Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

he form, and is always the subject of it. Farther still, if the intel¬ ligible world is there, but this our world is the imitation of that, and this is a composite, and con¬ sists of matter [and form,] it is necessary that there also there should be matter. Or how can you denominate it a world [or that which is adorned,] unless you look to form ? And how can you look to form, unless you assume that in which form sub¬ sists ? For the intelligible world, indeed, is perfectly every where impartible ; but in a certain respect is also partible. And if the parts of it are divulsed from each other, the section and divulsion are the passions of matter ; for it is matter which is di¬ vided. But if the many which are there, are Plot . Cp. 34 one 1 impartible being, the many subsisting in one, —if this be the case, they are in one matter, of which they are the forms. For this various one, is to be considered as having a multiform nature. It must, therefore, be considered as formless prior to its variety. Hence, if by intellect you take away its variety, its forms, its productive principles, and intellections, that which is prior to these is formless and indefinite, and this is no one of the things which subsist together with and in it.

V. If, however, it should be said, that because it always possesses these things, and both [the subject and the forms] are one, this subject is not matter, neither will the subject of bodies here be matter. For the matter of sensibles is never without form, but there is always the whole body. At the same time, however, this is a composite ; and intellect discovers its twofold nature. For it divides till it arrives at that which is simple, and which is no longer capable of being analyzed. But so far as it is able, it proceeds into the profundity of body.

* Instead of cl Se πολλά op , αμεριστον εστι^ in this place, it is necessary to read, cl he πολλά εν ον αμεριστον εστι.

The profundity, however, of each body is matter. Hence all matter is dark, because reason is lightf v and intellect is reason. Hence, too, intellect be¬ holding the nature of each [i. e. of intelligible and sensible matter,] conceives that which is beneath, as under light, to be dark ; just as the eye which is luciform, extending itself to the light, and to colours which are illuminations, says, that what is under colours, is dark and material, and concealed by the colours.

tter,] conceives that which is beneath, as under light, to be dark ; just as the eye which is luciform, extending itself to the light, and to colours which are illuminations, says, that what is under colours, is dark and material, and concealed by the colours. Nevertheless, that which is dark in intelligibles is different from that which is dark in sensibles ; and the matter of the one differs as much from the matter of the other, as the super¬ vening form of the one from that of the other. For divine matter receiving that which defines and bounds it, possesses a definite and intellectual life. But sensible matter becomes, indeed, a certain de¬ finite thing, yet neither vital nor intellectual, but an unadorned privation of life. The morph e ,* also, is an image, so that the subject likewise is an image.

In intelligibles, however, the morphe is truly form, so that the subject also is real. Hence, those who superficies.

* Morphe pertains to the colour* figure, and magnitude of

p. 36

say that matter is essence, if they assert this of in¬ telligible matter, speak rightly. For the subject there is essence, or rather, is the object of intellec¬ tual perception, together with that which it con¬ tains, and is wholly illuminated essence. To in¬ vestigate, however, whether intelligible matter is eternal, is similar to the inquiry whether ideas are eternal. For they are generated, indeed, so far as they have a principle of their subsistence ; but they are not generated, [according to the usual accepta¬ tion of the term] because they have not a temporal beginning, but always proceed from something else, not like the natures which are always rising into existence, or becoming to be, as is the case with the wOrld, but they always are , in the same man¬ ner as the WOrld which is there [has an eternal subsistence.] For the difference which is there always produces matter ; since this which is the first motion is the principle of matter. Hence, it is called difference, because motion and difference were unfolded into light together with it. But the motion and difference wrhich proceed from the first cause of all, are indefinite, and are in want of this cause in order that they may become terminated. They are, however, terminated, when they are con-

\p. 37 verted to it. But prior to this, matter and diffe¬ rence are indefinite, and are not yet good, but are without the light of the good .

in want of this cause in order that they may become terminated. They are, however, terminated, when they are con-

\p. 37 verted to it. But prior to this, matter and diffe¬ rence are indefinite, and are not yet good, but are without the light of the good . For if light is from the good , that which receives the light, prior to its reception of it, does not always possess it, but pos¬ sesses it, being different from it, since the light is from something else. And thus much concerning intelligible matter, which we have discussed per¬ haps more than is fit.

VI. Of the receptacle of bodies, however, we must speak as follows : That it is necessary then, there should be a certain subject to bodies, which is different from them, the mutation of the elements into each other manifests. For there is not a per¬ fect corruption of that which is changed ; since if there was, there would be a certain essence which would be dissolved into nonentity. Nor again, does that which is generated proceed into being from that which in every respect is not ; but there is a mutation from one form into another. That, however, remains, which receives the form of the thing generated, and casts aside another form. This, therefore, in short, corruption mani¬ fests ; for corruption is of that which is a compop. 38site. But if this be the case, eacii sensible thing consists of matter and form. This, too, induction testifies, demonstrating that the thing which is cor¬ rupted is a composite. Analysis, likewise, evinces the same thing; as if, for instance, a pot should be resolved into gold ; 1 but gold into water ; and the water being corrupted, will require an analogous process. It is necessary, also, that the elements should either be form, or the first matter, or that which consists of matter and form. But it is im¬ possible, indeed, that they should be form. For how, without matter, could they have bulk and magnitude? Nor are they the first matter; for they are corrupted. Hence, they consist of matter and form. And form, indeed, subsists according to quality and morphe ; but matter according to the subject, which is indefinite, because it is not form.

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* What Plotinus here says of the analysis into gold, is per¬ fectly conformable to the assertion of Albertus Magnus, as cited by Becher in his Physica Subterranea, p. 319. 4to. For his words are, “ Non dari rem elementatam, in cujus ultima substantiatione non reperiatur aurum.’’ That all metals, likewise, may be analyzed into water, is the doctrine both of Plato and Aristotle.