Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

y [i. e. the superior]

p. 395

soul* so far as it communicates with the other. It is fit, however, that the inferior soul should also desire the recollection of the energies of the other soul, and especially when it has likewise become itself elegant and worthy. But this inferior soul may from the first become better, in consequence of being disciplined by the more excellent soul. The latter, however, will gladly resign to oblivion the concerns of the former. For it may happen, that the latter soul being worthy, the former which is of an inferior nature, may be forcibly restrained by the superior soul. And in proportion as this more excellent soul hastens to the intelligible, it will forget the concerns of this world, unless the whole of its life here, has been such as to preserve the remembrance alone of things of the most exalted nature. For here also it is beautiful to abandon human pursuits : [and this is the work of perfect virtue *]. A forgetfulness, therefore, of such pursuits, is necessary in another life. Hence, he who says that the worthy soul is oblivious, will in such a way as we have mentioned speak rightly.

1 It appears from the version of Ficinus* that the words και τοντο τψ reXeias aper?j$ epyor, are wanting in the original in this place.

p. 396

f or it will fly from the many, and will collect mul¬ titude into one, dismissing that which is infinite. For thus it will not associate with multitude, but expelling it will live bv itself : since here also, when it wishes to be in the intelligible world, while an inhabitant of earth, it dismisses all other con¬ cerns. Hence, when it is there, it remembers but few things of a terrestrial nature ; but it remem¬ bers more of them when it is in the heavens. And Hercules, indeed, [when in Hades] may speak of his own fortitude ; but in the intelligible world, he will consider these things as trifling, being trans¬ ferred into a more sacred place, and strenuously engaging even above himself, in those contests in which the wise wish to engage.

OX THE

GENERATION AND ORDER OF THINGS

AFTER

THE FIRST·

I. The one is all things, and yet no one of alt For the principle of all is not all things ; but the one is all, because all things run as it were into it, or rather do not as yet exist, but will be.

GENERATION AND ORDER OF THINGS

AFTER

THE FIRST·

I. The one is all things, and yet no one of alt For the principle of all is not all things ; but the one is all, because all things run as it were into it, or rather do not as yet exist, but will be. How, therefore, [does multitude proceed] from the one which is simple, and in which no variety, nor any duplicity present themselves to the view ? Is it be¬ cause there was nothing in it, on this account all things are from it? Hence, in order that being might exist, the one is not being, but being is the progeny of it, and as it were its first-born. For the one being perfect, in consequence of not seeking after, or possessing, or being in want of any thing,

<*■ t,p. 398 it becomes as it were overflowing, and the super¬ plenitude of it produces something else. That, however, which is generated from it is converted to it, and is filled, and was generated looking to it. But this is intellect. And the permanency indeed of it about the one , produced being ; but its vision of the one , intellect. When, therefore, it is esta¬ blished about the one , in order that it may see it, then it becomes at once intellect and being. Hence, being in the same manner as the one produces things similar to itself, through an effusion of abun¬ dant power. Its offspring also has the form of it, in the same manner as prior to this it likewise flowed forth from the one . And this energy from essence is soul, w’hich w^as generated from intellect permanently abiding. For intellect also was gene¬ rated, that which is prior to it abiding. Soul, how¬ ever, does not produce abiding, but being moved generates an image of itself. Soul, therefore, look¬ ing thither whence it was generated, is filled. But proceeding into another and contrary motion, it generates an image of itself, viz. sense, and the nature which is in plants. Nothing, however, is r separated or cut off from that which is prior to itself. Hence, also, the soul of man is seen top. 399 proceed as far as to plants. For after a certain manner it proceeds into them, because that which is in plants is derived from it. Nevertheless, the whole of the human soul is not in plants, but it is thus ingenerated in plants, because it so far proceeds into an inferior nature, having made another hypo» stasis by its progression into and propensity to that which is subordinate ; since the soul which is prior to this, being suspended from intellect, permits in¬ tellect to abide in itself.

II.

it so far proceeds into an inferior nature, having made another hypo» stasis by its progression into and propensity to that which is subordinate ; since the soul which is prior to this, being suspended from intellect, permits in¬ tellect to abide in itself.

II. The procession, therefore, of these is from the principle to the extremity, each thing at the same time being always left in its proper seat. But that which is generated receives another order, which is subordinate. Nevertheless, each thing becomes the same with that which it follows, as long as it follows it. When, therefore, soul [i. e. the human soul] is ingenerated in a plant, there is one part, viz. the part which is in the plant, which is most rash and insane ; and as far as to this soul ‘ proceeds. But when the soul is in a brute,1 it isp. 400 led by the sentient power, which then has dominion. When, however, it is ingenerated in man, then in short, either the motion is in the rational nature, or from intellect, in consequence of the soul having its proper intellect, and deriving from itself the power of intellection, or of being moved* Again, therefore, returning [whence we digressed], when some one cuts off either the germinations, or cer¬ tain branches of a plant, w hither does the soul that is in the plant depart ? Shall we say, to that from w hence it came ? For it is not distant by place from its source. It is, therefore, in its principle* But if you cut off or burn the root, where is the life which was in the root ? In soul, not proceeding to another place, but it may also be in the same place. It will, however, be in another place, if it should run back. But if not, it will be in another vegetable nature. For it is not contracted into a narrow space. But if it should run back, it will be in the power which is prior to it. Where, how¬ ever, is this powrer situated ? In the power prior to presiding dcemons attend us in their beneficent operations. For the rational part never becomes the soul of the irrational na¬ ture.” This doctrine, which originated from Syrianus and Proclus, was universally adopted by all the succeeding Platonists>p. 401 itself. And this again in another, as far as to in¬ tellect. But not in place. For no one o.f these was in place. And much less is intellect in place; so that neither is soul.

1 “ When human souls/' says Sallust, in his golden treatise On the Gods and the World, u transmigrate into irrational animals, they follow externally, in the same manner as our