Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor
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however, is not the same with the thing caused. But the cause of all things is not any one of them. Hence neither must it be denominated that good which it imparts to others ; but it is after another manner the good , in a way transcending other goods.
VII. If, however, because it is none of these things, you become indefinite in your decision, in this case establish yourself in the abovementioned particulars, and from these [ascend to] and fix your¬ self in God. But for this purpose you must not extend the dianoetic power outwardly. For God is not in a certain place, so as to desert other things ; but wherever any thing is able to come into contact with him, there he is present. Hence, as in other things, it is not possible to perceive some¬ thing intellectually, while understanding and attend¬ ing to another thing, but it is necessary not to in¬ troduce any thing else to the object of intellectual vision, in order that the perceiver may be the thing itself which is perceived ; — thus also here, it is not possible for the soul to perceive God, whilep. 491 it retains the impression of something else, and energizes according to that impression. Nor again, is it possible for the soul w hile occupied and detained by other things to be impressed with the form of something contrary to them. But as it is said of matter, that it ought to be void of all quali¬ ties, in order that it may receive the impressions of all things ; thus also, and in a much greater degree, it is necessary that the soul should become form¬ less, in order that there may be no impediment to its being filled and illuminated by the first principle of things. If, however, this be the case, it is re¬ quisite that the soul, dismissing all externals, should be entirely converted to its inmost recesses, and should not be called to any thing external, but should be unintellective of all things ; and prior to this indeed, in inclination, but then also it should be without the perception of forms. It is likewise necessary that the soul, being ignorant of herself, should dwell on the contemplation of God, and associating, and as it were sufficiently conversing with him, should announce, if possible, the confer*? ence which it there held to another ; which Minos perhaps having accomplished, was on this account &aid to be the familiar of Jupiter. Calling to
p. 492
» * mind also this conference, he established laws which were the images of it, being filled through the contact with divinity with materials for the institution of law s.
accomplished, was on this account &aid to be the familiar of Jupiter. Calling to
p. 492
» * mind also this conference, he established laws which were the images of it, being filled through the contact with divinity with materials for the institution of law s. Or may we not say that the soul, if she washes to abide on high, will consider political concerns as unworthy to be the subject of conference with deity ? For this indeed will be the language of him who has seen much of divinity. For, as it is said , God is not external to any one , but is present with all things , though they are ignorant that he is so. For they fly from him, or rather from themselves. They are unable, there¬ fore, to apprehend that from wdfich they fly. And having destroyed themselves, they are incapable of seeking after another. For neither will a child, when through insanity he becomes out of himself, recognize his father. But he who knows himself, w ill also know from whence he was derived*
VXIL If, therefore, a certain soul has known itself at another time, it wdll also know that its motion is not rectilinear, but that its natural motion is as it w?ere in a circle about a certain thing, not externally, but about a centre. The centre, how¬ ever, is that from which the circle proceeds ; andp. 493 therefore such a soul will be moved about the source of its existence. It will also be suspended from this, eagerly urging itself towards that to which all soujs ought to hasten. But the souls of the Gods always tend thither ; and by tending to this they are Gods. For whatever is conjoined to this is a God. But that which is very distant from it, is a multitudinous man and a brute. Is, there¬ fore, that in the soul wdiich is as it were a centre, the object of investigation ? Or is it necessary to think that it is something else, in which as it were all centres concur ? This centre, however, and this circle are assumed by us according to analogy, For the soul is not a circle in the same way as a figure ; hut because an ancient nature is in it and about it. And because the soul is suspended from a thing of this kind, and in a still greater degree when it is wholly separated from the body. Now, however, since a part of us is detained by the body ; just as if some one should have his feet in the water, hut with the rest of his body should be above it ;■ — thus also being elevated by that part which is not merged in body, we are conjoined to that which is as it wjere the centre of all things ; after the same manner as we fix the centres of n the water, hut with the rest of his body should be above it ;■ — thus also being elevated by that part which is not merged in body, we are conjoined to that which is as it wjere the centre of all things ; after the same manner as we fix the centres of thep. 494 greatest circles in the centre of the sphere by which they are comprehended. If, therefore, the circles were corporeal and not psychical, they would be conjoined to the centre locally, and the centre being situated in a certain place, the circles would revolve about it. Since, however, these souls are themselves intelligible, and this centre is above in¬ tellect, it must be admitted that this contact is effected by other powers than those by which an intellective nature is adapted to be conjoined to the object of intellectual perception. The contact, also, is greater than that by which intellect is pre¬ sent [with the intelligible] through similitude and sameness, and is conjoined with a kindred nature, nothing intervening to separate the conjunction. For bodies, indeed, are prevented from being united to each other ; but incorporeal natures are not separated from each other by bodies. Hence, one is not distant from the other by place, but by other¬ ness and difference. When, therefore, difference is not present, then the natures which are not dif¬ ferent are present with each other. The principle of all things, therefore, not having any difference, is always present ; but we are present with it when we have no difference. And it indeed does not
4 95 aspire after us, in order that it may be conversant with us ; but we aspire after it, in order that we may revolve about it. We indeed perpetually re¬ volve about it, but we do not always behold it0 As a band of singers, however, though it moves about the coryphaeus, may be diverted to the sur¬ vey of something foreign to the choir, [and thus become discordant], but when it converts itself to him, sings well, and truly subsists about him ; — thus also we perpetually revolve about the prin¬ ciple of all things, even when we are perfectly loosened from it, and have no longer a knowledge of it. Nor do we always look to it ; but when we behold it, then we obtain the end of our wishes, and rest [from our search after felicity]. Then also we are no longer discordant, but form a truly divine dance about it.
IX. In this dance, however, the soul beholds the fountain of life, the fountain of intellect, the principle of being, the cause of good, and the root of soul.