent than the one , except that which is not one ? This, therefore, that is more indigent is many. At the same time, however, it aspires after the one . Hence it is one many. For the one saves every thing which is not one ; and every thing is what it is through the one . For un¬ less it becomes one, though it should consist of many things, it cannot yet be denominated being. And though it may be possible to say what each thing is, yet this is only in consequence of each thing being one, and participating of sameness. That, however, which has not multitude in itself, is

1 The words within the brackets are supplied from the ver¬ sion of Ficinus ; so that in the original, after ovbe ye βεΧτω vt it is necessary to supply rt yap βεΧτων τον evost η οΧω$ xpetr- τον ; χεφον αρα . τοντο $e cvbcecrrepov*p. 445 not one by the participation of one, but is the one itself, not from another, but because it is this ; from which other things also derive their subsist¬ ence, some indeed, proximately, but others re· motely. But since that which is next to the one is

/ characterized by sameness, and is posterior to the one , it is evident that the multitude of it is every where one. For being multitude at the same time it subsists in sameness, and without separation, because all things in it exist collectively at once [in impartible union]. Each also of the natures which proceed from it, as long as it participates of life, is one many. For it cannot exhibit itself to the view as one all . That, however, from which this origi¬ nates is one all , because it is a great principle. For the principle is in reality and truly one. But that which is next to the principle, being thus after a manner [exuberantly full of ] and heavy with the one , becomes all things through its participation of the one ; and whatever it contains is again all and one.