Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

ted with form by its generator. But the progeny of intellect is a certain reason, and an hypostasis which energizes Plot . Sp. 274 dianoetically. This, however, is that which is moved about intellect, is the light of intellect,1 and a vestigie suspended from it. Hence, according to one part of itself it is conjoined with it, and on this account it is replete with and enjoys it, participates of, and intellectually perceives it ; but according to another part, it comes into contact with things posterior to itself, or rather, generates them, and which are necessarily inferior to soul. About these, however, we shall speak hereafter. And as far as to these is the progression of divine natures.

VIII. On this account all things are distributed by Plato in a triple order about the king of all. For he says, ££ that all things are about the king of all ; a second things about that which is second, and such as are third about that which ranks as the third/ He also says that this king is the father 3 of cause, denominating intellect cause. For with

* i, e. Is a light emanating from intellect.

% There is evidently a defect here in the original ; for there is nothing more than φησι γαρ π ρωτά. But the words of Plato ill his second Epistle are περί τον πάντων βασιλέα παντ εστι, και εκείνου ενεκα παντα , και εκείνο αίτιον απαντών των καλών, δεύτερον δε περί τα δεύτερα , και τρίτον περί τα τρίτα .

3 παρα here is erroneously printed for πατέρα .

27 5

Plato, intellect is the demiurgus. But he says that this cause produced soul in that Crater [mentioned by him in the Timasus]. The cause, however, be¬ ing intellect, he says that the father1 is the good , and that which is beyond intellect, and beyond essence. In many places, also* he calls being and intellect idea ; so that from Plato we may know that intellect and idea are from the good , but soul from intellect. These assertions, however, are not new, nor of the present time, but were delivered by the ancients, though not explicitly, and what has now been said by us is an interpretation of them. That these opinions also are ancient, is testified and confirmed by the writings of Plato. Parmenides, therefore, prior to Plato, adopted this opinion, so far as he collects into one and the same thing being and intellect. Being, likewise, he does not place among sensibles. For he says, that to perceive intellectually , and to be , are the same thing .

armenides, therefore, prior to Plato, adopted this opinion, so far as he collects into one and the same thing being and intellect. Being, likewise, he does not place among sensibles. For he says, that to perceive intellectually , and to be , are the same thing . He also says, that this is immoveable , though he adds, that it perceives intellectually , removing from it all corporeal motion in order that it may abide invariably the same. And he assimi»

1 There is the same error in the original here as above.

p. 276

lates it to the bulk of a sphere* because it contains all things involved in itself* and because its intel¬ lection is not external to but in its own essence. When, likewise, in his writings he calls it one, he alludes to the cause of it, as if this one [of intellect] was found to be many. The Parmenides, how¬ ever, in Plato, speaking more accurately, divides from each other this and the first one, which is more principally one. He also calls the second one many, and the third, one and many. And after this manner, he likewise accords with the doc¬ trine of the three [above mentioned] natures.

IX. But Anaxagoras, when he says that there is a pure and unmingled intellect, admits also that the first [principle of things] is simple, and that the one is separate. On account of antiquity, how¬ ever, he omits the accurate discussion of these things. Heraclitus, also, knew an eternal and in¬ telligible one. For he says, that bodies are always rising into existence , or becoming to be , and flow - ing. With Empedocles, strife $ indeed divides, but friendship is the one ; and this according to m him is incorporeal. But the elements are arranged by him analogous to matter. Aristotle, however., afterwards asserts that the first principle is separate and intelligible. But when he says that it intellec¬ tually perceives itself, again he makes it not to be the first.1 When also he introduces many other intelligibles, and as many as there are spheres in the heavens, in order that each of these may move each of the spheres, he speaks of intelligibles in a way different from Plato, and not being able to assign probable reasons, adduces necessity. It may also be opportunely observed, that it is more reasonable to refer all the spheres to one co-ordi¬ nation, and to assert that they look to one thing, and the first cause of all Moreover, it may like¬ wise be asked, whether according to him the many intelligibles are from one first cause, or whether there are many principles in intelligibles ? And if indeed they

* In the original, eitcos instead of vcikos .

, and to assert that they look to one thing, and the first cause of all Moreover, it may like¬ wise be asked, whether according to him the many intelligibles are from one first cause, or whether there are many principles in intelligibles ? And if indeed they are from one first, they will be ana-

1 Aristotle in his writings ascended no higher than the in¬ telligible* and this with him is the first principle. And per¬ haps this was because he knew that the nature which is beyond the intelligible is perfectly ineffable and unknown, and there» fore accurately speaking, is even beyond principle. See my translation of his Metaphysics.

p. 278

iogously arranged, like the spheres in the sensible universe, one comprehending another, but one ex¬ ternal to them ruling over all of them. So that the first will there comprehend the rest, and there will be an intelligible world. As here, likewise, the spheres are not empty, but the first is full of stars, and all the rest have stars ; so there also the moving causes will contain many things in them¬ selves, and what is there contained will have a more true subsistence. But if each is a principle, the principles will subsist fortuitously. And it may be asked, why they subsist and accord in accom¬ plishing one work, viz. the concord of all heaven. How, likewise, are the sensible natures in the heavens equal to the intelligible and motive causes. And how are they thus many being incorporeal, since matter does not separate them from each other. Hence, those ancients who especially em¬ braced the doctrines of Pythagoras and his fol¬ lowers, and of Pherecydes, were investigators of this intelligible essence, Some of them, however, committed discussions of these things to writing, but others delivered them not in writing, but un¬ folded them in unwritten discourses, or wholly dis¬ missed the consideration of them.

X. It has been shown, however, as far as it is possible to demonstrate about things of this kind, that it is requisite to think that beyond being there is the oney such as reason wishes to unfold ; that next to this, being and intellect subsist ; and that, in the third place, follows the nature of soul. But, as in the nature of things there are these three hypostases, so likewise it is proper to think, that the above mentioned three subsist with us. I do not mean to assert that they are to be found in sensibles ; for they have a separate subsistence ; but that they are external to sensibles, and external after the same manner in man also, as the three which we have been considering are external to all heaven.